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Overview
Macro-finance is the subfield of economics at the border between macroeconomics and finance.
Finance must have macroeconomic underpinnings. The basic prediction of asset pricing theory
is that asset prices equal expected discounted cashflows (Harrison and Kreps, 1979; Hansen and
Richard, 1987). The discounting is done by means of a stochastic discount factor which, by
DSGE reasoning, equals the growth rate in the marginal utility of wealth and is a function of
macroeconomic fundamentals (Merton, 1973). The mimicking portfolio theorem shows how some
linear combination of asset returns—a portfolio formed by projecting the discount factor on the
payoff space—has the same pricing implications as the stochastic discount factor. However, a
structural link to macroeconomic fundamentals remains ultimately necessary to motivate any asset
pricing model and to limit the in-sample fishing of spurious pricing factors (Fama, 1991; Cochrane,
2005, 2008b). In fact, the sample mean-variance efficient portfolio always prices all asset returns
perfectly in the sample and is typically not robust across samples (a warning that goes back at least
to Roll, 1977). It follows that the only testable content of any asset pricing model comes from the
discipline imposed by economic theory in motivating the discount factor as a particular function of
the observables, so as to avoid coming up with some ad hoc pricing factor that really is just the
sample mean-variance efficient portfolio.
Monetary macroeconomics, in turn, cannot abstract from its asset pricing implications. The
asset pricing implications of a model—or, more specifically, its implications for the marginal utility
of wealth—are crucial for welfare analysis and to understand the transmission mechanism from
monetary policy to the real economy. First, the transmission mechanism is mediated by financial
markets. In most monetary macromodels (e.g., Woodford, 2003; Galı´, 2008) a single return, the
real risk-free rate, mediates all decisions to save and invest, while risk premia are modeled as
second-order terms. Yet, the business cycle seems to correlate much more with changes in risk
premia than with changes in short-run interest rates (e.g., Cochrane, 2011). At the same time
there is evidence that a policy shock has a first-order effect on risk premia (Rigobon and Sack,
2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005), hence either on the price or on the quantity of systematic risk.
A proper account of the policy transmission mechanism seems to require an explanation of the
documented asset market’s reaction to monetary policy, which requires the incorporation of risk
premia variation into monetary macromodels.
Second, asset prices reveal information about the underlying states that drive the economy and
about consumer preferences and/or firm behavior that can be used to test competing macromodels,
on the one hand, and that have potentially important welfare implications, on the other. For example,
a structural model able to account for observed equity and bond market data, say by modeling a
high risk sensitivity of households, opens up the possibility that people value more a stable cashflow
path than stable inflation.
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Against this background, there is a major challenge that may question the usefulness of a
macro-finance approach. Tallarini (2000) points out a potential dichotomy between quantity and
price dynamics. He embeds Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences within an otherwise standard
RBC model. He then calibrates the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to have a standard
dynamic IS equation and shows how the quantity dynamics are nearly independent of the choice
of the risk aversion parameter. The degree of freedom in the risk aversion coefficient then allows
him to replicate the empirically high unconditional equity premium. People now fear much more
the shocks that hit the economy but there is little they can do to avoid them; thus, the quantity
predictions stay the same. If Tallarini’s model correctly describes reality, then any macromodel
designed to study quantity dynamics may disregard its asset pricing implications without harm.
However, there is an important reason why Tallarini’s dichotomy does not condemn the macro-
finance approach. Tallarini works in a RBC model in which monetary policy has no real effects.
Outside monetary neutrality different policy rules can make a large difference in terms of welfare,
as people are now highly sensitive to fluctuations.1 Tallarini’s work provides an important lesson
nonetheless; as we adjust preferences to match more asset pricing facts, the equations driving
quantities—including the dynamic IS equation—should likely remain unchanged in order to avoid
counterfactual quantity dynamics and a risk-free rate puzzle (this is also among the main points
of Campbell and Cochrane, 1999—see also Lettau and Uhlig, 2000 for a discussion). Thus, from
a macroeconomic perspective, nearly all structural consequences of the macro-finance exercise
should be on welfare and on our understanding of the transmission mechanism.
The important welfare implications of a macromodel that incorporates the properties of risk
premia we see in the data is perhaps most easily seen in the model’s predictions for the welfare cost
of cashflow uncertainty. Lucas (1987) famously calculates a trivial cost of consumption fluctuations.
However, within the representative-consumer power-utility model used by Lucas, the gains from
stabilizing fluctuations are small for the same reason that the model predicts a small equity premium.
Consumption is a fairly smooth time series, so that a model with a low and constant risk aversion
can only predict that the representative consumer does not fear the typical empirical fluctuations
much. This prediction is precisely why the model is controversial, for reasons that go back to
Shiller (1981), Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Mehra and Prescott (1985). In this regard, the
famous asset pricing puzzles forcefully suggest a departure from power utility (see, for example,
Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Tallarini, 2000; Alvarez and Jermann, 2004; Bansal and Yaron,
2004; Hansen and Sargent, 2005; Barillas et al., 2009; Croce et al., 2012; Gabaix, 2012; Wachter,
2013).
I show in part 1 how the welfare cost of uncertainty is closely related to the risk premium on
equity. Namely, I link the notion of cost of uncertainty to a rich set of recent financial market
evidence—in particular, the term structure of equity (Binsbergen et al., 2012, 2013). The negative
slope of the estimated term structure cannot be captured by today’s leading consumption-based
1Tallarini’s result is robust to moving from the highly risk-sensitive Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences to a power-utility
model in which one introduces some fear of model misspecification, for example as formalized in the ambiguity
averse multiplier preferences of Barillas et al. (2009). Note however that there are important ingredients missing in
Tallarini’s model, who is in particular unable to replicate the time-variation of asset prices. For example, Tallarini’s
model predicts counterfactually constant stock prices (Q) because he works without frictions to capital accumulation
such as adjustment costs.
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asset pricing models (Binsbergen et al., 2012; Ludvigson, 2013) and therefore represents a puzzling
piece of evidence with seemingly crucial welfare consequences. The finding of large and volatile
costs imposed by an increase in short-run uncertainty inscribes into a burgeoning literature that
finds high and time-varying short-maturity risk premia as a pervasive phenomenon across different
asset classes (Duffee, 2010; Binsbergen et al., 2012, 2013; Aı¨t-Sahalia et al., 2012; Palhares,
2012).2 The paper also contributes to the large literature that exploits asset market data to reveal
information about the marginal utility of wealth (main examples of work in this agenda are Hansen
and Jagannathan, 1991; Alvarez and Jermann, 2004, 2005; Hansen and Scheinkman, 2009; Backus
et al., 2013).3
Once we depart from Tallarini’s dichotomy, the asset pricing implications of a monetary model
can even allow, if one accepts to take them seriously, for using a rich body of financial market data
to test competing macromodels. For example, central ingredients of modern monetary models such
as sticky prices may have peculiar predictions for asset prices (some examples are Gallmeyer et al.,
2007; Bekaert et al., 2010; Berg, 2010; Palomino, 2012; Gorodnichenko and Weber, 2013). In part 2
I exploit this idea to test a New Keynesian Q theory of investment. The central ingredient of New
Keynesian models (sticky prices and monopolistic competition) is able to break the equivalence
between the average and marginal Q—which Hayashi (1982) showed to be very robust in a
frictionless setting—and thereby to provide a rational explanation for a comovement between
stock prices and expected inflation. I thus provide a test of the New Keynesian model versus the
frictionless alternative based on asset market data.
Financial economics: stylized facts and theory
Why do asset prices vary? How do fundamentals move asset prices? What are those fundamen-
tals? These are the crucial questions of asset pricing (e.g., Cochrane, 2005). A full-fledged model
able to answer them would ideally work in general equilibrium, model both the consumption and
the production sides of the economy, and reduce all motion to variation in some credibly exogenous
states. This is the goal but we are not there yet: both small-scale (Jermann, 1998; Boldrin et al.,
2001) and medium-scale (Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007) state-of-the-art general
equilibrium models are not yet able to explain the variation of asset prices, neither through time nor
across securities. For the time being, it may be useful to study consumption- and production-side
implications separately, to better understand where refinements are necessary.
On the production side, the benchmark story is the Q theory of investment. By making the
capital stock costly to adjust, the Q theory predicts that investments are high when market-book
ratios are high (Hayashi, 1982). The Q theory performs surprisingly well at tracking investments in
the last 20 years or so (Cochrane, 2011) but does not over, say, a 60-year sample. Simple versions
of the Q theory find more empirical support along other dimensions (e.g., Cochrane, 1991, 1996;
2A related strand of literature extracts measures of equity duration of individual stocks and finds that short-duration
stocks associate with higher average returns than long-duration stocks (Dechow et al., 2004; Da, 2009; Weber, 2012).
Under the assumption that value stocks have shorter duration than growth stocks, part of the literature then uses the
evidence to explain the value premium (see also Santons and Veronesi, 2010; Lettau and Wachter, 2007, 2011) and
even a partially downward-sloping term structure of equity (Ai et al., 2012).
3See Hansen (2013) for a review of this literature.
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Lamont, 2000; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2002; Kogan, 2004; Zhang, 2005; Liu et al., 2009), while a
recent literature is refining the micro-foundations underlying firms’ behavior and thereby the asset
pricing implications of the production side (e.g., Belo, 2010; Jermann, 2010, 2013).
On the consumption side, the benchmark story is the power-utility model (Grossman and Shiller,
1981; Hansen and Singleton, 1983), which predicts that the price of a financial asset is low if its
payoff covaries positively with consumption (Lucas, 1978). This prediction is correct qualitatively
but is a disaster quantitatively: the model suffers from the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and
Prescott, 1985), the risk-free rate puzzle (Weil, 1989) and the equity volatility puzzle (Shiller, 1981).
The reason is that the quantity of risk, say in an equity index, is measured by the covariance of its
return with consumption, which is empirically low and stable, and the price of risk is measured
in the power-utility model by the constant risk aversion of the average consumer. A high relative
risk aversion could make sense of the high and volatile empirical equity risk premium but only a
low relative risk aversion (which in this model equals the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution) could make sense of the low and stable risk-free rate. The power-utility model has
therefore two mutually inconsistent needs.
The equity volatility puzzle stems from a body of empirical evidence about return forecastability,
i.e., the observation that expected (excess) returns are predictable and volatile (e.g., Shiller, 1981;
Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Fama and French, 1988; Campbell, 1991; Cochrane, 1992, 2008a;
Lettau and Nieuwerburgh, 2008; Bollerslev et al., 2009; Binsbergen and Koijen, 2010; Bakshi
et al., 2011; Golez, 2013).4 The evidence in favor of time-varying risk premia seems a robust
and pervasive phenomenon across several asset classes, in spite of the documented issues in
the typical predictive regressions, such as parameter instability, poor out-of-sample forecasting
power (Goyal and Welch, 2008) or statistical bias in finite samples (Stambaugh, 1999). Several
variables appear to forecast returns but their statistical significance must be motivated theoretically
to avoid the in-sample fishing of return predictors. The dividend-price ratio (and other stationary
transformations of stock prices, such as the market-book ratio), the consumption-wealth ratio and
the investment-capital ratio all appear to have return-forecasting abilities and have a special status
as predictors, because they are robustly related to returns by an identity. The Campbell and Shiller
(1988) identity tightly links the dividend-price ratio to market returns; the consumption-wealth ratio
also is in an identity relation with returns on the wealth portfolio (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001a);
and the investment-capital ratio should be in an equilibrium relation with market-book ratios—by
the basic Q story—so that it too should be related to market returns by the Campbell-Shiller identity
(Cochrane, 1991). The return-forecasting regressions besides show that predictors comove and
are highly correlated with the business cycle (Fama and French, 1989; Lettau and Ludvigson,
2010; Cochrane, 2011). In particular, when the state of the economy is bad, the average investor
commands a higher expected return to get exposed to systematic risk.5
Asset pricing theory can rationalize the stylized asset pricing facts—which include the size,
time-variation and term structure properties of stock and bond risk premia—either by changing
4See Cochrane (2011) and Koijen and Nieuwerburgh (2011) for a survey of the evidence.
5A richer set of evidence that modern asset pricing models are only recently trying to match is the one coming from
equity term structure data (Binsbergen et al., 2012, 2013). At the state of the art no structural model seems able to
explain the observed downward-sloping term structure of equity and an upward-sloping term structure of interest rates.
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the price of risk (e.g., through additional factors affecting preferences) or the quantity of risk
(e.g., through richer dynamics in consumption). Among the most common ingredients to model
risk-premia variation are financial frictions introduced by the behavior of intermediaries and new
preferences that introduce some time or state non-separability that affects the risk-bearing ability of
investors (see Cochrane, 2011, for a survey). Examples of these preference specifications include
the habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the long-run risk model of Bansal
and Yaron (2004), the long-run risk model under limited information of Croce et al. (2012), the
non-expected utility models of Tallarini (2000) and Barillas et al. (2009), and the rare disasters
models of Gabaix (2012) and Wachter (2013).
For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) are able to replicate, at least partially, the stylized
asset pricing facts by introducing a slow-moving habit in the utility function. The quantitative
implications of the model are much better than the power-utility alternative. Risk aversion no
longer equals the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; there no longer is a tradeoff between
solving the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles. Moreover, the price of risk becomes
time-varying, which helps accounting for the return-forecasting evidence about the cyclicality of
risk premia. Formally, Campbell and Cochrane reverse-engineer a stochastic discount factor whose
time-varying slope (the price of risk) and intercept have just enough degrees of freedom as to make
by construction the model immune to the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles; and to
have the dividend-price ratio reveal—up to first order—the unique state of the system, thus solving
in part the equity volatility puzzle.6
Another example is provided by the long-run risk literature opened by Bansal and Yaron (2004).
They build on Epstein-Zin-Weil utility, which are preferences able to break down the equality
between the risk aversion parameter and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
that holds in the power-utility model. Since two distinct parameters control the two quantities, the
model is then able to avoid the tension between a large and volatile equity premium and a low
and stable risk-free rate and thereby generate realistic risk premia by assuming rich dynamics in
consumption.
Monetary economics: stylized facts and theory
What should be the goals of monetary policy? How should the central bank use its policy tools
to react to systematic and unpredictable movements in the economy? What is the transmission
mechanism from policy tools to macroeconomic variables? These are the fundamental questions of
monetary policy (e.g., Galı´, 2008). I focus here on a particular family of monetary macromodels—
the New Keynesian framework—which is suitable to answer these questions.
The New Keynesian framework arises in the 1980s as a family of microfounded monetary
macromodels describing a non-trivial relation between monetary policy and the business cycle
6A stochastic discount factor conditionally linear in consumption growth (such as Campbell and Cochrane’s) seems
also able to price the cross-section of returns remarkably well and thereby to make progress relative to one last empirical
failure of the benchmark consumption-based model which, in its CCAPM form, is unable to line up its predicted
average cross-sectional returns to the empirical mean returns. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) show how a particular
specification of a discount factor with Campbell and Cochrane’s shape can replicate (quasi-)structurally the positive
results of the nonstructural 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993, 1996) on their 25 portfolios.
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and capable of giving goals and tools for the conduct of monetary policy (Mankiw and Romer,
1991; Yun, 1996; King and Wolman, 1996; Goodfriend and King, 1997; Clarida et al., 1999).
The microfoundations of the New Keynesian model make it immune to Lucas (1976) critique;
predictable actions by the government generally affect the reduced form of modeled variables, so
that a structural model is necessary when studying systematic monetary policy. The New Keynesian
framework offers a structural model capable of studying the implementation of monetary policy
through systematic policy rules such as targeting and interest-rate rules as well as to characterize
the best monetary policy in an environment where people take their decisions also depending on
their expectations about the way the central bank will act (Prescott, 1977; Kydland and Prescott,
1977, 1980). Moreover, the basic New Keynesian model offers a structure that has proved suitable
to accommodate more complex frictions, such as labor market frictions (e.g., Erceg et al., 2000;
Blanchard and Galı´, 2010) or financial frictions (e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999; Cu´rdia and Woodford,
2009; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011; Gertler and Karadi, 2011).7
The introduction of a parsimonious friction—monopolistic competition and Calvo (1983) price
stickiness in the market for goods—on top of an otherwise efficient RBC model economy (Kydland
and Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983) breaks the neutrality of money that prevents monetary
policy from having real effects in the baseline RBC structure (Lucas, 1972). The assumption of
sticky prices is key to make the nominal dimension more than just a veil; since goods prices do not
all move at the same time, whenever the state of the economy gives incentives to firms to change
prices, there will be an inefficient movement in relative prices that in turn associates to an inefficient
general equilibrium. The nonneutrality of monetary policy is then crucial because it implies that
the policy rule adopted by the central bank makes a difference for overall welfare. The central bank
should therefore design a policy rule in line with its goals and with its understanding of the way
our decentralized market economies work. Formally, the goal monetary policy should achieve is
the constrained maximization of overall welfare, a concept that arises naturally in a microfounded
macromodel as the utility of the representative consumer (Lucas, 1987; Rotemberg and Woodford,
1997). Then, welfare maximization typically means that the central bank should stabilize inflation,
real activity and the financial variables near their first-best levels. However, the precise definition of
the policy goals, just as the way the central bank should achieve them with its policy tools, depends
a lot on the structure of the model economy.
The basic New Keynesian model consists of three theoretical pillars (Galı´, 2008). First, a New
Keynesian Phillips curve describes the optimal price-setting decision of firms. The central New
Keynesian friction is that only a fraction of firms is allowed to choose prices at each time period.
Therefore, firms would set their prices by considering future economic developments; this behavior
results, up to first order, in the forward-looking optimality condition linking inflation, pi, and the
aggregate markup, µ,
pit = −λ Et
∞∑
j=0
β j(µt+ j − µ)
7Galı´ (2008) and Galı´ (2011) survey many of the recent extensions. The examples that possibly epitomize the
gain in complexity of New Keynesian models are the medium-scale models of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2007).
12
Inflation is high when firms expect long-run markups below the flexible-price level. In that case
resetting firms choose a price above the average price level to realign their markup to the desired
level. Deviations of aggregate markups from the desired level, µ, then associate to a gap in aggregate
activity relative to the flexible-price equilibrium.
Second, an Euler equation describes the dynamic relation between consumption and saving—
which is an asset pricing equation that holds unchanged in the baseline frictionless model—and
controls the policy transmission mechanism. In a power-utility world characterized by certainty
equivalence, the stochastic discount rate equals the risk-free rate and the dynamic IS equation is
driven only by an intertemporal substitution motive as
it − Etpit+1 − ρ = γEt∆ct+1
where ∆c is consumption growth, ρ is a subjective time-discount factor, and 1/γ is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. A positive shock to the real rate—either following a policy shock or
expected deflation—increases the incentives to save and thereby displaces some consumption
forward in time. In a frictionless setting, all firms can adjust nominal prices to leave real output
choices, and thereby overall welfare, unchanged. In a world with nominal rigidities, only some
firms can reset prices; the remaining firms choose to inefficiently adjust quantities to meet the new
consumption profiles. These effects on prices and/or real consumption restore the no-arbitrage
condition by increasing ex-ante inflation and/or discount rates. This impact on the economy is
dampened by a Taylor rule that responds positively to expected inflation or current consumption
because people would expect some automatic decrease in the nominal rate to restore the no-arbitrage
condition; the required adjustments in current consumption and prices would then be smaller. The
costly distortions caused by price rigidities are therefore reduced.8 This property justifies inflation
targeting as the optimal monetary policy.
Third, a policy rule describes the monetary policy and formalizes the presence of a predictable
and of an unpredictable policy component. The policy tool that is simplest to consider in the New
Keynesian framework is some reference interest rate. Through an interest-rate rule—for example of
the Taylor type—you can devise an endless number of systematic policy reactions to developments
in the economy. The dynamic IS equation then transmits changes in the interest rate to the real
economy, thus affecting consumers’ and firms’ decisions.
These three theoretical pillars have reasonable empirical success. From a full-information
perspective, the New Keynesian model beats the benchmark RBC model in the qualitative replication
of the empirical impulse responses to monetary and technology shocks (Christiano et al., 1999, 2005;
Galı´, 1999; Galı´ and Rabanal, 2005). However, these impulse responses are extracted with structural
vector autoregressions (SVAR), a technique that remains controversial (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al.,
2007).
From a limited-information perspective, the New Keynesian Phillips curve has empirical support
(Galı´ and Gertler, 1999; Galı´ et al., 2005), although there is still debate about specification and
8Note that, on the one hand, inflation volatility is equivalent, up to first order, to a cross-sectional dispersion in
prices, which in turn associates to a cross-sectional dispersion in output and causes welfare losses because it associates
to inefficient employment; on the other hand, people dislike output-gap volatility because they are risk averse.
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weak-identification issues (Mavroeidis, 2005; Nason and Smith, 2008; Canova and Sala, 2009). In
part 2 I present a new limited-information test of the New Keynesian story versus the frictionless
alternative based on return forecastability—and therefore on reduced-form evidence.
Roadmap
My broad research agenda is that asset pricing models have implications for monetary models,
and vice versa.
Part 1 is an example of the implications of finance for macroeconomics, both in terms of
providing a measure of people’s current preferences between growth, short-run and long-run
stability and in terms of pointing out how a macromodel that fails to explain these asset market
features is likely to miss crucial welfare implications.
Part 2 is an example of macro-financial linkages running in both directions. On the one hand,
the same monetary nonneutralities that are routinely used in monetary models are able to explain
the observed comovement between inflation and dividend yields; on the other, stock market data
help estimating important structural parameters and testing some implications of nominal rigidities.
Part 3 studies an example in which the explicit integration of some time-variation in stock prices
can have non-trivial normative implications.
Part 1. The term structure of the welfare cost of uncertainty
I study the macroeconomic priorities as revealed by the notion of cost of consumption fluc-
tuations. I show how the marginal cost of fluctuations has a term structure that is a simple
transformation of the term structures of equity and interest rates (e.g., studied by Lettau and
Wachter, 2007, 2011; Binsbergen et al., 2012, 2013). I am therefore able to use current finance
models and recent index option market evidence about the term structures (Binsbergen et al., 2012;
Boguth et al., 2012) to infer a downward-sloping and volatile term structure of welfare costs.
On average, cashflow stability is a macroeconomic priority and short-run stability is a greater
priority than long-run stability. I estimate that at the margin the elimination of one-year ahead
cashflow volatility is worth around twelve percentage points of additional growth. This number
compares to a marginal cost of all consumption fluctuations of about two percentage points.
Over time, the term structure of welfare costs, hence the priority between growth, short-run and
long-run stability, varies substantially. The macroeconomic priorities vary across the business cycle.
Against this background, I show how a policy-maker can assess the current position and evolution
of the term structure of welfare costs and forecast its movements by looking at innovations in the
information set made by excess return predictors.
Finally, the link between welfare costs and risk premia can make the case for risk premia
targeting as a welfare-enhancing policy regime.
Part 2. A New Keynesian Q theory of investment and the link between inflation and the stock market
I study a New Keynesian version of the Q theory, which is non-standard if prices are sticky. The
benchmark real business cycle (RBC) Q theory of investment links investment with stock prices. In
this study, I demonstrate how a New Keynesian Q (NKQ) theory links investment, stock prices, and
inflation, providing a rational explanation for a comovement between expected inflation and stock
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prices. This result is an example of how some features typical of monetary models (in this case,
sticky prices) have implications for finance. The NKQ theory offers a parsimonious story to make
sense of the correlation between stock prices and inflation as a rational outcome which, within a
frictionless setting, appears to have to be explained outside the rational expectations framework.
Like the standard Q theory, the NKQ equation contains a specification error that complicates
estimation. Because the specification error can have any shape and property, I must restrict its
distribution for the theory to be rejectable. Namely, I choose to reject the NKQ theory if the
market-book ratio predicted by the theory does not have the same return-forecasting ability as
the observed market-book ratio; the NKQ theory might be inaccurate along several dimensions
but, at least, predicted and observed market-book ratios should reveal the same sources of priced
movement in the economy, which is what really matters from an asset pricing perspective.
This strategy allows me to overidentify the two free parameters. With this overidentification,
I am able to both estimate and test the NKQ theory. This test is a good test for the NKQ theory,
because nothing implies that there is a linear combination of inflation and the investment-capital
ratio that displays a return-forecasting power similar to that of the market-book ratio. The replication
of the return-forecasting ability of the market-book ratio is not perfect but the simple NKQ theory
already succeeds along several dimensions. The benchmark frictionless alternative has instead a
more difficult time accounting for the return-forecasting ability of the market-book ratio, because
the investment-capital ratio alone cannot forecast long-run returns over the whole sample; the NKQ
theory captures a long-run component of the market-book ratio that is missing in the benchmark Q
theory.
Finally, the fit of the NKQ theory is a dramatic improvement over the benchmark.
Part 3. Reassessing the role of stock prices in the conduct of monetary policy
I reassess the role of stock prices in the conduct of monetary policy. I build a New Keynesian
model with capital adjustment costs and exogenous sources of policy tradeoffs in which central
banks should not respond to stock price movements. Even though the policy exercise is not trivial
(financial stability affects consumer welfare in the model in addition to price and production
stability), in the model a policy that focuses on stabilizing inflation is close to optimal. I show this
fact under exogenous cost-push disturbances and financial frictions to discuss the robustness of the
result to different sources of policy tradeoffs.
I then solve numerically for the optimal Taylor-type rule that responds to stock prices by
using the typical approach adopted by the extant literature, which consists in fixing the response
coefficient to inflation to subsequently search numerically for desirable policy reactions to stock
prices and output. The numerical approach can easily prescribe all possible qualitative reactions to
stock prices; the model highlights some pitfalls in a numerical study of stock prices and monetary
policy that can explain and reconcile the conflicting policy prescriptions found in the literature. For
fixed values of the Taylor rule coefficient attached to inflation, the optimal coefficients attached
to stock prices and output are non-monotonic and nonlinear in the deep-parameter space, which
can explain the qualitative variation in the prescription found in the literature. However, the only
prescription that survives after a closer look is a strong commitment to stabilizing inflation with no
response to stock price movements, as the other prescriptions are just roundabout ways of increasing
the anti-inflationary stance.
15

Part 1
The Term Structure of the
Welfare Cost of Uncertainty
Abstract. The marginal cost of aggregate fluctuations has a term structure that is a simple transformation
of the term structures of equity and interest rates. I extract evidence from index option markets to infer a
downward-sloping, volatile and pro-cyclical term structure of welfare costs. On average, cashflow stability is
a macroeconomic priority and short-run stability is a greater priority than long-run stability. I estimate that at
the margin the elimination of one-year ahead cashflow volatility is worth around twelve percentage points
of additional growth. This number compares to a marginal cost of all consumption fluctuations of about
two percentage points. Over time, the term structure of welfare costs varies substantially, pro-cyclically and
with a volatility that decreases with maturity. Return predictors reveal the states that drive the term structure
of welfare costs and thereby signal its current position and future developments. Finally, the link between
welfare costs and risk premia can make the case for risk premia targeting as a welfare-enhancing policy
regime.
1.1. Introduction
How much growth are people willing to trade against a marginal stabilization of macroeconomic
fluctuations? The marginal welfare cost of aggregate uncertainty (Alvarez and Jermann, 2004)
answers this important question in economics, which goes back at least to Lucas (1987). I
decompose the marginal cost of uncertainty into a term structure. This decomposition allows for
studying how cashflow fluctuations at different horizons contribute to the total cost of uncertainty
(proposition 1). The term structure of welfare costs allows for understanding the tradeoff between
growth and macroeconomic stability as well as the tradeoff between cashflow stability at different
periodicities (for example, between short-run and long-run stability).
Reviving the insight that asset market data reveal the marginal cost of fluctuations (Alvarez and
Jermann, 2004), I then show how the components of the term structure of welfare costs are tightly
linked to the risk premia on market dividend strips (proposition 2); the term structure of welfare
costs is a simple transformation of the term structures of equity and interest rates (e.g., studied in
Lettau and Wachter, 2007, 2011; Binsbergen et al., 2012, 2013). This link allows for a measure
of the cost of fluctuations that is directly observable over the last two decades. Like Alvarez and
Jermann (2004), my approach requires only the absence of arbitrage opportunities and does not
require a parametric specification of consumer preferences.
In the empirical section, I extract evidence about the term structure of equity from index option
markets to infer the cost of uncertainty as a function of its time horizon. I find costs that are large,
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volatile, pro-cyclical and have non-trivial term structure features. The point estimates, reported in
figure 1.1a, suggest a negatively sloped term structure of welfare costs; people command a larger
premium to shoulder short-term cashflow uncertainty than to shoulder longer-term uncertainty. The
premium at one-year frequency is 12-13 percent on average and its volatility has at least the same
size. Since both are measures of the premium people command to shoulder aggregate risk, it is
natural to compare this number with the equity premium, which averages 6-9 percent over the last
two decades and also displays significant time-variation.
The evidence of a downward-sloping term structure of welfare costs helps identifying a model
to capture and quantify the entire term structure. I study the implications of today’s leading
consumption-based asset pricing models for the three term structures.9 I consider the habit formation
model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004), the
long-run risk model under limited information of Croce et al. (2012), the ambiguity averse multiplier
preferences of Barillas et al. (2009), and the rare disasters model of Gabaix (2012). Although
these models do not study the term structure of welfare costs directly, they have implications for
it and are calibrated to match several other asset pricing facts. Unfortunately, from a structural
perspective, replicating a downward-sloping term structure of equity and an upward-sloping term
structure of interest rates is problematic (Lettau and Wachter, 2007; Binsbergen et al., 2012; Croce
et al., 2012, make this point). I therefore have to discard a structural explanation and turn to a quasi-
structural model. In this regard, Lettau and Wachter (2011) offer a parsimonious model designed to
capture precisely a downward-sloping term structure of equity, an upward-sloping term structure of
interest rates, and time-varying risk premia. The quantitative implications of the model, reported
in figure 1.1b, are a marginal cost of lifetime fluctuations of about 3 percent—which compares
with an equity premium of about 7 percent. Over a horizon of up to ten years, a marginal increase
in uncertainty costs more than 10 percentage points of annual growth per unit of uncertainty, as
measured by the conditional standard deviation of cashflows over the relevant horizon. These
numbers compare with much smaller marginal benefits of long-run stabilization.
Thus, on average, cashflow stability is a macroeconomic priority, especially in the short run.
Over time, the tradeoff among short-run, long-run stability and growth revealed by the term structure
of welfare costs varies substantially because excess returns are predictable. Consequently, return
predictors reveal the state that drives the time-variation in the term structure of welfare costs and
thereby signal the current and future macroeconomic priorities. For example, in the model of Lettau
and Wachter (2011), the cost of fluctuations at different periodicities is driven by one state, the price
of risk, which is perfectly revealed by equity and bond yields. In the model, positive discount-rate
news signal an increase in the cost of short-run fluctuations that slowly decays across maturities
and over time.
Finally, from a welfare perspective, the link between risk premia and the cost of fluctuations
could make the case for a risk premia targeting regime as a welfare-enhancing policy. I discuss in
what sense a policy-maker could use the cost of fluctuations at different time horizons as a welfare
criterion. A regime that targets the level of the term structure components, which I refer to as risk
premia targeting, is unambiguously desirable provided it is neutral on the mean growth rate of
9See Cochrane (2011), Koijen and Nieuwerburgh (2011) and Ludvigson (2013) for a survey of the main asset
pricing facts and of the progress state-of-the-art asset pricing models have made in explaining them.
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cashflows and on the level of any additional factors that affect utility (proposition 3).
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Figure 1.1: Term structures of equity (‘◦’ and dashed line), interest rates (‘×’ and dotted line) and welfare costs (‘+’
and solid line); annualized premia.
1.1.1. Marginal costs of uncertainty in the time domain
In his seminal work, Lucas (1987) uses a log utility representative consumer model and defines
cashflow uncertainty as the deviations of consumption from a deterministic growth trend. He
then calculates a cost of fluctuations of .01-.05% of aggregate consumption—a small amount
that would make policies pursuing macroeconomic stability a low priority. However, within the
representative-consumer power utility model, the gains from stabilizing fluctuations are small for
the same reason that the model predicts a small equity premium (which is just the equity premium
puzzle of Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Accordingly, a large literature studies the cost of fluctuations
under different preferences or under consumer heterogeneity and possibly uninsurable idiosyncratic
risk and finds highly dispersed model-based estimates, from virtually zero to more than 20 percent
(for example, Atkeson and Phelan, 1994; Krusell and Smith, 1999; Tallarini, 2000; De Santis, 2007;
Barillas et al., 2009; Croce, 2012; Ellison and Sargent, 2012).
In this context, Alvarez and Jermann (2004) represent a breakthrough, as they manage to move
the game to a preference-free environment by showing how we can directly use asset market data
to measure the cost of fluctuations at the margin. Alvarez and Jermann provide two main lessons
about the estimate of the cost of fluctuations. A model that is consistent with the observed equity
premium and takes the deterministic trend in consumption as the stable stream increases Lucas’s
estimates by two orders of magnitude. If you consider instead as the stable stream some stochastic
trend in consumption the estimates can be much closer to Lucas’s. They conclude that what people
really dislike is the low-frequency volatility in consumption.
My approach builds on and complements the analysis of Alvarez and Jermann (2004). First, by
focusing on marginal welfare costs, I stick to their preference-free setting while linking the cost of
fluctuations to a richer set of financial market evidence.
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Second, the term structure of the cost of uncertainty answers roughly to the question ‘How
much compensation do people command to bear n-year ahead cashflow uncertainty?’ This question
compares to ‘How much compensation do people command to bear uncertainty at business-cycle
frequency in the entire cashflow process?’, which is the one studied by Alvarez and Jermann.
Their answer depends a lot on the parametric assumptions about the filter that separates the trend
and the business-cycle frequencies of the cashflow process. The question I am interested in is
nonparametric and complements the exercise of Alvarez and Jermann by decomposing the marginal
cost of uncertainty in the time domain rather than in the frequency domain.10
Finally, I take a slight departure from the original definition and express the marginal benefits of
stability in terms of extra cashflow growth, as opposed to a uniform increase in the level of lifetime
cashflows. Along with still measuring the cost of fluctuations, my notion of welfare cost measures
the tradeoff between growth and consumption stability and is therefore of more direct interest to
economic policy-makers facing tradeoffs between economic growth and macroeconomic stability.
1.2. The term structure of the cost of uncertainty
People live in a stochastic world, have finite resources and decide how to allocate them across
time. Identical risk-averse consumers i ∈ [0, 1] have time-t preferences Ut = EtU(Ci, Xi), where
C ≡ {Ct+n}∞n=1 is consumption and X ≡ {Xt+n}∞n=1 is any other factor that influences utility.11 Without
loss of generality, I let factor Xi depend on aggregate consumption C =
∫ 1
0
Cidi but not on individual
consumption Ci. Since there is a continuum of agents each of which has zero mass, this modeling
strategy allows me to ask an individual how much he would pay in exchange for less cashflow
uncertainty without thereby having to affect all aggregate quantities, including factor X.
Financial markets are without arbitrage opportunities and people can trade in the financial
market the full set of zero-coupon bonds and the full set of single market dividend payments,
so-called dividend strips.
I am interested in measuring the cost of consumption uncertainty, i.e., how much consumption
growth a consumer is willing to trade against a stable consumption stream. Let Ct+n denote the
consumption level that is hypothetically offered to the ith individual at time t + n, which I refer to
as stable consumption. Then, I parametrize stable consumption as Ct+n(θ) = θEtCt+n + (1 − θ)Ct+n,
where the parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] indexes a convex combination of ex-ante and ex-post consumption
and represents the fraction of ex-post uncertainty that is removed.
Definition (Marginal cost of uncertainty). In line with Alvarez and Jermann (2004), I define the
cost of fluctuations as Lt in
EtU
({(
1 +LNt (θ)
)nCt+n}n∈N , {Ct+n}n∈N\N , {Xt+n}∞n=1) =
= EtU
({
θEtCt+n + (1 − θ)Ct+n}n∈N , {Ct+n}n∈N\N , {Xt+n}∞n=1) (1.1)
10It is natural to compare my finding of a downward-sloping term structure of welfare costs to the conclusion of
Alvarez and Jermann that long-run fluctuations are the fluctuations that people fear the most. Our results are not
necessarily inconsistent because they focus on the volatility of the entire consumption process with a given band of
spectral frequencies, whereas I focus on the entire volatility in consumption at a given time horizon.
11In section 1.4 I relax the assumption of identical preferences across agents.
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where the index set N ⊂ N ≡ {1, ...,∞} indicates which coordinates of consumption are stabilized
and allows for focusing on any window of interest.
Two particularly interesting quantities are the total cost LNt (1), which measures how much extra
growth the elimination of all cashflow uncertainty is worth, and the marginal cost LNt ≡ ∂L
N
t (θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣
θ=0
,
which represents the current assessment of how much extra growth a marginal stabilization is worth.
The appendix discusses the relationship between definition (1.1) and the original definitions
studied by Lucas and Alvarez and Jermann.
I assume enough smoothness in preferences to guarantee that LNt is a differentiable map on
θ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, differentiating (1.1) with respect to θ,
LNt =
∑
n∈N Et(Mt,t+n)Et(Ct+n) − Et(Mt,t+nCt+n)∑
n∈N n Et(Mt,t+nCt+n)
(1.2)
where Mt,t+n = (∂Ut/∂Ct+n)/(∂Ut/∂Ct) is the n-period stochastic discount factor. Note how D
(n)
t =
EtMt,t+nCt+n is the no-arbitrage price of a n-period consumption strip and EtMt,t+n is the no-arbitrage
price of a n-period zero-coupon bond. Under no-arbitrage, equation (1.2) expresses the marginal
cost of uncertainty around all coordinates n ∈ N as a function of the price of a claim to the trend
in consumption and of the price and duration of a claim to future consumption at all coordinates
n ∈ N .
Definition (Term structure of the cost of uncertainty). Consider the singleton set N = {n}, for
n = 1, 2, ..., and consider the marginal costs l(n)t ≡ ∂L
{n}
t (θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣
θ=0
. The marginal cost l(n)t is the cost of a
marginal increase in uncertainty in the nth coordinate of consumption. Then, by equation (1.2), it
follows that
l(n)t =
1
n
(
Et(Mt,t+n)Et(Ct+n)
Et(Mt,t+nCt+n)
− 1
)
The motivation for calling the map lt : n 7→ l(n)t a term structure of the marginal cost of
uncertainty is given by proposition 1. Given the prices of strips {D(n)} and the term structure
components {l(n)} you can compute the marginal cost LN for any coordinate set N ⊂ N.
Proposition 1. The marginal cost of uncertainty within any window of interestN , LNt , is the linear
combination of the term structure components {l(n)t } defined by
LNt =
∑
n∈N
ωn,tl
(n)
t (1.3)
where the weights ωn,t ≡ n D
(n)
t∑
n∈N n D
(n)
t
are positive and such that
∑
n∈N ωn,t = 1.12
12No-arbitrage guarantees that the weights are positive. The weights ωn,t depend on the coordinate set N ; to keep
formulas simple I omit such a dependence in the notation.
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1.2.1. The term structures of equity, interest rates, and welfare costs
Proposition 2 shows how the term structure of welfare costs is a simple transformation of
the term structures of equity and interest rates, by which I mean the maps n 7→ EtR(n)d,t→t+n and
n 7→ EtR(n)b,t→t+n of ex-ante hold-to-maturity returns on dividend strips and zero-coupon real bonds,
respectively, as a function of maturity.13
Proposition 2. The nth component of the term structure of welfare costs is the risk premium for
holding to maturity a portfolio long on a n-period dividend strip and short on a n-period zero-
coupon bond. The term structure of welfare costs is the transformation of the term structures of
equity and interest rates
l(n)t =
1
n
(
EtR
e,(n)
t→t+n − 1
)
=
1
n
(
exp
{
Etr
(n)
d,t→t+n − Etr(n)b,t→t+n +
1
2
Vt(R(n)d,t→t+n)
}
− 1
) (1.4)
whereVt(X) ≡ 2[ln EtX − Et ln(X)] denotes conditional entropy and r ≡ ln(R).
Equation (1.4) provides the link between the term structures of equity and interest rates and
the term structure of welfare costs. In particular, since the entropy term is independent of the
bond price, it shows clearly how the term structure of welfare costs would unambiguously slope
downwards in the case of a downward-sloping term structure of equity and of an upward-sloping
term structure of interest rates.
There is a powerful intuition behind these formulas. At the margin, people would trade l(n)t θ
points of growth against the elimination of a fraction θ of the aggregate cashflow uncertainty around
the nth consumption coordinate, Ct+n. Proposition 2 shows how this tradeoff is precisely the one
offered by the financial market. In fact, by holding to maturity a portfolio short on the n-period
zero-coupon bond and long an equal amount in the n-period dividend strip, people can experience
an average growth rate of 1n(EtR
e,(n)
t→t+n − 1) by shouldering a volatility of Vt(Re,(n)t→t+n) = Vt(Ct+n).
Therefore, the cost of n-year ahead uncertainty must be l(n)t =
1
n (EtR
e,(n)
t→t+n − 1).14
1.2.2. Relationship between the cost of uncertainty and the equity premium
A theoretically important relationship is the one between the cost of fluctuations and the equity
premium, as both are measures of the premium people command to shoulder aggregate risk. A
natural benchmark is the case of flat term structures of equity and interest rates. Indeed, when both
term structures are flat the entire term structure of the cost of uncertainty equals the equity premium,
13For now, dividends and consumption are used interchangeably. I discuss in section 1.4 how dividends rather than
consumption can be used to measure the welfare costs of uncertainty in a production economy.
14Note how the nth component of the term structure of uncertainty is the arithmetic version of the dividend risk
premium, θ(n)t , as defined by Binsbergen et al. (2013), namely l
(n)
t =
1
n (exp{nθ(n)t } − 1). Therefore, in their language,
time-variation in forward equity yields must reveal a time-varying term structure of growth or a time-varying term
structure of the welfare cost of fluctuations. Binsbergen et al. flesh out the former link; the present writing explains
the latter and how the term structure components combine to measure the cost of uncertainty around arbitrary sets of
cashflow components.
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and LNt equals the equity premium, for all N ⊂ N. In essence, the term structure of equity is flat if
shocks to the cashflow opportunity set (e.g., shocks to expected cashflow growth and to cashflow
volatility) are either absent or unpriced; the term structure of interest rates is flat in economies
in which the state driving the risk-free rate is either absent or unpriced, so that the expectations
hypothesis of bond valuation holds.15
While the benchmark case would allow for a quantification of the cost of uncertainty over
a large sample, it is restrictive, both empirically and theoretically, and must therefore be taken
with caution. On the one hand, recent evidence about the term structures of equity and interest
rates challenges the trivial term structure properties required for the equality between the cost of
fluctuations and the equity premium (Binsbergen et al., 2012, 2013; Boguth et al., 2012).
On the other hand, although it is not restrictive for some asset pricing models, the assumption of
flat term structures is particularly severe for the long-run risk explanation (for example, of Bansal
and Yaron, 2004). A flat term structure of equity in a long-run risk setting with Epstein-Zin-Weil
type utility requires either a random walk in consumption or a unitary elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. The random walk in consumption would imply that the main component of the
long-run risk explanation is absent, while the unitary elasticity of substitution implies that the
long-run risk component is not priced. Both features actually kill the mechanism that generates
several interesting asset pricing facts within that framework. Therefore, the long-run risk literature
shows how local alternatives, against which we have no statistical power, to the conditions granting
flat term structures can have non-trivial asset pricing implications.
1.3. Empirics of the cost of uncertainty
Suppose that a full set of zero-coupon real bonds and a full set of put and call European options
whose underlying is an aggregate equity index are traded on the market. In absence of arbitrage
opportunities, put-call parity holds as
Ct,t+n − Pt,t+n = Pt −
n∑
j=1
D( j)t − X P(n)b,t (1.5)
where Ct,t+n and Pt,t+n are the prices at time t of a call and a put European options on the market
index with maturity n and strike price X, P(n)b,t = EtMt,t+n is the price of a n-period zero-coupon bond,
Pt = Et
∑∞
j=1 Mt,t+ jDt+ j is the price of the market portfolio, and D
(n)
t = EtMt,t+nDt+n is the price of
the nth dividend strip. Since the only unknowns in equation (1.5) are the prices of the dividend
strips, {D(n)t }, one can synthetically replicate them (Binsbergen et al., 2012).
1.3.1. Empirical results
I follow Binsbergen et al. (2012) and Golez (2013) in synthesizing the evidence on dividend
claims from put and call European options on the S&P 500 index. Standard index option classes,
with twelve monthly maturities of up to one year, and Long-Term Equity Anticipation Securities
15The technical appendix studies approximate analytical conditions that grant flat term structures in a general
loglinear-lognormal environment.
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(LEAPS), with ten maturities of up to three years, are exchange traded on the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE) since 1990.16 The overall size of the index option market in the U.S.
grows rapidly over the years. During the first year of the sample Options Clearing Corp reports an
average open interest of $60 billion for standard options and LEAPS with maturities of less than six
months that gradually decreases across maturities to $200 million for maturities larger than two
years. The corresponding figures in the last year of the sample are an open interest of $1,400 billion
for maturities of less than six months and of $40 billion for maturities larger than two years.
I use a dataset provided by Market Data Express containing end-of-day S&P 500 index option
data for CBOE traded European-style options and running from January 1990 to December 2013. I
obtain the daily S&P 500 price and one-day total return indices from Bloomberg and combine them
to calculate daily index dividend payouts; I then aggregate the daily payouts to a monthly frequency
without reinvestment. To measure real bond prices I use zero-coupon TIPS yields with maturities of
up to ten years from Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2010). Since TIPS yields are unavailable during the 1990s, I
also use Treasury yields from Gu¨rkaynak et al. as a proxy available over the same sample period as
I have dividend strips.17 Both nominal and real government bonds are computed on the last trading
day of the month.
There are three major difficulties when extracting options implied prices through the put-call
parity relation. First, quotes may violate the law of one price for reasons that include measurement
errors such as bid-ask bounce or other microstructural frictions. Second, the synthesized prices
are extremely sensitive to the choice of the nominal risk-free rate, which multiplies the strikes in
the put-call parity relation; since strike prices are large numbers, any error in the interest rate will
magnify in the synthetic prices (see also Boguth et al., 2012). Third, end-of-day data quote the
closing value of the index, whose components trade on the equity exchange, and the closing prices
of derivatives that are exchange-traded on a market that continues to operate for 15 minutes after
the equity exchange closes. An asynchronicity of up to 15 minutes may therefore drive a wedge
between the reported quotes of the index value and the option prices and bias the synthetic prices.
To address these difficulties, I use the no-arbitrage relation to extract both the risk-free rate and
the strip price in a unique step. This approach produces the appropriate interest rate for synthetic
replication as well as it allows for spotting violations of the law of one price (LOOP) on any trade
date and for any maturity.18 Moreover, I follow Golez (2013) in using ten days of data at the
end of each month to compute options implied prices at monthly frequency. He shows how this
16Other data sources that allow for extracting the prices of index dividend claims include index futures and dividend
futures (Binsbergen et al., 2013). CME S&P 500 futures have expiration dates only for eight months in a quarterly
cycle over most of the available sample and thereby maturities of less than two years. Dividend futures have the
clear advantage over index options and futures that they directly reveal strip prices without the need for synthetic
replication and they do so for longer maturities. However, for S&P 500 dividend futures only proprietary datasets are
available covering over-the-counter trades for a relatively short sample (for example, the dataset studied by Binsbergen
et al., 2013, starts in October 2002). The exchange-traded nature of options makes it more likely that the preferences
embedded in their pricing reflect those of the average investor.
17I adjust the means of the Treasuries to match the means of TIPS yields over the 1999-2013 period; this adjustment
provides the correct average welfare costs up to a second-order term.
18The intra-daily approach of Binsbergen et al. (2012), who use tick-level prices on put and call European options on
the S&P 500 index to synthesize the dividend claims, has the clear advantage of exploiting information from more data
points and avoids the asynchronicity problem. However, Binsbergen et al. may be sacrificing accuracy as they choose a
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strategy reduces substantially the distance between intra-day and end-of-day options implied prices
and thereby the potential effect of asynchronicities and other microstructural frictions. I bring
further support to his claim by showing large correlations with the intra-day options implied prices
extracted by Binsbergen et al. (2012) over the 1996-2009 period; the correlation of the 6-, 12-,
18- and 24-month equity prices with Binsbergen-Brandt-Koijen data are of .91, .95, .95 and .94,
respectively, with a mean-zero difference in levels.19
1.3.1.1. Data selection and synthetic replication
I drop weekly, quarterly, pm-settled and mini options, whose non-standard actual expiration
dates are not tagged. Index mini options with three-year maturities are traded since the 1990s but
standard classes appear only in the 2000s; for this reason I follow Binsbergen et al. (2012) and
focus on options of up to two-year maturity. I eliminate all observations with missing values or
zero prices and keep only paired call and put options. I use mid quotes between the bid and the ask
prices on the last quote of the day and closing values for the S&P 500 index.
On any date t, consider all available put-call pairs that differ only in strike price. For the ith
strike price, Xi, i = 1, ..., I, define the auxiliary variable
A(n)it ≡ Pt − Ct,t+n + Pt,t+n
= P(n)d,t + XiP
(n)
b,t
where the last equality holds by put-call parity (1.5), with P(n)d,t =
∑n
j=1 EtMt,t+ jDt+ j the no-arbitrage
price of the next n periods of dividends. Therefore, if there are no arbitrage opportunities and the
LOOP holds then the mapA(n)t : Xi 7→ A(n)it is strictly monotonic and linear. In practice, the relation
does not always hold without error across all strike prices available; as long as more than two strike
prices are available for a given maturity, I use the no-arbitrage relation to extract P(n)d,t and P
(n)
b,t as the
least absolute deviations (LAD) estimators that minimize expression
I∑
i=1
∣∣∣A(n)it − P(n)d,t − XiP(n)b,t ∣∣∣
for a given trade date t and maturity n. The cross-sectional error term accounts for potential
measurement error (e.g., because of bid-ask bounce, asynchronicities, or other microstructural
frictions).
In many instances, non-monotonicities in the auxiliary variable are concentrated in deep in-
proxy for the interest rate and do not develop an approach to spot and drop observations in which the LOOP may be
importantly violated. In this sense, I bring an additional robustness check to their synthesized prices by showing how
my approach extracts very similar prices; the nearly white-noise deviation between their estimate and mine over the
comparable sample are likely a mixture of asynchronicities and different proxies for the interest rate (I find options
implied interest rates with nearly perfect correlations with the corresponding LIBOR and Treasury rates but with
different levels that lie about halfway between the two proxies).
19End-of-month data using a one-day window have slightly higher volatilities and correlations between .80 and .95.
The median or the mean over a three-day window centered on the end-of-month trading day increases correlations to
.87-.95; the marginal increase in correlations for window widths of more than ten days is nearly imperceptible.
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and out-of-the-money options. Whenever I spot non-monotonicities for low and high moneyness
levels I restrict the sample to strikes with moneyness between 0.7 and 1.1 before I run the cross-
sectional LAD regression. Over most of the sample the strikes and the auxiliary variables are in a
nearly perfect linear relation except for a few points that violate the LOOP. The LAD estimator is
particularly appropriate to attach little weight to those observations as long as their number is small
relative to the sample size of the cross-sectional regression. Accordingly, I drop all trade dates and
maturities that associate with a linear relation between Xi andA(n)it that fails to fit at least a tenth of
the cross-sectional size (with a minimum of five points) up to an error that is less than 1% of the
extracted dividend claim price.
Figure 1.2 box-plots the size of the LOOP violations present in the sample which, for the most
part, concentrate around errors of less than 1%; larger violations associate with the first years of the
sample—probably because of a relatively low liquidity—and to years of greater volatility such as
2001 or the last years of the sample. Data previous to 1994 are more problematic by this metric
(see also Golez, 2013) and I therefore exclude them altogether from the sample.
The procedure results in a finite number of matches, which I combine to calculate the prices
of options implied dividend claims and nominal bonds by using the put-call parity relation. The
number of cross-sectional observations available to extract the options implied prices of bonds and
dividend claims increases over time (from medians of around 25 observations per trading day up to
more than 100) as the market grows in size and declines with the options maturity. Of the resulting
extracted prices I finally discard all trading days that associate with prices that are non-increasing
in maturity, as they would represent arbitrage opportunities. Overall, my selection method based on
LOOP violations excludes almost a fifth of the available put-call pairs.
Finally, to obtain monthly implied dividend yields with constant maturities, I follow Binsbergen
et al. (2012) and Golez (2013) and interpolate between the available maturities. As advocated by
Golez (2013), I then construct monthly prices using ten days of data at the end of each month
(namely, I consider the average price over a ten-day window centered on the end-of-month value).
Figure 1.3a plots the prices of the synthetic dividend claims.
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Va
lu
es
Figure 1.2: Law-of-one-price violations, in percent of the associated options implied dividend claim price; only
observations not filtered out by my data selection approach are included.
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(c) Monthly cumulated returns on nominal bonds.
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(d) Monthly cumulated returns on real bonds.
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(e) Average term structures of equity, interest rates
(mean-adjusted Treasuries) and welfare costs (with
block bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals).
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(f) Average term structures of equity, interest rates
(TIPS) and welfare costs (with block bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals), 1999-2013.
Figure 1.3: Term structures of equity, interest rates and welfare costs over the last two decades. The term structure of
equity is synthesized from index options; the term structure of interest rates use Gu¨rkaynak-Sack-Wright data.
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1.3.1.2. Mean
To measure the cost of uncertainty I consider dividend strip data and thereby disregard the
difference between aggregate consumption and dividends. Consumption and dividends coincide in
an endowement economy. Moreover, although definition (1.1) is in terms of consumption, I show
in section 1.4 how in a production economy the definition is in terms of dividends. This result has
the convenient consequence that the term structure of welfare costs links to the observable term
structure of equity rather than to the unobservable term structure of consumption equity, even in a
production economy.
I follow Binsbergen et al. (2012) and focus on a semestral periodicity; the first strip pays off
the next six months of dividends, the second strip the dividends paid out six to twelve months
out, and so on. I measure the hold-to-maturity return on the first semestral strip as the return on
a six-month buy-and-hold strategy that pays off the next six months of dividends; namely, I roll
over three times on a two-month buy-and-hold strategy that goes long in the six-month strip.20
Accordingly, I measure the hold-to-maturity return on the n-semester strip as the return for holding
for n − 1 semesters a n-semester strip times the semestral return on the first semestral strip.
Risk premia are large for short-duration equities and small for short-duration bonds. To address
the potential concerns raised by Boguth et al. (2012) that microstructural frictions could cause
spuriously large arithmetic high-frequency returns on synthetic dividend claims, I report log returns
and hold-to-maturity returns on strategies with maturities between 0.5 and 2 years, which Boguth
et al. argue are much less biased by microstructure effects related to highly-leveraged positions.21
Figure 1.3b illustrates the size of average annualized monthly log returns on six-month strategies
over different subsamples by plotting the cumulated return on an investment strategy that goes long
on January 31, 1996 by a dollar on a claim to the next n years of dividends, holds the investment for
six months and then rolls over the position. Monthly average log returns are large and positive for
short-duration equities (close to ten percent for claims to the next semester and year of dividends)
and larger than the return on the index. The economic significance of the large returns on short-term
equities becomes even stronger once we note that the initial and final years of the 1994-2013 period
are years in which the index performed particularly well.
Figures 1.3c and 1.3d plot the analogous cumulated monthly returns on six-month bond strate-
gies long a dollar on zero-coupon bonds with maturities between six months and ten years; average
returns steadily increase in maturity across nominal as well as real government bonds, consistent
with an upward-sloping average term structure of interest rates.
The annualized average hold-to-maturity return over the available dataset is of 13.4%, 13.1%,
12.3% and 10.9% for a strategy that goes long in the first to fourth semestral dividend strip,
20This strategy, as opposed to holding to maturity a six-month strip, has the advantage of being robust to potential
bias in prices resulting from preannouncement. Golez (2013) raises concerns that equity prices of up to three-month
maturity may be biased as a result of firms routinely preannouncing part of their dividend payouts, which would
lower their riskiness. Options implied data on the one-month and two-month strips display a negative risk premium
(as opposed to a zero risk premium as would be expected of a riskless asset) while the three-month strip pays off an
extremely large and positive average return over the sample. Along with the preannouncement of part of the dividend
payouts, potential reasons for the likely biased properties of very short-term dividend claims include the microstructural
issues described by Boguth et al. (2012) (the shorter the maturity the higher the leverage).
21The annual strategy on the six-month claims holds the claim for six months and then rolls over the same strategy.
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respectively, and of 2.9%, 3.0%, 3.1% and 3.3% for a strategy that goes long in the first to fourth
semestral Treasuries, respectively. Over the 1999-2013 sample period, in which TIPS data are
available, the hold-to-maturity strategies pay off average returns of 17.0%, 14.0%, 11.5% and 10.5%
for long positions in the short-term equities and 0.2%, 0.6%, 0.7% and 0.9% for long positions in
the first to fourth semestral TIPS, respectively. These numbers compare with an average return on
an annual buy-and-hold strategy on the market index of 10.2% over the 1994-2013 period and of
6.5% during 1999-2013.
As in Binsbergen et al. (2012), the economic significance of this evidence is that the average
term structure of equity is downward-sloping owing to the fact that the equity premium is a linear
combination of the entire sequence of dividend strip premia.
1994-2013 1999-2013
0.5 years 1 year 1.5 years 2 years 0.5 years 1 year 1.5 years 2 years
(n = 1) (n = 2) (n = 3) (n = 4) (n = 1) (n = 2) (n = 3) (n = 4)
l(n)t
Mean 0.1259 0.1192 0.1081 0.0913 0.1362 0.1288 0.1077 0.1002
(0.0325) (0.0160) (0.0120) (0.0097) (0.0408) (0.0196) (0.0134) (0.0107)
[0.0689] [0.0303] [0.0204] [0.0180] [0.0906] [0.0412] [0.0255] [0.0243]
L{1,...,n}t
Mean 0.1259 0.1184 0.1113 0.1036 0.1362 0.1299 0.1177 0.1110
(0.0325) (0.0190) (0.0139) (0.0107) (0.0408) (0.0239) (0.0170) (0.0129)
[0.0689] [0.0398] [0.0276] [0.0210] [0.0906] [0.0535] [0.0375] [0.0295]
l(1)t , 1 period = n semesters
Mean 0.1259 0.0905 0.0782 0.0711 0.1362 0.1124 0.1032 0.0972
(0.0325) (0.0187) (0.0126) (0.0097) (0.0408) (0.0230) (0.0154) (0.0116)
[0.0689] [0.0444] [0.0305] [0.0243] [0.0906] [0.0571] [0.0384] [0.0306]
Equity premium, semestral
Mean 0.0885 0.0575
(0.0169) (0.0207)
[0.0398] [0.0471]
Table 1.1: Options implied average term structure of the welfare cost of uncertainty. l(n) is the cost of a marginal
increase in uncertainty in n-semester ahead cashflows. L{1,...,n} is the cost of a marginal increase in uncertainty in 1 to
n-semester ahead cashflows. The third panel reports the cost of a marginal in increase in one-period ahead uncertainty,
l(1), for different period lengths. The short sample (1999-2013) uses TIPS yield data to measure the term structure
of real interest rates. The full sample (1994-2013) uses Treasury yield data, whose means are adjusted to match the
corresponding TIPS means over the 1999-2013 period, as a proxy for the term structure of real interest rates. The
equity premium is the average six-month buy-and-hold return on the S&P 500 index in excess over the six-month
risk-free rate. Boostrapped standard errors use block sizes of one (in parentheses) and ten (in brackets) observations.
Table 1.1 reports the point estimates for the term structure of welfare costs. The welfare costs of
aggregate uncertainty around semestral cashflows 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 years out are of 12.6%, 11.9%,
10.8% and 9.1%, respectively. I then use equation (1.3) to compute the costs of uncertainty around
multi-period cashflows. Namely, I estimate average welfare costs of 11.8% associated with up to
one-year ahead uncertainty, of 11.1% with up to 18-month uncertainty, and of 10.4% with up to
29
two-year ahead uncertainty, respectively. Restricting the attention to the 1999-2013 period, over
which TIPS data are available to measure real interest rates, the estimated welfare costs around
semestral cashflows 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 years out are of 13.6%, 12.9%, 10.8% and 10.0%, respectively;
welfare costs associated with up to 1-, 1.5- and 2-year ahead cashflow uncertainty are of 13.0%,
11.8% and 11.1%, respectively. These figures compare to an average six-month buy-and-hold equity
premium over the two sample periods of 8.8% (1994-2013) and of 5.7% (1999-2013).
Additionally, I compute the welfare cost of one-period ahead uncertainty for different periodici-
ties, from semestral to biennial. These estimates complement the evidence about the term structure
in a way that bypasses the somewhat arbitrary choice of the semestral periodicity of the strips. I
find comparable results; the average cost of one-year ahead uncertainty over the two samples is of
9.0% (1994-2013) and 11.2% (1999-2013), whereas the cost of uncertainty over the next two years
is of 7.1% and of 9.7%.
Figures 1.3e and 1.3f plot the point estimates for the term structures of equity, interest rates,
and welfare costs. The term structures of equity and interest rates report the semestral zero-coupon
equities and real bonds and the corresponding per-period hold-to-maturity returns for different
maturities. The dotted lines represent the counterfactual case of flat term structures of equity and
interest rates, expressed in excess over the first bond yield. To report estimates for the term structure
of welfare costs, I use equation (1.4) to compute hold-to-maturity excess returns on the available
semestral strips whose unconditional means are the first components of the term structure of welfare
costs. The figures also show block-bootstrapped one-sided critical values based on bootstrap-t
percentiles corresponding to a five-percent size for the means of l(n)t and the six-month market
return; the block size of ten observations is slightly larger than the number of lags after which the
correlogram of the underlying returns becomes negligible. I can reject the hypothesis that the term
structure components are zero over both samples.
The evidence suggests a downward-sloping term structure of welfare costs, driven both by a
downward-sloping term structure of equity and by an upward-sloping term structure of interest
rates.
1.3.1.3. Volatility
The components of the term structure of welfare costs are volatile and pro-cyclical.
Present-value logic with time-varying expected returns and expected dividend growth imply
that dividend yields contain information about both state variables (Golez, 2013). Since the same
states would drive the risk premia that constitute the term structure of welfare costs I can use
the semestral equity yields to signal variation in the term structure of welfare costs. In line with
Binsbergen et al. (2013) and motivated by theoretical models such as Lettau and Wachter (2011)
I consider a one-factor specification for these risk premia. To capture the factor I extract the first
principal component of the semestral equity yields, which captures 82% of their volatility, and use
it to forecast the hold-to-maturity excess returns whose ex ante values measure the welfare costs.
Motivated by theoretical considerations, I control for the presence of additional factors by including
the second principal component of equity yields (these two principal components account for 95%
of the variance in equity yields) and the first principal component of bond yields.22
22Section 1.5 and the appendix show how the model of Lettau and Wachter (2011) implies that these three variables
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re,(1)t→t+1
1
2 r
e,(2)
t→t+2
1
3 r
e,(3)
t→t+3
1
4 r
e,(4)
t→t+4 r
e,m
t+1
Constant 0.083 0.083 0.094 0.094 0.084 0.084 0.069 0.069 0.072 0.072
[0.031] [0.022] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.034] [0.033]
pc1d,t 0.369 0.366 0.150 0.150 0.077 0.079 0.064 0.066 -0.094
[0.100] [0.056] [0.028] [0.032] [0.024] [0.023] [0.019] [0.017] [0.056]
pc1b,t 0.095 -0.017 -0.067 -0.111 0.104
[0.145] [0.088] [0.072] [0.057] [0.118]
pc2d,t 0.703 -0.063 -0.220 -0.152
[0.144] [0.065] [0.043] [0.037]
dpmt 0.345 0.318
[0.152] [0.194]
R2 0.353 0.502 0.254 0.259 0.106 0.229 0.105 0.204 0.098 0.147
std(Etr)
E(r) 2.68 3.19 1.00 1.01 0.57 0.85 0.57 0.79 1.10 1.35
E(r) 0.0832 0.0941 0.0837 0.0694 0.0719
Table 1.2: Predictive regressions on hold-to-maturity semestral strip returns and on the semestral buy-and-hold market
return. Annualized log returns in excess over the riskless return over the holding period. Regressors are the first two
principal components of the semestral equity yields, pc1d and pc
2
d, the first principal component of up to ten-year bond
yields, pc1b, and the market dividend yield, dp
m. Monthly data, 1996m1-2013m12. Newey-West standard errors to
correct for overlapping.
Thus, since excess returns are forecastable, the cost of uncertainty varies over time and consider-
ably so. Table 1.2 shows a standard deviation of expected returns about as large as the already large
level. Note how the forecasting regressions may miss some important return predictors. Therefore,
since the variance of expected returns is increasing in the number of predictors, the estimates in
table 1.2 understate the actual volatility of the cost of uncertainty. The cost of short-run cashflow
uncertainty is huge at some junctures of the business cycle.
Figure 1.4 plots the estimated time series of the term structure of the welfare cost of uncertainty
over time. The cost of uncertainty rises dramatically during the dot-com crash and the period
immediately preceding the early 2000s recession as well as during the most recent recession
as declared by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Moreover, the premium to hedge
uncertainty six months out is considerably larger than the premium to hedge longer-run uncertainty.
The estimated term structure remains downward-sloping during the downturns whereas it appears
considerably flatter and even upward-sloping in normal times.
The evidence is consistent with people being highly sensitive to cashflow stability in bad times,
in particular to short-run stability. The evidence indicates that some systematic stabilization policy
to smooth the cost of uncertainty likely is a macroeconomic priority, especially in the short run and
in particular states of the economy such as downturns.
1.3.2. Term structures in some consumption-based asset pricing models
Since the available sample allows for estimating only the first few components of the term
structure of welfare costs at semestral frequency, I now turn to a model-based approach to capture
are sufficient to reveal the factor that drives the term structure of welfare costs.
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Figure 1.4: Semestral term structure of welfare costs and semestral equity premium, conditional on the information set
spanned by equity and bond yields; annualized premia. Regressors are the first two principal components of semestral
equity yields and the first principal component of up to ten-year bond yields. The semestral excess return on the index
is additionally regressed on the market dividend yield. The vertical lines indicate business-cycle peaks and troughs as
declared by the NBER (March-November 2001 and December 2007 to June 2009).
and quantify the rest of the term structure. The evidence in subsection 1.3.1 helps to identify a
suitable model. The extant asset pricing literature offers several models, already calibrated to match
several stylized asset pricing facts, that have implications for the term structure of welfare costs.
Unfortunately, from a structural perspective, replicating a downward-sloping term structure of
equity and an upward-sloping term structure of interest rates is problematic (Lettau and Wachter,
2007; Binsbergen et al., 2012; Croce et al., 2012). I therefore have to discard a structural explanation
to answer the question I am interested in and be satisfied with a quasi-structural model. I thus turn to
the model of Lettau and Wachter (2011), which is a parsimonious quasi-structural framework able to
capture the term structures of equity and interest rates in line with the evidence in subsection 1.3.1.
1.3.2.1. Structural approach
Table 1.3 and figure 1.5 show the implications of some of today’s leading consumption-based
asset pricing models for the three term structures and for the welfare cost of uncertainty and the
equity premium. I consider the habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the
long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004), the long-run risk model under limited information
of Croce et al. (2012), the recursive preferences of Tallarini (2000) and Barillas et al. (2009), the rare
disasters model of Gabaix (2012), and the quasi-structural model of Lettau and Wachter (2011). In
studying the term structures in the different asset pricing models, I consider the original calibrations,
which the authors choose to match some asset pricing facts. Note that alternative calibrations and
refinements of the models are possible and some of the model-based predictions about the term
structures of equity and interest rates might change accordingly. The technical appendix works out
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the details of each model. I refer to the original writings for a list of the stylized asset pricing facts
each model is matched to.
The habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) predicts a flat term structure
of interest rates and an upward-sloping term structure of equity. The term structure of interest
rates is driven by a particular calibration of the time-varying risk aversion that produces a constant
risk-free rate. The term structure of equity is instead driven by the positive correlation between
the pricing factor—shocks to consumption growth—and dividend growth, and by the perfectly
negative correlation between the pricing factor and the shocks to the price of risk, which decreases
as consumption grows away from the external habit. Since dividend strips load negatively on shocks
to the price of risk, and the more so the longer the maturity, people command a greater risk premium
to bear long-run dividend strip risk. Under the baseline calibration, the model of Campbell and
Cochrane predicts a marginal cost of all fluctuations of 4.4% and an equity premium of 6.8%.
The long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) generates an upward-sloping term structure
of equity and a downward-sloping term structure of interest rates. Bansal and Yaron introduce rich
dynamics in consumption growth, which is driven both by shocks to expected consumption growth
and to consumption volatility. Epstein-Zin-Weil utility then makes all shocks to the consumption
opportunity set show up as pricing factors. In the calibration of Bansal and Yaron, long-run dividend
strips load more heavily on the shocks to the consumption opportunity set and therefore are more
risky, as long as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is larger than one. In the model the
risk-free rate is driven by shocks to the predictable component of consumption, which is positively
priced; since long-run zero-coupon bonds load less on this state than the risk-free rate, they provide
long-run insurance. This property explains the downward-sloping term structure of interest rates.
The quantitative implications of the long-run risk model is a marginal cost of all fluctuations of
7.7% and an equity premium of 4.9%.
Croce et al. (2012) consider the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and change the
information structure. Under limited information, not all shocks to the cashflow opportunity set
are observable. The shocks that are priced are therefore a linear combination of both short-run and
long-run cashflow shocks. Then, since long-run shocks have a relatively small volatility, long-run
dividend strips load less on the shocks that are priced under limited information than short-run
dividend strips. This strategy allows for generating a downward-sloping term structure of equity.
Notably, at the time of the present writing Croce et al. (2012) is the only state-of-the-art structural
model that generates a downward-sloping term structure of equity for both holding-period and
hold-to-maturity returns; however, the curvature is not enough quantitatively, at least under the
baseline calibration, it still predicts a downward-sloping term structure of interest rates, and it
works in a world in which risk premia are not time-varying. The model predicts a marginal cost of
all fluctuations of 8.8%, against a predicted equity premium of 6.6%.
The ambiguity averse multiplier preferences in Barillas et al. (2009) and the recursive pref-
erences of Tallarini (2000) yield two flat term structures which imply the equality between the
equity premium and the cost of fluctuations. The unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution that
characterizes the recursive preferences of Tallarini (2000) and the robust control literature implies
constant dividend yields, as discount-rate effects exactly offset cashflow effects in pricing equity
claims; the random walk in consumption in turn implies constant interest rates and thereby a flat
bond term structure. The multiplier preferences of Barillas et al. (2009) and the observationally
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equivalent model of Tallarini (2000) predict a marginal cost of all fluctuations of 2.0% and an equity
premium of about the same size.
Finally, the rare disasters model of Gabaix (2012) produces two flat term structure of holding-
period returns but a slightly downward-sloping term structure of hold-to-maturity equity returns.
The intuition behind the flat term structure of holding period returns in the rare disasters model
is that different dividend strips have the same exposure to the disaster event, whose probability is
independent of the cashflow shocks that are priced. However, the mean-reversion in the state that
drives equity prices makes long-duration equities load slightly less on it than than short-duration
equities, which produces a negative slope in the term structure of hold-to-maturity returns. The
model implies a marginal cost of all fluctuations of 6.9% and a slightly larger equity premium.
LN ln E(Re,m)
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) 4.42 6.81
Bansal and Yaron (2004) 7.68 4.90
Croce et al. (2012) 8.82 6.56
Barillas et al. (2009) 2.00 1.92
Gabaix (2012) 6.87 7.89
Lettau and Wachter (2011) 2.79 7.18
Table 1.3: Mean marginal cost of uncertainty and equity premium (in percent per year) for different consumption-based
asset pricing models. I consider the habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the long-run risk model
of Bansal and Yaron (2004), the long-run risk model under limited information of Croce et al. (2012), the ambiguity
averse multiplier preferences of Barillas et al. (2009), the rare disasters model of Gabaix (2012), and the quasi-structural
model of Lettau and Wachter (2011).
1.3.2.2. Quasi-structural approach
I next turn to the quasi-structural model of Lettau and Wachter (2011), which is designed to
capture a downward-sloping term structure of equity and an upward-sloping term structure of
interest rates. They combine lognormal pricing formulas and a loglinear state-space system with a
price of risk, xt, linear in the states of the economy. The exponential-Gaussian setting is particularly
tractable to study term structures because their equilibrium values have closed-form solutions.
Without micro-founding it, Lettau and Wachter (2011) directly specify a stochastic discount
factor, whose existence is guaranteed by the no-arbitrage theorems. To keep low the number of
degrees of freedom in the model, they assume a single conditional pricing factor perfectly related
to short-run cashflow shocks and a single state driving the price of risk. They then assume a zero
correlation between cashflow and discount-rate shocks and show how that property seems crucial
to generate a downward-sloping term structure of equity (see also Lettau and Wachter, 2007). To
match the downward-sloping term structure of equity, Lettau and Wachter (2011) assume that the
predictable component of cashflows is negatively related to priced shocks. Long-run dividend strips
thus contain a component that provides long-run insurance. The independence of discount-rate
shocks and cashflows shocks then avoids that the negative load of long-run dividend strips on the
state that drives the price of risk offsets the long-run insurance effect.
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(a) Habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999).
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(b) Long-run risk (Bansal and Yaron, 2004).
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(c) Ambiguity aversion (Barillas et al., 2009), Epstein-
Zin-Weil log utility (Tallarini, 2000).
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(d) Long-run risk (limited information) (Croce et al.,
2012).
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(e) Rare disasters (Gabaix, 2012).
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(f) Quasi-structural model (Lettau and Wachter,
2011).
Figure 1.5: The term structures of equity, interest rates and welfare costs of uncertainty in some consumption-based
asset pricing models.
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Finally, since only short-run cashflow shocks are priced, Lettau and Wachter manage to replicate
the upward-sloping term structure of interest rates by assuming that shocks to the state driving
the risk-free rate are negatively correlated with priced shocks. Since long-run zero-coupon bonds
are less exposed to this state than short-run bonds, the assumption generates a positive bond risk
premium as the maturity increases.
The model of Lettau and Wachter predicts a marginal cost of total uncertainty of 2.8% and an
equity premium of 7.2%.
1.4. Robustness
This section examines the robustness of the results of section 1.3 along two dimensions. First,
even though only the model of Lettau and Wachter (2011) captures the term structure features I
am interested in, propositions 1′ and 1′′ show how all of today’s leading consumption-based asset
pricing models are unanimous in producing a high marginal cost of total uncertainty.
Second, I relax some important assumptions made in subsection 1.3.1. Namely, I show how the
evidence of subsection 1.3.1 still measures the cost of uncertainty as we move, on the one hand, to
a production economy in which the notions of consumption and market equity no longer coincide,
and on the other hand, to a setting with consumers characterized by heterogeneous preferences and
possibly uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.
1.4.1. Robustness across models
Even though I can only turn to the quasi-structural model of Lettau and Wachter (2011) to
capture the term structure features I am interested in, I can draw some lessons that are robust across
all asset pricing models considered.
Table 1.3 shows how the marginal cost of uncertainty in the entire consumption process is above
two percent in each of today’s leading asset pricing models. This robustness across models is in
line with the result by Alvarez and Jermann (2004) that a model that is consistent with the main
stylized asset pricing facts must increase the original estimates by Lucas (1987) by two orders of
magnitude.
1.4.2. Market equity or consumption equity?
The definition of cost of fluctuations is in terms of consumption equity. The evidence I consider
is in terms of market equity. These two notions of equity may not perfectly substitute. In fact, along
with the choice of the moving-average filter, the other main empirical challenge of Alvarez and
Jermann (2004) is to find a proxy for the price of a claim to the entire consumption stream.
The critique does not bite in an endowement economy, in which Ct = Dt, and the theoretical
definition of cost of uncertainty can be stated in terms of dividends in the first place. However,
in a production economy the equality breaks down. Fortunately, under mild general equilibrium
assumptions one can save the link between the cost of fluctuations and market equity.
A natural approach in a production economy is to consider preferences that depend also on
labor effort, Nt. Moreover, to model theoretically a difference between consumption and dividends
I rely on assumption 1. The definition of dividends as current aggregate profits is standard in the
Q literature (Hayashi, 1982). The optimality condition implies that there are no distortions in the
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consumption-side of the economy that generate so-called labor wedges (such as, for example, the
aggregate wage markup considered by Galı´ et al., 2007).
Assumption 1. Assume the first-best optimality condition Wt = −(∂Ut/∂Nt)/(∂Ut/∂Ct), i.e., the
marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption equals the relative price—the real
wage rate, Wt. Assume that the aggregate firm pays off all profits as dividends Dt = Yt −WtNt − It,
where Yt is total output and It are gross investments made by the firm. Assume the market-clearing
condition Yt = Ct + It.
Definition (Marginal cost of uncertainty, production economy). I define the cost of fluctuations as
EtU
({(
1 +LNt (θ)
)nCt+n}, {Nt+n}, {Xt+n}) =
= EtU
({
θEtCt+n + (1 − θ)Ct+n}, {θN t+n + (1 − θ)Nt+n}, {Xt+n}) (1.6)
where stable hours worked N t are defined as Wt+nN t+n ≡ Et(Wt+nNt+n), i.e., stable hours provide a
stable labor income. In a production economy, Lt measures the cost of aggregate uncertainty around
consumption and labor income, i.e., how much people would pay to hedge against uncertainty in
consumption and in labor income.
Proposition 1′. Under assumption 1, the marginal cost of uncertainty around all coordinates
n ∈ N is
LNt =
∑
n∈N
ωn,tl
(n)
t
with weights {ωn,t} and term structure components {l(n)t } defined by
ωn,t =
n Et(Mt,t+nDt+n)∑
n∈N n Et(Mt,t+nCt+n)
l(n)t =
1
n
(Et(Mt,t+n)Et(Dt+n)
Et(Mt,t+nDt+n)
− 1
)
In this production economy, as I distinguish between market equity and consumption equity,
only the weights {ωn,t} depend on consumption equity. Most importantly, the term structure
components {l(n)t } remain functions of market equities, which therefore exclusively control the slope
of the term structure of welfare costs. In this context, the robust empirical finding about the term
structure of the welfare cost of uncertainty is its slope. As I depart from the equality between
market and consumption equity, an unobservable component appears (via weights ωn,t) in the level
of the cost of uncertainty LNt . This issue adds to the fact that available direct data on both dividend
strips and inflation-indexed bonds cover only a short period of time and thereby leave fairly large
confidence intervals around the estimated level of the term structure of welfare costs. However, the
downward slope in the term structure is robust to the departure from the equality between market
and consumption equity.
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1.4.3. Do we need identical consumers?
The term structure of marginal costs of uncertainty remains well-defined even in a heterogeneous-
agent incomplete-market setting.
Consider agents with heterogeneous preferences, Ui, and an idiosyncratic consumption com-
ponent, εi,t, driving their consumption stream, Ci,t = Ct + εi,t. Agents can only trade the entire
term structures of dividend strips and zero-coupon bonds and therefore face possibly uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk.
Definition (Marginal cost of uncertainty, heterogenenous-agent incomplete-market economy). In
line with Alvarez and Jermann (2004), I define the cost of fluctuations as
EtUi
({(
1 +LNi,t (θ)
)nCt+n + εi,t+n}) = EtUi({θ(EtCt+n + εi,t+n) + (1 − θ)Ci,t+n})
In this incomplete-market setting, Lt measures the cost of uncertainty around the systematic
part of the ith agent’s consumption, i.e., how much people would pay to hedge against uncertainty
in their systematic consumption component.
By the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the projection of their marginal rates of substitution
on the payoff space is the same across people, so that their valuations of available asset prices are
equal. Since all agents have access to the entire term structures of dividend strips and zero-coupon
bonds, they end up equalizing their valuation of strips. Therefore,
Proposition 1′′. The marginal cost of uncertainty around all coordinates n ∈ N for agent i is
LNi,t =
∑
n∈N
n Et(Mit,t+nCt+n)∑
n∈N n Et(Mit,t+nCt+n)
× 1
n
(Et(Mit,t+n)Et(Ct+n)
Et(Mit,t+nCt+n)
− 1
)
= LNt
and is constant across agents.
1.5. Policy implications
Lucas (1987, 2003) introduced the notion of cost of aggregate uncertainty as an indicator of the
macroeconomic priorities. Similarly, the term structure of the marginal cost of uncertainty requires
little structure to reveal a tradeoff between growth and macroeconomic stability as well as a tradeoff
between macroeconomic stability at different time horizons.
1.5.1. Macroeconomic priorities
The negative slope of the term structure of the cost of fluctuations is a robust feature over the
available sample, driven both by the upward-sloping term structure of interest rates and by the
downward-sloping term structure of equity. The immediate consequence for policy-makers is that,
on average, short-run economic stability should be a primary focus of attention. On the one hand,
short-run aggregate consumption stability is a greater priority than long-run stability. On the other,
the high level of the cost of fluctuations reveals that people are willing to trade a large amount of
growth against short-run consumption stability.
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Table 1.4 reports the cost of short- and long-run fluctuations over different coordinate sets as
captured by the quasi-structural model of Lettau and Wachter (2011). An increase in consumption
uncertainty by a fraction θ over a ten-year period has a marginal cost of more than 12θ percentage
points of growth per year during the decade. These numbers compare to smaller yet non-trivial
marginal benefits of long-run stability, which tend to zero as the stabilization becomes asymptotic,
and are in line with the options implied estimates in table 1.1.
N LN LN\N
up to 1 year 16.70 2.77
up to 2 years 16.44 2.75
up to 3 years 16.04 2.71
up to 5 years 15.00 2.61
up to 10 years 12.31 2.35
up to 20 years 8.67 1.93
N 2.79 0
Table 1.4: Marginal cost of fluctuations at all periodicities n ∈ N . Lettau and Wachter (2011) model-based estimates
Furthermore, the volatility of the cost of fluctuations at different frequencies is large so that this
measure of the macroeconomic priorities varies substantially across the business cycle. The evidence
in table 1.2 and figure 1.4 shows how the volatility of the first two term structure components is at
least as large as the level. The cost of fluctuations is huge at some junctures of the business cycle,
particularly during downturns.
The volatility of the term structure as captured by the model of Lettau and Wachter, reported in
figure 1.6a, confirms the direct evidence. The standard deviation of the cost of fluctuations at short
periodicities is large and decays over long horizons. In their model, the term structure of welfare
costs follows a one-factor structure driven entirely by movements in the time-varying market price
of risk, as shown in the appendix. Figure 1.6b shows the impulse-response of the term structure of
the cost of uncertainty after a one standard deviation discount-rate shock. News to the price of risk
forecast a transitory change in the state of the economy that makes consumers temporarily increase
their aversion to uncertainty, hence the cost of uncertainty and the risk premium they require to
hold equities. The positive initial effect then decays across maturities and over time.
A policy-maker interested in following the developments of the macroeconomic priorities over
the business cycle would therefore find useful some information about the state that drives the
term structure of welfare costs. Since the term structure components are expected excess returns,
present-value logic tells us that return predictors must reveal the state. Therefore, news to return
predictors signal the tradeoff between growth and macroeconomic stability at each juncture of
the business cycle and reveal what periodicities are the priority as well as they forecast future
developments of the macroeconomic priorities.
I turn once more to the model of Lettau and Wachter (2011) to put the point formally. The
model suggests that a sufficient information set to reveal news to the market price of risk is made
by two equity yields and a bond yields. This theoretical consideration motivates the predictive
regressions of section 1.3 that extract the time series of the term structure of welfare costs from the
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Figure 1.6: Time-variation in the term structure of welfare costs in the model of Lettau and Wachter (2011).
hold-to-maturity excess returns on the dividend strips. Outside the world of Lettau and Wachter
the intuition remains the same, provided the policy-maker has some belief about a sufficient set of
variables to predict the hold-to-maturity excess returns that form the term structure of welfare costs.
1.5.2. Risk premia targeting
The result that the aggregate stability is a macroeconomic priority suggests that policy-makers
should pay special attention to the quantity of aggregate cashflow uncertainty. A natural subse-
quent question is whether policy-makers have traction on the aggregate quantity of uncertainty.
Unfortunately, even though it is generally accepted that greater policy forecastability reduces
aggregate uncertainty (e.g., Clarida et al., 1999), the quantitative implications on the economy of
a change in policy uncertainty are not yet well-understood (see for example Baker et al., 2011;
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2011).
Alternatively, we can think of directly targeting the cost of uncertainty. Such a policy regime
would not just target the amount of uncertainty but also the market price of uncertainty. Therefore,
the question is whether it is desirable, from a welfare viewpoint, to target the risk premia that
form the term structure of welfare costs. The advantage of this prescription is that the effect of
policy on equity premia is more documented than the effect of policy on the amount of uncertainty.
For example, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) report evidence about the effect of monetary policy
shocks on a broad array of asset market data, although the theoretical mechanism explaining the
documented effects is still an open question.
Proposition 3 provides a basis for interpreting the cost of uncertainty as a welfare criterion. It
shows how people prefer a smaller cost of fluctuations for a given expected path of consumption
growth and of factor X. The argument is one of second-order stochastic dominance.
Proposition 3. For two lognormally distributed lotteries C(1) and C(2) that have the same expecta-
tion E(C), and for a given level of the factor X, one has that
L(1) < L(2) ⇒ E[U(C(1), X)] > E[U(C(2), X)]
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There is an important caveat in proposition 3 and thereby a qualifier for the risk premia targeting
regime that is desirable. An intervention that reduces the mean cost of fluctuations and that affects
the trend of cashflows or the aggregate level of the other variables in the utility function is not
necessarily welfare-enhancing. Therefore, the desirability of a regime that aims at reducing the cost
of fluctuations at any frequency is not to be taken for granted.
The careful design of desirable policy rules requires a full-fledged structural model able to
account for, on the one hand, the shape of the term structures of equity and interest rates and, on
the other, the stock market’s reaction to a policy shock documented in the literature.
1.6. Conclusion
The term structure of the marginal cost of uncertainty requires little structure to reveal both
a tradeoff between growth and macroeconomic stability and a tradeoff between macroeconomic
stability at different time horizons. I link the notion of cost of uncertainty to a rich set of recent
financial market evidence—in particular, the term structure of equity. I use equity prices extracted
from index option markets to show how recent evidence about the term structures of equity and
interest rates is able to provide new insight into an old question (the first tradeoff) and allows for
studying the new question (the second tradeoff).
Asset markets suggest that cashflow stability is on average a macroeconomic priority and that
marginal increases in aggregate uncertainty are particularly costly, especially in the short run
and during downturns such as in the early 2000s and during the recent financial crisis. However,
macroeconomic priorities can vary substantially across the business cycle. In this context, a
policy-maker can assess the current position of the term structure of welfare costs and forecast its
movements by looking at innovations in the information set made by excess return predictors.
The negative slope of the estimated term structure cannot be captured by today’s leading
consumption-based asset pricing models (Binsbergen et al., 2012; Ludvigson, 2013) and therefore
represents a puzzling piece of evidence with seemingly crucial welfare consequences. The finding of
large and volatile costs imposed by an increase in short-run uncertainty inscribes into a burgeoning
literature that finds high and time-varying short-maturity risk premia as a pervasive phenomenon
across different asset classes (Binsbergen et al., 2012, 2013; Aı¨t-Sahalia et al., 2012; Palhares,
2012). The paper also contributes to the large literature that exploits asset market data to reveal
information about the marginal utility of wealth (for example, Hansen and Jagannathan, 1991;
Alvarez and Jermann, 2004, 2005; Hansen and Scheinkman, 2009; Backus et al., 2013; Hansen,
2013).
The result that the welfare cost of uncertainty is a linear combination of risk premia makes
one of the main tasks of macroeconomics—that of assessing the macroeconomic priorities (Lucas,
2003)—inextricably linked to finance. A major implication of this finding is that a structural model
able to explain the stylized evidence about the term structures of equity and interest rates, and
thereby of welfare costs, should be high on the research agenda. Such a project promises to deliver
important new insights in terms of welfare analysis and in the policy transmission mechanism.
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Appendix
1.A. Relationship with the definitions of Lucas (1987) and Alvarez and Jermann (2004)
Definition (1.1) is more general and slightly different from to the one studied by Lucas (1987)
and Alvarez and Jermann (2004). First, they measure the cost of fluctuations by the uniform
compensation Ωt in
EtU
({(1 + Ωt(θ))Ct+n}∞n=1, {Xt+n}∞n=1) = EtU({θEtCt+n + (1 − θ)Ct+n}∞n=1, {Xt+n}∞n=1)
whereas the definition I consider measures the cost of fluctuations by a compounded compen-
sation. The alternative definition I study can be interpreted as the tradeoff between growth and
macroeconomic stability and thereby has an arguably more intuitive appeal.
Second, I allow for considering the stabilization of only some coordinates of consumption—the
set N in definition (1.1)—rather than of the whole stochastic process. This flexibility allows for a
direct focus on the relevant periodicity of economic fluctuations.
1.B. Proof of proposition 1
I can rewrite equation (1.2) as
LNt =
∑
n∈N
n Et(Mt,t+nCt+n)∑
n∈N n Et(Mt,t+nCt+n)
× 1
n
(Et(Mt,t+n)Et(Ct+n)
Et(Mt,t+nCt+n)
− 1
)
=
∑
n∈N
ωn,tl
(n)
t
1.C. Proof of proposition 1′
Differentiating definition (1.6) with respect to θ, it follows that
LNt =
∑
Et(U1,t+n)Et(Ct+n) + Et(U2,t+n Pt+nWt+n )Et(
Wt+n
Pt+n
Nt+n) − Et(U1,t+nCt+n + U2,t+nNt+n)∑
n Et(U1,t+nCt+n)
(1.C.1)
Then, under assumption 1, expression (1.C.1) becomes
LNt =
∑
Et(Mt,t+n)Et(Dt+n) − Et(Mt,t+nDt+n)∑
n Et(Mt,t+nCt+n)
=
∑
ωn,tl
(n)
t
1.D. The term structure of welfare costs in the model of Lettau and Wachter
The variation of the term structure of welfare costs over the business cycle is driven by the
time-varying components of {`(n)t }, where `(n)t ≡ ln(1 + nl(n)t )1/n is the continously-compounded
marginal cost of uncertainty associated with l(n)t . In the model of Lettau and Wachter (2011), the
technical appendix shows how this component is driven entirely by movements in the market price
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of risk xt as, up to a constant term,
`(n)t =
1
n
{1 − φnx
1 − φxσd +
(1 − φnx
1 − φx −
φnx − φnz
φx − φz
) σz
1 − φz
} σ′d
‖σd‖ xt
where the price of risk follows the autoregressive process xt+1 = (1 − φx)x + φxxt + σxεt+1, with
x the average discount rate. Vectors σ′d, σ
′
z and σ
′
x are respectively the loadings of short-run and
long-run cashflows and of the price of risk on the reduced-form shocks that drive the system, and
φz is the persistence of the predictable component of cashflows.
The term structure of the costs of uncertainty starts from a level of ‖σd‖x, which is about 17
percent per year in the calibration of Lettau and Wachter, to then decay with a slope determined by
the persistence coefficients φz and φx.
The model suggests that a sufficient information set to reveal news to the market price of risk is
made by the first two dividend yields, e(1)t and e
(2)
t , and the first bond yield, y
(1)
t . In fact,
e(1)t = −zt + ‖σd‖xt + rt
e(2)t = −
1 + φz
2
zt +
1 + φr
2
rt +
1 + φx
2
‖σd‖xt + σz − σr2
σ′d
‖σd‖ xt
y(1)t = rt
where the variables are in log-deviations from the mean.
Therefore, the projection of hold-to-maturity excess strip returns on the information set induced
by the history of the observable vector st = [e
(1)
t ; e
(2)
t ; y
(1)
t ] is the true cost of uncertainty `
(1)
t =
E[re,(1)d,t+1|st] = ‖σd‖xt. The residuals of the Wold representation of the information set st then reveal
discount-rate news.
1.E. Proof of proposition 3
First note that
E
[
U
({(1 + L(1))nC(1)t+n}, X)] = E[U({(1 + L(2))nC(2)t+n}, X)]
> E
[
U
({(1 + L(1))nC(2)t+n}, X)] (1.E.2)
because utility is strictly increasing in consumption and the scalars L(1), L(2) are such that L(1) < L(2).
Since the two lotteries have the same mean and are conditionally lognormal, they must differ in
variance.
Suppose C(1) has a larger variance than C(2), i.e., by the projection theorem in Hilbert spaces,
C(1) = C(2) + ε with E[ε|C(2)] = 0. This implies E[U(C(1), X)] = E[E[U(C(1), X)|C(2)]] ≤
E[U(E[C(2) + ε|C(2)], X)] = E[U(C(2), X)] by the projection theorem and Jensen’s inequality.
However, the assumption also implies that the variance of {(1 + L(1))nC(1)t+n} = {(1 + L(1))nC(2)t+n +
(1 + L(1))nεt+n} is larger than the variance of {(1 + L(1))nC(2)t+n}. Therefore, E[U({(1 + L(1))nC(1)t+n}, X)] ≤
E[U({(1 + L(1))nC(2)t+n}, X)], which contradicts expression (1.E.2).
Therefore, it must be that C(2) has a larger variance than C(1) and E[U(C(2), X)] < E[U(C(1), X)].
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Part 2
A New Keynesian Q theory of investment
and the link between inflation and the
stock market
Abstract. The benchmark Q theory links investment with stock prices. In this study, I demonstrate how a New
Keynesian Q (NKQ) theory links investment, stock prices, and inflation, providing a rational explanation for
a comovement between expected inflation and stock prices. The NKQ equation contains a specification error
that complicates estimation. I estimate and test the NKQ theory by matching the return-forecasting ability of
predicted and actual stock prices; this strategy provides orthogonality conditions that bypass the specification
error. Investment accounts for a portion of the component of stock prices that forecasts excess returns;
inflation accounts for the component of stock prices that forecasts the risk-free rate. The benchmark Q theory
fails to capture the second component, and it therefore presents difficulties in accounting for long-horizon
return forecastability. Finally, the fit of the NKQ theory is a dramatic improvement over the benchmark.
2.1. Introduction
How does the Q theory of investment change if prices are sticky? Since the work of Tobin (1969),
the Q theory of investment has been one of the main off-the-shelf production-based explanations
of stock prices. In this study, I focus on the asset pricing implications of the production side of a
widely used monetary macromodel—the New Keynesian model.23
I show how sticky prices add inflation, pi, to the standard Q theory relationship between the
market-book ratio, s, and the investment-capital ratio, ik. Namely, the New Keynesian Q (NKQ)
theory is the equilibrium condition24
st = ηikt − ϑ
λ
Etpit+1 (2.1)
where η is the inverse of the elasticity of investment to Q, λ is the slope of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, and ϑ is a function of other deep parameters. Therefore, monopolistic competition
23A substantial literature attempts to replicate both time-series and cross-sectional asset pricing facts by studying
asset pricing from the first-order conditions that describe an optimal firm’s behavior (for example, Cochrane, 1991,
1996; Lamont, 2000; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2002; Kogan, 2004; Zhang, 2005; Liu, Whited and Zhang, 2009; Belo,
2010; Jermann, 2010, 2013).
24The variables are log-deviations from the steady state.
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and sticky prices in the goods market break down the equality between the marginal and average
Qs that holds in the benchmark frictionless real business cycle model (Hayashi, 1982). In so doing,
the New Keynesian framework provides a rational explanation for a comovement between expected
inflation and stock prices, which is both strongly supported by the data and a long-standing puzzle
in the literature (e.g., Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004; Bekaert and Engstrom, 2010). (“Stock
prices,” “average Q,” and “market-book ratio” are all used interchangeably here.25 )
Like the standard Q theory, however, the NKQ equation is misspecified, i.e., it contains a
specification error, e, defined by
st = ηikt − ϑ
λ
Etpit+1 + et (2.2)
≡ ŝt + et
The misspecification arises because expected inflation is restricted by the New Keynesian
Phillips curve in a way that makes the NKQ equation (2.1) stochastically singular. Because the
specification error is a stochastic process that can have any shape and property, I must restrict its
space for the theory to be rejectable. Namely, I choose to reject the NKQ theory if the predicted
market-book ratio, ŝ, does not have the same return-forecasting ability as the observed market-book
ratio, s. This strategy allows me to overidentify the two free parameters, η and λ. With this
overidentification, I am able to both estimate and test the NKQ theory.
The NKQ theory captures a component of the market-book ratio that is missing in the benchmark
Q theory. The investment-capital ratio forecasts returns in the short run. Inflation forecasts returns
in the long run. Stock prices forecast returns both in the short and in the long run. As predicted
by the NKQ theory, I can therefore replicate, at least in part, the return-forecasting ability of
the market-book ratio by combining inflation with the investment-capital ratio. The benchmark
frictionless alternative has instead a more difficult time accounting for the return-forecasting ability
of the market-book ratio, because the investment-capital ratio alone cannot forecast long-run returns
over the whole sample. Also the fit of the NKQ theory is dramatically better than that of the
benchmark Q theory. The predicted and observed investment-capital ratios have a 61% correlation
(a 120% improvement over the benchmark), while the predicted and observed market-book ratios
have a 72% correlation (a 160% improvement over benchmark).
Stock price information helps therefore recover two important structural parameters that describe
the monetary transmission mechanism. In particular, the restrictions on the joint distribution of
observables imposed by the NKQ theory allow for estimates of the slope of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, λ, that are more accurate than is standard in the New Keynesian literature.
2.1.1. Long-horizon forecasting regressions
My approach to estimation most closely relates to Cochrane (1991) and Lettau and Ludvigson
(2002), who study the successes and failures of the benchmark Q story in terms of long-horizon
25There is a conceptual difference between average Q and the market-book ratio, however, in my setting the
replacement cost of capital coincides with its book value and thereby average Q equals the market-book ratio.
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forecasting regressions. Like these authors, I use return forecastability as a crucial factor to evaluate
the Q theory.26
In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) setting, the benchmark Q theory describes
the optimal investment choice for a firm in a RBC model with adjustment costs to capital accumula-
tion (Hayashi, 1982) and consists of an exact linear relationship between the market-book ratio and
the investment-capital ratio,
st = ηikt (2.3)
As shown by Cochrane (1991) and Restoy and Rockinger (1994), the benchmark Q theory can
also be expressed in (quasi-)first differences as the equality
rmt+1 = r
I
t+1 (2.4)
between the return on the market portfolio, rm—a claim to the stream of the firms’ profits—and
the return to investment, rI—a claim to the marginal product of capital, net of its depreciation,
generated by the investment of a unit of value.
Against this background, there are two main reasons to focus on long-run forecasting regressions.
First, the literature documents a failure of the benchmark Q theory in explaining the short-run
correlation between investment and stock returns. In fact, some authors document a short-run
correlation not statistically different from zero between investment and future stock returns and
even a contemporaneous covariation with the wrong sign (Lamont, 2000; Lettau and Ludvigson,
2002). The problem disappears, however, over longer horizons, as investment expenditures seem to
react with a lag to stock price developments.
Second, Cochrane (1991) uses forecasting regressions to test equation (2.4). Although, with
no error, equation (2.4) is false, he shows how its weaker implication E(rmt+1 − rIt+1|X) = 0, for any
information set X known at time t, fares surprisingly well. Cochrane does not reject the prediction
that forecasts of investment and stock returns are equal in an information set that includes the
term spread (on both government and corporate bonds), the market return, the dividend-price ratio
and the investment-capital ratio. He also finds that, depending on the frequency considered, the
unconditional correlation between rm and rI is substantial, with a value ranging from 25-40%.
Cochrane also finds, however, that dividend-price ratios can forecast stock returns but cannot
forecast long-horizon investment returns; investment and stock returns appear to have a different
low-frequency component.
The NKQ theory remains consistent with the hits of the benchmark Q theory; because the NKQ
theory results from a first-order approximation, the NKQ theory still predicts E(rmt+1 − rIt+1|X) = 0.27
In addition, the NKQ theory appears successful where the benchmark Q theory fails. Inflation in
the NKQ theory can account for a low-frequency component in stock prices.
26There is extensive literature that provides empirical evidence of predictable and volatile expected returns (see
Cochrane, 2011; Koijen and Nieuwerburgh, 2011, for a survey). In this regard, the equity dividend yields (and other
stationary transformations of stock prices, such as the market-book ratio) have a special status as return predictors,
because they robustly relate to returns by the Campbell and Shiller (1988) identity.
27The loglinearization ignores all second-order risk-premia. The appendix shows in detail this fact by proving how,
up to a first-order approximation, the return on investment equals the market return plus an unforecastable term.
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Figure 2.1: Market-book ratio, investment-capital ratio and inflation rate (demeaned logs).
2.1.2. Interpreting the relation between inflation and stock prices
Figure 2.1 offers a first measure to inspect the fit of the Q theory. The market-book ratio closely
tracks the investment-capital ratio in the last 20 years of the sample (where the correlation is 73%),
but it fails to do so over the whole 60-year sample (where the correlation is a mere 25%). Because
there is room for improvement along this first dimension, some of the extant literature is skeptical of
the standard Q theory (Caballero, 1999). A further difficulty for our study is that our theory should
explain the dramatic increase in the correlation from the first two-thirds to the last third of the
sample. Against this background, the inflation rate also displays a high unconditional correlation
with both stock prices (-55%) and investment (32%). We can also observe how inflation loses its
volatility in the last 20 years or so, which is when the investment-capital ratio starts to effectively
track the market-book ratio. This is exactly what the NKQ theory would predict. The addition
of inflation to the standard Q relationship helps explain the time-varying correlation between the
market-book ratio and the investment-capital ratio.
The strong negative correlation between a stationary transformations of stock prices (such as
market-book and price-dividend ratios) and inflation (or expected inflation) is both well-documented
and puzzling, at least from a rational expectations perspective (e.g., Modigliani and Cohn, 1979;
Ritter and Warr, 2002; Sharpe, 2002; Asness, 2003; Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004; Cohen,
Polk and Vuolteenaho, 2005; Bekaert and Engstrom, 2010). In a context of price rigidities,
expected inflation rationally signals something about the real cashflow component of market-book
ratios;28 high inflation associates to low expected markups and thereby to low expected aggregate
dividends. Therefore, the New Keynesian framework offers a parsimonious story to make sense of
the correlation between stock prices and inflation as a rational outcome.
28The NKQ theory provides micro-foundations to a hypothesis that goes back at least to Fama (1981).
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2.1.3. Identification of important structural parameters
Another contribution of this paper is the use of stock market data to estimate macroeconomically
important structural parameters and test the importance of nominal rigidities.29
On the one hand, by only adding adjustment costs of capital accumulation to the basic New
Keynesian model (Galı´, 2008), one obtains the NKQ theory, which restricts the joint distribution of
stock prices, investment and inflation, and thus offers more structure to identify the slope of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve, λ. This structure significantly increases the accuracy of the estimated λ,
as shown in table 2.2. Notice in fact how the parameter λ is quite controversial quantitatively in the
extant literature. Galı´ and Gertler (1999), Galı´, Gertler and Lo´pez-Salido (2005) and Kleibergen
and Mavroeidis (2009) provide point estimates between 0.01 and 0.03, with standard deviations of a
similar magnitude, and there is still debate about the strength of the identification (e.g., Mavroeidis,
2005; Nason and Smith, 2008; Canova and Sala, 2009).
On the other hand, the NKQ theory allows for identifying the elasticity of Q to investment, η,
whose range of values is also subject to considerable disagreement in the literature.30
2.2. A New Keynesian Q theory
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms i ∈ [0, 1] choose nominal prices {P∗t+h(i)},
real output {Yt+h(i)}, labor demand {Nt+h(i)} and real investment {It+h(i)} to maximize the expected
discounted value of profits
Et
∞∑
h=0
Mt,t+h
[Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
Yt+h(i) − (1 − τ)Wt+hPt+h Nt+h(i) − (1 − τ)It+h(i) − Tt+h
]
subject to
Yt+h(i) =
(Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
)−ε
Yt+h
Yt+h(i) = At+hKt+h(i)αNt+h(i)1−α
Kt+h+1(i) = (1 − δ)Kt+h(i) + Φ
( It+h(i)
Kt+h(i)
)
Kt+h(i)
Pt+h(i) =
P∗t+h(i), with probability (1 − θ)Pt+h−1(i), with probability θ
In this formula, M is the stochastic discount factor for real payoffs, P is the nominal price of a
unit of consumption (the numeraire), W is the nominal wage rate, A is technology and K is the real
capital stock. Prices are sticky (Calvo, 1983), so that firms can reset their prices at any given time
with probability 1 − θ only. There are capital adjustment costs. The adjustment cost function Φ(·) is
such that Φ(I/K) = δ, Φ′(I/K) = 1 and its curvature η ≡ −[Φ′′(I/K)I/K]/Φ′(I/K) are constant and
29Bekaert, Cho and Moreno (2010) use bond term structure data to (just-)identify a New Keynesian macromodel.
30One portion of the literature (e.g., King and Wolman, 1996; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999) suggests values
for η between 0 and 1, while another area (e.g., Abel, 1980; Jermann, 1998) prefers values between 2 and 5.
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positive in the steady state. The government levies lump-sum taxes, Tt = τWt/Pt + τIt, to finance
an employment and investment subsidy, τ, which is in place to offset any steady-state distortion
caused by the monopolistic competition.31 The parameters δ and α are the average depreciation
rate of capital and capital share in value added, respectively.
This problem is the one of the firm in a New Keynesian model with firm-specific capital
accumulation (Woodford, 2005; Sveen and Weinke, 2005).
2.2.1. Exact model
The first-order conditions for an interior optimum are
∞∑
h=0
θhEtMt,t+hPε−1t+h Yt+h(i)
[
P∗t (i) − M̂Ct+h(i)Pt+h
]
= 0 (2.5)
MCt(i)MPNt(i) = (1 − τ)WtPt
Qt(i) =
[
Φ′
( It(i)
Kt(i)
)]−1
(2.6)
EtMt,t+1RIt+1(i) = 1 (2.7)
with
RIt+1(i) ≡
M̂Ct+1(i)MPKt+1(i) +
(
(1 − δ) + Φ
(
It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
− Φ′
(
It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
Qt+1(i)
Qt(i)
where Q is marginal Q, MPN is the marginal productivity of labor, MC is the real marginal cost of
output, RI is the gross real rate of return to investment, MPK is the marginal productivity of capital
and M̂C ≡ MMC, withM ≡ ε/(ε − 1) the average price markup that firms charge over marginal
costs because of monopolistic competition in the market for goods.
Firms then distribute profits as dividends Pt+hDt+h to consumers.
Next, I define average Q as
S t(i) ≡ Et
∑∞
h=1 Mt,t+hDt+h(i)
Kt+1(i)
the ratio of two different valuations of the capital stock of firm i: the market price (expected
discounted profits) and the book value.
Average Q is related to marginal Q through
S t(i)Kt+1(i) = Qt(i)Kt+1(i) +
∞∑
h=1
EtMt,t+h
[Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
− M̂Ct+h(i)
]
Yt+h(i) (2.8)
Equation (2.8), which I prove in the appendix, states that the total value of the ith firm is the
sum of the marginal value of the capital stock and the expected discounted value of future profits
31τ = 1/ε achieves this goal.
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due to imperfect competition on the market for goods. This result extends the finding of Hayashi
(1982) to a model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition in the market for goods.
Finally, by the degree-one homogeneity of the production function, the aggregate real marginal
cost, MCt = Wt/PtMPNt, relates to the aggregate labor share of income, Lt ≡ WtNt/PtYt, through
(1 − α)MCt = Lt
hence, in deviations from the mean, mct = `t (Galı´ and Gertler, 1999).
2.2.2. Approximate model
A loglinearization of equation (2.5) around the zero-inflation steady state yields a standard New
Keynesian Phillips curve (Woodford, 2005; Sveen and Weinke, 2005), which drives inflation as
pit = βEtpit+1 + λ`t
= −λEt
∞∑
j=0
β jµt+ j
(2.9)
where µt = −`t is the average price markup. Thus, λ is the elasticity of inflation to expected long-run
markups.32 Because of nominal rigidities, the wedge µt is responsible for all deviations from the
first best equilibrium.33
Equation
qt = ηikt (2.10)
approximates the optimal investment choice (2.6) whereby in equilibrium the marginal value of a
unit of new capital equals its marginal cost.
Finally, as indicated in the appendix, the linearized version of equation (2.8) around the
undistorted steady state combined with equations (2.9) and (2.10) is
st = ηikt − ϑ
λ
Etpit+1
= ηikt − ϑ
βλ
pit +
ϑ
β
`t
(2.11)
where ϑ ≡ [1−β(1−δ)]/α. This equation represents the NKQ theory, which describes an equilibrium
condition that holds when prices adjust sluggishly in the goods market and are flexible in financial
32Note that the the relation between the elasticity, λ, and the Calvo frequency of price adjustment, θ, is nonstandard
under firm-specific capital accumulation. This issue is however irrelevant to my purposes, because I focus on estimating
the parameter λ. In this respect, one may ask why I estimate λ rather than θ. The answer is that the parameter θ has
a nice microeconomic interpretation, but a fragile link to the structural equations of the New Keynesian model. The
structural equations depend on θ only through λ. However, the link between θ and λ is not robust, for example, to the
choice of modeling investment through a rental market or through firm-specific capital accumulation. The connection
between the structural equations and λ is more robust.
33There is inflation if the desired markup differs from the constant, natural markup. The natural markup is zero when
the efficient unemployment subsidy is in place.
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markets. Note in particular how the equation is robust to systematic changes in the policy rule in
place; for example, the equation is robust to a switch in policy regime of the type studied by Clarida
et al. (2000) or to entering a period in which the zero lower bound on the interest rate is binding.
The economic mechanism behind equation (2.11) is straightforward. The rewards to stock
owners come from two sources: the marginal product of capital, which they own, and the mo-
nopolistic profits that firms realize by charging a markup on output. Through the marginal Q, the
investment-capital ratio signals future changes in the first source; equation (2.10) predicts that
periods of high investment associate to times in which the marginal value of a unit of new capital
is high. Using the New Keynesian Phillips curve, inflation signals future changes in the second
source; equation (2.9) suggests that inflation is high if long-run expected markups, hence profits
and dividends, are low.
In this study, equation (2.11) is the theory tested. Note that I can rewrite equation (2.11) as the
(quasi-)first differenced NKQ equation
rmt+1 = r
I
t+1 −
ϑ
λ
(Et+1 − Et)pit+1 (2.12)
where rIt+1 = αϑ(mpkt+1 − µt+1) + βηikt+1 − ηikt, which is available in the appendix. Shocks to
inflation signal low future profits and thereby decrease the return on equity relative to the return on
investment.
2.3. Identification
I choose standard values for the uncontroversial parameters. I estimate the key parameters η
and λ. The values I consider are given in table 2.1.
α capital share in value added 0.35
β subjective discount factor 0.99
δ depreciation rate 0.025
η inverse of elasticity of investment-capital ratio to marginal Q to be estimated
λ elasticity of inflation to expected long-run markups to be estimated
Table 2.1: Deep parameters
In estimation, I use U.S. time series at a quarterly frequency running from 1952 to 2011.34
The market-book ratio is the market value of nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business net worth
over the book value of corporate equities (Fed Flow of Funds Accounts). Investment is the real
private nonresidential fixed investment (BEA-NIPA database). Following Cochrane (1991, 2011),
capital is constructed from investment using the quarterly depreciation rate δ.35 Inflation is the
34The 1952-2011 period is likely characterized by non-linearities in policy, such as changes in the policy regime
(Clarida et al., 2000) and prolonged periods at the zero lower bound. This non-linearity is inconsequential for the
estimation of the NKQ equation because its derivation is independent of the policy rule in place.
35Given the time series for investment {it}, I use the capital accumulation equation to compute ikt+1 = ∆it+1 + ikt −
δ(ikt − ln δ); this construction is accurate up to a term of second-order importance.
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change in GDP deflator (BEA-NIPA). The labor share is the nonfarm business sector labor share of
income (BEA-NIPA). The market return is the return on the CRSP NYSE value-weighted stock
index (CRSP database).
Using the calibrated values, the last term in the NKQ equation (2.11) becomes quantitatively
irrelevant.36 Thus, the NKQ theory really adds only one regressor—the inflation rate. Any increase
in the fit of the NKQ theory with respect to the benchmark Q theory is entirely due to inflation.
2.3.1. Misspecification
The Q theory—both in the RBC version (2.3) and in the NK version (2.11)—is an exact
relationship among the variables that should hold in every time period. Of course, the data reject
the stochastic singularity predicted by equation (2.11) at any level of significance.37 Therefore,
equation (2.11) contains some specification error, which by definition can have any shape and
property.38
Formally, I assume that there is a DSGE model describing the relevant time series. The model’s
solution then has the state-space representation, which I assume to be linear,
ζt = Aζt−1 + But
Xt = Cζt + Dut
(2.13)
where Xt = [st; ikt; pit; `t], ζt is a vector of states and ut ∼ Niid(0, I) is a vector of structural shocks.
Thus, the specification error, e, defined in the NKQ equation (2.2) is
et =
[
1 −η ϑ
βλ
−ϑ
β
]
Xt
=
[
1 −η ϑ
βλ
−ϑ
β
] (
C[I − AL]−1B + D)ut
where L is the lag operator. The NKQ theory is silent regarding the orthogonality of et and the
elements of Xt. The specification error is likely autocorrelated and conditionally heteroskedastic.
These facts forbid any estimation of the NKQ equation based on the orthogonality of its residual
with some instrument (including, e.g., OLS).
36The labor share of income has a relatively low variance, while the constant term [1 − β(1 − δ)]/αβ ≈ 0.10 drives
the variance further down by two orders of magnitude.
37Consider the New Keynesian Phillips curve (2.9) to write the NKQ equation as Etεt+1 ≡ Et[(ϑ/λ)pit+1−ηikt+st] = 0.
Then, a possible approach is a GMM estimation on the orthogonality condition E(xtεt+1) = 0, where xt = [st; ikt; pit; `t].
Although attractive in principle, this approach fails because of the prediction of stochastic singularity: (a) since the four
moments E(xtεt+1) = 0 are linearly dependent, the efficient weighting matrix diverges to infinity and therefore rejects
the theory at any level of significance; (b) if we consider only a subset of three moments out of four, then estimates
differ widely across subsets; moreover, [st; ikt; pit] leads to strong rejection, since ` is quantitatively irrelevant, so that
we have a near stochastic singularity problem.
38The specification error includes approximation errors due to the Taylor expansion, likely measurement errors in
the time series, variations in flexible-price desired markups, the possibility that the labor share of income is not an
exact proxy for the real marginal cost, or the fact that the simple NKQ theory abstracts from elements that might affect
the problem of firms (e.g., taxation).
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2.3.2. Identification strategy
My identification strategy is that observed stock prices, st, and predicted stock prices, ŝt =
ηikt − (ϑ/βλ)pit + (ϑ/β)`t, should have the same ability to forecast returns.39 This requirement
restricts the space of the stochastic process {et} and defines what I require to not reject the NKQ
theory.
Regardless of the characteristics of the specification error e, I only take the Q theory seriously
if it explains some important component of stock prices. From an asset pricing perspective, the
component of st that forecasts returns is of crucial importance because, by ICAPM logic, it is the
component that is priced (Merton, 1973; Harrison and Kreps, 1979). The NKQ theory might be
inaccurate along several dimensions (st and ŝt might move on different structural shocks and also
on different states, as shown by the general form of et) but, at least, st and ŝt should reveal the same
sources of priced movement in the economy.
To better grasp the identification strategy, it is important to recall that there is an identity linking
the market return and the market-book ratio: a version of the approximate Campbell and Shiller
(1988) identity, rmt+1 = βst+1 − st + (1 − β)dkt+1, where dkt+1 ≡ dt+1 − kt+1 + β1−β∆kt+2. This identity
allows us to recover from the state-space model (2.13) the reduced form of the market return as
rmt+1 = ψ
′
r,ζζt +ψ
′
r,uut +ε
r
t+1, where ε
r
t is some linear combination of the structural shock, ut. Therefore,
the predictable component of the cumulated return from t to t + h, rmt→t+h ≡
∑h
j=1 r
m
t+ j, is
Et(rmt→t+h) = E(r
m
t→t+h|ut)
= ψ′r,ζ[I − A]−1[I − Ah]ζt + ψ′r,uut
where ut = [u0, ..., ut] is the true information set at time t, and by the law of iterated projections
E(rmt→t+h|st) = ψ′r,ζ[I − A]−1[I − Ah]E(ζt|st) + ψ′r,uE(ut|st)
Thus, the predictor st (and analogously for ŝt) reveals a slice of the true information set, ut, i.e.,
the slice of the systematic movement in ex-ante returns that is perfectly correlated with st.
2.3.3. Moments for GMM estimation
In the language of the generalized method of moments (GMM), I am assuming that the observed
market-book ratio, s, is orthogonal to the forecast error in predicting the cumulative market return,
rm·→·+h, with the theoretical market-book ratio, ŝ, at all yearly horizons, h.
Formally, I define the predicted market-book ratio, ŝt = ηikt − (ϑ/βλ)pit + (ϑ/β)`t, so that
st = ŝt + et, and I consider the forecasting regressions with ŝt as a predictor,
rmt→t+h = a
(h) + b(h) ŝt + εt+h (2.14)
39I focus in particular on replicating the ability of the market-book ratio to forecast nominal returns, rather than real
returns. This choice is motivated by the fact that the market-book ratio forecasts nominal returns more strongly than
real returns; nominal returns provide therefore more information to estimate and test the NKQ equation. The results are
however similar if I consider real returns.
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Since the regressors are log-deviations from the mean, the constant terms simply equal the
sample mean cumulative returns. For a best mean squared error forecast, I then estimate (2.14)
through the orthogonality condition E(̂stεt+h) = 0. These H moments estimate H parameters b(h). I
then define ŝt as a good approximation for st if ŝt contains the part of st that forecasts returns, i.e., if
E(stεt+h) = 0, so that adding st as a predictor in equation (2.14) does not improve the forecasts (in
the appendix I demonstrate this implication).40 These H moments estimate the two key parameters
[η, λ].
Because the moment
E
( [̂st
st
]
εt+h
)
= 0, h ∈ {1, ...,H} (2.15)
pins down [η,−ϑ/βλ] only up to a multiple, I add the moment condition,
var(st) = var(̂st) (2.16)
which is a weak implication of the NKQ equation (2.11), to pin down [η, λ] uniquely.41 Thus, the
identifying condition (2.15) restricts the stochastic process {et} to the process that has the smallest
ability to forecast returns. This restriction pins down the stochastic process up to a scale factor.
Then, the identifying condition (2.16) pins down the scale factor by restricting the variance of the
stochastic process.42
Note how the estimation procedure allows for a test of overidentification with H − 1 degrees
of freedom. This test is a good test for the NKQ theory, because nothing implies that there are
parameters [η, λ] that make ŝ display a return-forecasting power similar to that of s.
The final object I need to specify is H, hence the set of h-year ahead forecasts relevant for
estimation. Ideally, I would match the forecasts indefinitely into the future, i.e., H = ∞. However,
because the sample is finite, I must pick some finite H. To determine which value of H to use, one
must trade off, as H increases, more information due to more moments and less information due to
a shorter remaining sample. To gain insight into this tradeoff, I initially pick different values for H.
2.4. Estimation
Table 2.2 reports one- and two-step GMM estimates of the key parameters and J tests of the
theoretical orthogonality conditions. The estimated η is lower for longer forecast horizons, H. With
a threshold value H as high as 15 years, I can still observe how the information gained with more
estimating moments outweighs the information lost due to the fact that a higher H leaves fewer
data points available for estimation. Thus, from this point on, I use H = 15.
40An equivalent way to state the identifying condition E(stεt+h) = 0 is as E(etεt+h) = 0, because E(stεt+h) =
E(̂stεt+h) + E(etεt+h) and E(̂stεt+h) = 0.
41I relax the identifying condition (2.16) in section 2.4.4 below.
42Note how the 2H + 1 moment conditions can all be true in population at the same time, if et does not account for
the part of st that forecasts returns (by present-value logic it must forecast future dividend-capital ratios) and if it allows
ŝt to display fluctuations with an amplitude equal to st.
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η λ σ(η) σ(λ) t(η) t(λ) J P(χ2H−1 > J)
H = 10
1st step 3.54 0.001 (0.91) (0.0003) 3.89 3.84 12.52 0.19
2nd step 2.98 0.001 (0.89) (0.0001) 3.34 7.70 18.83 0.04
H = 12
1st step 3.30 0.001 (0.84) (0.0003) 3.95 4.57 13.52 0.26
2nd step 3.01 0.001 (0.81) (0.0001) 3.73 8.42 16.89 0.11
H = 15
1st step 2.91 0.001 (0.78) (0.0002) 3.73 5.61 23.12 0.06
2nd step 2.62 0.001 (0.43) (0.0001) 6.06 14.31 24.92 0.04
Table 2.2: GMM estimates, matching up to H-year ahead return forecasts and variance of the market-book ratio,
observed and predicted. Quarterly data, 1952q1-2011q2 (238 points). J is the Hansen (1982) statistic for testing
overidentifying moments. Newey and West (1987) HAC standard errors use eight leads and lags and a Bartlett kernel.
Weighting matrices are the identity (first step) and the spectral density at frequency zero (second step).
2.4.1. Estimates
The precision in both the one- and two-step estimates is quite high, and the precision in the
second step rises with a higher J statistic. Thus, at a 5% size level, I could reject that moments are
zero in population (although not at a 1% level). However, I must use some judgment to place this
rather low statistical support into perspective. After all, I am working with a very simple theory,
which reduces all priced variation in stock prices to movements in investment and inflation. The
high values of the J statistics point to a margin for improvement, but the simple NKQ theory already
succeeds along several dimensions. By simply adding inflation to the benchmark Q relation, both
the fit and the return-forecasting performance of the Q theory improve dramatically. Moreover, the
evidence forcefully rejects ϑ/λ = 0, which indicates that the benchmark Q theory with only the
investment-capital ratio fails to pass the same J test at a much higher level of significance, because
the investment-capital ratio cannot possibly mimic the forecasting power of the market-book ratio
over long horizons.43
To give a visual complement to the low volatility of the estimates, figure 2.2 shows the shape
of the in-sample GMM objective in the [η, λ]-plane. The high curvature along both dimensions
at the estimated values can be observed in this figure. There appears to be no evidence of weak
identification issues, especially for the New Keynesian Phillips curve parameter λ. This is a large
gain in precision when compared to the estimates available in the literature (e.g., Galı´ and Gertler,
1999; Galı´, Gertler and Lo´pez-Salido, 2005; Kleibergen and Mavroeidis, 2009).
43There is a long-standing debate about the statistical significance of long-horizon forecasting regressions. These
regressions might not carry more statistical power than short-run regressions (Hodrick, 1992; Campbell, 2001;
Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw, 2008; Cochrane, 2008a). The debate concerns my identification strategy in that
difficulties in estimating the distribution of long-run forecasts affect the second GMM step. Table 2.2 and figure 2.2,
however, suggest a small difference between the first and the second GMM step.
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Figure 2.2: Graph of GMM objective as functions of [η, λ], optimal b(h) fixed.
Horizon h rmt→t+h = a + bst + εt+h
(years) b t(b) R2
1 −0.10 −2.62 0.08
3 −0.24 −3.12 0.23
5 −0.35 −4.26 0.33
8 −0.55 −5.17 0.53
10 −0.70 −5.37 0.61
12 −0.82 −5.00 0.62
15 −1.02 −8.86 0.63
Horizon h rmt→t+h = a + bŝ
rbc
t + εt+h r
m
t→t+h = a + bŝ
nk
t + εt+h
(years) b t(b) R2 b t(b) R2
1 −0.11 −1.98 0.04 −0.04 −1.23 0.01
3 −0.28 −2.54 0.11 −0.11 −1.74 0.05
5 −0.38 −2.29 0.15 −0.23 −3.52 0.14
8 −0.45 −1.82 0.14 −0.42 −6.78 0.34
10 −0.40 −1.42 0.08 −0.53 −7.36 0.39
12 −0.06 −0.21 0.00 −0.57 −5.44 0.36
15 0.48 2.34 0.08 −0.65 −5.63 0.35
Table 2.3: OLS regressions of h-year nominal returns on the market-book ratio, observed and predicted. Standard
errors correct for overlapping, with a Bartlett kernel to ensure positive semidefiniteness of the asymptotic variance.
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Figure 2.3: Stylized return-forecasting ability of NKQ theory vs. benchmark Q theory. R2 is of the OLS regression
rmt→t+h = a + bxt + εt+h, for different predictors x. The t statistic is for testing b = 0.
Table 2.3 compares the return-forecasting performance of the observed market-book ratio, of
the benchmark Q prediction, ŝrbc = ηik, and of the NKQ prediction, ŝnk = ηik − (ϑ/βλ)pi + (ϑ/β)`.
The benchmark prediction performs well in the short term, but it fails in the long term. The
NKQ prediction instead replicates reasonably well the return-forecasting ability of the observed
market-book ratio. Figure 2.3 offers a visual representation of these facts, by reporting R2 in the
return-forecasting regressions with the three predictors. We can observe the reason for the high
values of the J statistics in table 2.2: there is still a margin for improvement in replicating the strong
return-forecasting ability of the market-book ratio.
2.4.2. Stylized facts driving the results
The predicted market-book ratio in the NKQ theory is a linear combination of the investment-
capital ratio and the inflation rate. Table 2.4 indicates how the investment-capital ratio and the
inflation rate forecast market returns at different yearly horizons. The NKQ theory predicts that
either investments are high or inflation is low when ex-ante returns are low. The regressions in
table 2.4 verify these claims. Of course, the return-forecasting ability of the investment-capital
ratio is equal to that of the benchmark Q prediction for the market-book ratio. The inability of the
benchmark Q prediction to account for the component of stock prices that forecast long-run returns
is therefore entirely due to the inability of investment to forecast long-run returns.
Figure 2.4 plots the results of the forecasting regressions for investment and inflation, which
are predictors of both returns and excess returns. We can decompose any expected return into a
risk premium and the risk-free rate. Figure 2.4 demonstrates how inflation forecasts risk-free rates
but not excess market returns, except perhaps over short horizons. The investment-capital ratio
forecasts excess returns, but not over long horizons. The market-book ratio forecasts excess returns
at all horizons, and it forecasts returns even more strongly. Thus, a natural interpretation of the
58
20 40 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
M/B as predictor
horizon, quarters
20 40 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
I/K as predictor
horizon, quarters
 
 
R2 (%)
|t|
|t| = 1.96
20 40 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Infl. rate as predictor
horizon, quarters
(a) Returns.
20 40 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
M/B as predictor
horizon, quarters
20 40 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
I/K as predictor
horizon, quarters
 
 
R2 (%)
|t|
|t| = 1.96
20 40 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Infl. rate as predictor
horizon, quarters
(b) Excess returns.
Figure 2.4: Stylized return-forecasting ability of market-book ratio, investment-capital ratio and inflation rate. R2 is
of the OLS regressions rmt→t+h = a + bxt + εt+h and r
m
t→t+h − r ft→t+h = a + bxt + εt+h, for different predictors x. The t
statistic is for testing b = 0.
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Horizon h rmt→t+h = a + bikt + εt+h r
m
t→t+h = a + bpit + εt+h
(years) b t(b) R2 b t(b) R2
1 −0.30 −1.98 0.04 −0.10 −0.03 0.00
3 −0.74 −2.54 0.11 1.32 0.25 0.00
5 −1.00 −2.29 0.15 7.99 0.94 0.02
8 −1.17 −1.82 0.14 23.01 2.87 0.13
10 −1.04 −1.42 0.08 32.59 4.84 0.20
12 −0.15 −0.21 0.00 39.49 6.40 0.27
15 1.26 2.34 0.08 51.30 7.67 0.41
Table 2.4: OLS regressions of h-year nominal returns on market-book ratio, investment-capital ratio and inflation rate.
Standard errors correct for overlapping, with a Bartlett kernel to ensure positive semidefiniteness of the asymptotic
variance.
results in table 2.3 is that inflation embeds the component of the market-book ratio that forecasts
risk-free rates and the investment-capital ratio part of the component that predicts excess returns.
Thus, figure 2.4 shows the reason for the high values of the J statistics in table 2.2. The
investment-capital ratio and inflation cannot account for the part of the market-book ratio that
forecasts long-run excess returns. This missing component that forecasts excess returns would
account for the remaining difference in forecasting power between observed and predicted market-
book ratios that we see in figure 2.3. Against this background, note how the high correlation
between market-book and investment-capital ratios in the last 20 years of the sample suggests that
the two ratios have a similar forecasting power over this period. This observation suggests that the
seemingly missing component in the predicted market-book ratio has stabilized in the last 20 years.
2.4.3. Fit
Equation (2.11) is an equilibrium condition that should hold between the market-book ratio,
the investment-capital ratio and the inflation rate. From a limited-information approach, if any two
of the three variables (market-book, investment-capital and inflation) are fixed, they should track
the remaining variable relatively well—in spite of the unknown error term in the relation. In this
section, I compare each one of the three time series to the respective NKQ prediction, which is
obtained by rearranging equation (2.11) with the market-book ratio, the investment-capital ratio or
the inflation rate on the left-hand side.
Figure 2.5 demonstrates how the predicted time series track their observable counterparts.
To analytically evaluate the fit of the predicted market-book ratio to the observed time series,
some R2 measure is required. Because, for a generic linear regression yt = x′tβ + εt, the equality
var(E[yt|xt])/var(yt) = corr(yt, E[yt|xt])2 breaks down outside standard OLS, I report both R2
measures. corr(yt, E[yt|xt]) is a meaningful measure because a correlation of ρ indicates that
the qualitative prediction is correct 50(1 + ρ)% of the times. var(E[yt|xt])/var(yt) quantitatively
compares the predicted variance to the actual variance, which is also a useful measure.44
44A third R2 measure is 1 − [var(εt)/var(yt)], however, outside OLS this measure is likely to take on values that are
negative or greater than one, which are meaningless.
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Figure 2.5: U.S. time series, observed and predicted by benchmark and New Keynesian Q theories.
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Market-book ratio
RBC: corr(s, ŝ) 0.28 var(̂s)/var(s) 0.37
NK: corr(s, ŝ) 0.72 var(̂s)/var(s) 0.93
Investment-capital ratio
RBC: corr(ik, îk) 0.28 var(îk)/var(ik) 2.72
NK: corr(ik, îk) 0.61 var(îk)/var(ik) 2.39
Inflation
NK: corr(pi, p̂i) 0.72 var(̂pi)/var(pi) 1.12
Table 2.5: R2 measures of fit of predictions.
Table 2.5 reports the unconditional correlation between the observed and predicted time series.
The simple addition of inflation dramatically improves the fit of the Q theory with respect to
the benchmark frictionless case. Predicted and observed investment-capital ratios have a 61%
correlation, which represents an improvement of 120% over the benchmark. The predicted and
observed market-book ratios have a 72% correlation, which is a 160% improvement over benchmark.
The predicted inflation rates track the observed rates with a 72% correlation.
2.4.4. Robustness
I next turn to relaxing the identifying condition (2.16), var(st) = var(̂st), and use only the
requirement that theoretical and actual stock prices have equal ability in forecasting returns. Note
how identifying condition (2.15),
E
( [̂st
st
]
εt+h
)
= 0, h ∈ {1, ...,H}
is only able to set-identify the key parameters η and λ, because ŝt and κ ŝt have the same fore-
casting ability, for any nonzero multiple κ. Indeed, this fact shows how the success of the NKQ
story in explaining a relation between stock prices, investment and inflation is robust to relaxing
assumption (2.16).
Figure 2.6 plots the fist step GMM objective and shows the identified set for the key parameters.
The GMM objective displays a ridge that describes all combinations of the key parameters [η; λ] that
associate to an equal return-forecasting ability, which remains as depicted in figure 2.3. For obvious
reasons, this estimation procedure is no longer suitable to pin down the structural parameters
uniquely or to discuss the fit of the NKQ theory, but it remains entirely appropriate to test the NKQ
equation and to give empirical content to the predicted linkage between inflation and stock prices.
2.5. Conclusion
Along several dimensions, the New Keynesian Q theory fits well postwar U.S. data. The addition
of inflation to the benchmark Q theory goes a long way in accounting for the states that drive both
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Figure 2.6: Graph of GMM objective as function of [η, λ], optimal b(h) fixed, set-identified case. The weighting matrix
is the identity matrix.
stock prices and investment. Coincidentally, the results contribute to the macro-finance literature by
providing theoretical support to the finding of Bekaert and Engstrom (2010) that expected inflation
is responsible for the high comovement between stock yields and nominal variables such as bond
yields (which, for example, is the basis of the so-called ‘Fed model’).
There is still a relatively small low-frequency component in excess returns that is forecast
by empirical stock prices and not by predicted stock prices. However, this discrepancy between
predicted and observed stock prices seems to have nearly disappeared in the last 20 years. This
observation suggests that such a missing component in the predicted market-book ratio has stabilized
in the last 20 years.
Appendix
2.A. Average Q and marginal Q
Along the lines of Hayashi (1982), I derive the relation between the unobservable marginal Q
and the observable average Q, which I denote by S t.
By the degree-one homogeneity of the production function and the optimality conditions,
Pt(i)Yt(i) − (1 − τ)WtPt Nt(i) − (1 − τ)It(i) − Tt = Pt(i)Yt(i) −
Wt
Pt
Nt(i) − It(i) + T t(i)
= M̂Ct(i)MPKt(i)Kt(i) + [Pt(i) − M̂Ct(i)]Yt(i) + T t(i)
(2.A.1)
where Pt(i) ≡ Pt(i)/Pt and T t(i) ≡ τWt[Nt(i) − Nt] + τ[It(i) − It] is a term that aggregates to zero.
Next, using Mt+1 ≡ βΛt+1Pt+1/ΛtPt, with Λ the marginal value of nominal income, rewrite the
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optimality conditions (2.6) and (2.7) as
βEtΛt+1Pt+1[M̂Ct+1(i)MPKt+1(i)Kt+1(i) − It+1(i)] =
= ΛtPtQt(i)Kt+1(i) − βEtΛt+1Pt+1Qt+1(i)Kt+2(i) (2.A.2)
which I use, along with equation (2.A.1), to derive equation (2.8)
S t(i) =
∑∞
h=1 β
hEt
Λt+hPt+h
ΛtPt
[
Pt+h(i)Yt+h(i) − (1 − τ)Wt+hPt+h Nt+h(i) − (1 − τ)It+h(i) − Tt+h
]
Kt+1(i)
=
∑∞
h=1 β
hEt
Λt+hPt+h
ΛtPt
[
M̂Ct+h(i)MPKt+h(i)Kt+h(i) − It+h(i) + [Pt(i) − M̂Ct+h(i)]Yt+h(i) + T t+h(i)]
Kt+1(i)
= Qt(i) +
1
Kt+1(i)
∞∑
h=1
EtMt,t+h{[Pt+h(i) − M̂Ct+h(i)]Yt+h(i) + T t+h(i)}
After aggregation45 and a loglinearization around the undistorted zero-inflation steady state,46
st − qt = −ϑ
∞∑
j=0
β jEtmct+ j+1
= −ϑ
λ
Etpit+1
(2.A.3)
where the last equality uses the New Keynesian Phillips curve (2.9). (The technical appendix
derives equation (2.A.3) in more detail and generalizes it to the case of a distorted steady state.) I
once more use the New Keynesian Phillips curve (2.9) and the relation between real marginal costs
and the labor share of income, mct = `t, to derive equation (2.11).
Note how, in an efficient economy, mct = 0 at all t; thus, I obtain set = q
e
t , which is the
result obtained by Hayashi (1982) that the average and marginal Q are equal when there are no
imperfections in the market for goods.
2.B. First-differenced NKQ theory
The gross return to investment, RIt+1, is such that
1 = EtMt+1
M̂Ct+1(i)MPKt+1(i) − It+1(i)Kt+1(i) + Kt+2(i)Kt+1(i) Qt+1(i)
Qt(i)
≡ EtMt+1RIt+1(i)
(2.B.4)
45Note that
∫ 1
0 T t(i)di = 0.
46Note that
∫ 1
0 pt(i)di = 0, up to a first-order approximation.
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The gross return on stock i is
Rmt+1(i) =
Et+1
∑∞
h=0 Mt+1,t+h+1Dt+h+1(i)
Et
∑∞
h=0 Mt,t+hDt+h(i) − Dt(i)
Then, proceeding as in the derivation of (2.8),
Rmt+1(i) =
Qt(i)Kt+1(i)RIt+1(i) + Et+1
∑∞
h=1 Mt+1,t+h[Pt+h(i) − M̂Ct+h(i)]Yt+h(i)
Qt(i)Kt+1(i) + Et
∑∞
h=1 Mt,t+h[Pt+h(i) − M̂Ct+h(i)]Yt+h(i)
where the denominator is the current value of the ith firm and the numerator is tomorrow’s payoff
for owning the ith firm.
Note how in absence of imperfections in the market for goods, M̂Ct+h(i) = Pt+h(i), and therefore
one has the benchmark Q prediction Rmt+1 = R
I
t+1 (Cochrane, 1991; Restoy and Rockinger, 1994).
When M̂Ct+h(i) , Pt+h(i), a loglinear approximation around the zero-inflation, undistorted
steady state yields the first-differenced NKQ theory for the aggregate stock market return
rmt+1 = r
I
t+1 −
ϑ
λ
(Et+1 − Et)pit+1
with rIt+1 = αϑ(mpkt+1 + mct+1) + ηβikt+1 − ηikt.
2.C. Moments for estimation
Let rt→t+h = E(rt→t+h |̂st) + εt+h. Suppose you increase the information set from ŝt to [̂st st], so
that rt→t+h = E(rt→t+h |̂st, st) + ε˜t+h. Suppose vt ≡ st − E(st |̂st) , 0, i.e. [̂st st] is an information set
strictly bigger than ŝt. Assume all projections are linear. Then, E(rt→t+h |̂st, st) = E(rt→t+h |̂st) if and
only if E(stεt+h) = 0.
Proof. Let X = ŝT , Z = sT , Y = rT→T+h, ε = εT and v = vT be the sample vectors. Let ε̂ and v̂
denote estimates of the unobservable vectors ε and v. Then, the projection matrix on the [X Z]-space
is
P[X Z] = [X Z]([X Z]′[X Z])−1[X Z]′
= [X Z]
[
(X′X)−1 − (X′X)−1X′ZV−1Z′X(X′X)−1 −(X′X)−1X′ZV−1
−V−1Z′X(X′X)−1 V−1
]
[X Z]′
where V = Z′Z − Z′X(X′X)−1X′Z = Z′MXZ = Z′M′X MXZ = v̂′̂v, with MX = I − PX and PX =
X(X′X)−1X′ the projection matrix on the X-space. Therefore, you can check that
P[X Z]Xβ = Xβ
a.s.→ E(E(rt→t+h |̂st)|̂st, st) = E(rt→t+h |̂st)
P[X Z ]̂ε = MXZV−1Z ′̂ε =
Z ′̂ε
v̂′̂v
v̂
a.s.→ E(εt+h |̂st, st) = E(stεt+h)E(v2t )
vt
where the asymptotic property holds by the law of large numbers for ergodic, stationary stochastic
processes.
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Thus, E(rt→t+h |̂st, st) = E(E(rt→t+h |̂st)|̂st, st) + E(εt+h |̂st, st) = E(rt→t+h |̂st) + [E(stεt+h)/E(v2t )]vt,
so that E(rt→t+h |̂st, st) = E(rt→t+h |̂st) if and only if E(stεt+h) = 0 (since by assumption v , 0, hence
E(v2t ) > 0).
2.D. Asymptotics of the estimates
I can write moments (2.15) and (2.16) for the GMM estimation as
E(εt+h ŝt) = 0, h ∈ {1, ...,H}
E(εt+hst) = 0, h ∈ {1, ...,H}
E(̂s2t − s2t ) = 0
⇔ E( ft(θ)) = 0
where θ ≡ [b(h), η, λ], εt+h = rmt→t+h − b(h) ŝt and ŝt = ηikt − (ϑ/βλ)pit + (ϑ/β)`t.
The GMM estimator of θ minimizes ET
(
ft(θ)
)′WT ET ( ft(θ)), with notation ET (·) = 1/T ∑Tt=1 ·t,
where WT is a weighting matrix. I use a two-step approach to efficient GMM estimation (Hansen
and Singleton, 1982), where the first-step weighting matrix is the identity matrix. In the second
step, therefore, WT is a matrix that is asymptotically consistent for the efficient weighting matrix
S −1, where S is the spectral density at frequency zero
S =
∞∑
j=−∞
E
(
ft(θ) ft− j(θ)′
)
which I estimate nonparametrically (Newey and West, 1987), with a Bartlett kernel and eight leads
and lags. Notice how, for any weighting matrix WT , the interior solution satisfies the first-order
condition
d′T WT ET
(
ft(θ)
)
= 0
where dT ≡ ∂ET ( ft(θ))/∂θ′, which fully defines the GMM estimate considered. Under standard
regularity conditions, Hansen (1982) shows how to derive the sampling distribution of the estimate
and the sample moments. The estimate distributes asymptotically as
√
T (̂θ − θ) d.→ N(0, (d′Wd)−1d′WS Wd(d′Wd)′−1)
where d ≡ ∂E( ft(θ))/∂θ′, while the sample moments—under the null hypothesis that they are zero
in population—conform to
√
T ET
(
ft(θ)
) d.,H0→ N(0, (I − d(d′Wd)−1d′W)S (I − d(d′Wd)−1d′W)′)
and thereby allow for a test of the H − 1 overidentifying restrictions
T ET
(
ft(θ)
)′[(I − d(d′Wd)−1d′W)S (I − d(d′Wd)−1d′W)′]†ET ( ft(θ)) d.,H0→ χ2H−1
where ‘†’ denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse operator.
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Part 3
Reassessing the Role of Stock Prices in the
Conduct of Monetary Policy
Abstract. In a New Keynesian model with capital adjustment costs and exogenous sources of policy tradeoffs
central banks should not respond to stock price movements; a policy that focuses on stabilizing inflation is
close to optimal. I then solve numerically for the optimal Taylor-type rule that responds to stock prices by
using the typical approach adopted by the extant literature, which consists in fixing the response coefficient
to inflation to subsequently search numerically for desirable policy reactions to stock prices and output. The
numerical approach can easily prescribe all possible qualitative reactions to stock prices. Therefore, the
model highlights some pitfalls in a numerical study of stock prices and monetary policy that can explain and
reconcile the conflicting policy prescriptions found in the literature.
3.1. Introduction
Should central banks respond to stock price movements? The extant literature provides conflict-
ing answers to this question; we are still not sure how central banks should respond to stock prices.
The discrepancy in the literature is qualitative, not merely quantitative. For example, Bernanke and
Gertler (1999, 2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) find that central banks should not respond to
stock price movements. Cecchetti et al. (2001, 2002) and Gilchrist and Saito (2008) find that they
should, and they should do so by increasing interest rates during a stock price boom (a “leaning
against the wind” prescription). Faia and Monacelli (2007) also prescribe a response, but they favor
a rate decrease when stock prices increase.
The main contribution of this writing is to offer a potential explanation for the conflicting policy
prescriptions found in the literature, and thereby a resolution. I adopt a simple New Keynesian
setting with capital adjustment costs in which nominal rigidities are the only source of inefficiencies
and policy tradeoffs are caused by some exogenous shocks. The model is sufficiently simple that
I can derive, on the one hand, a clean analytical approximate welfare loss function and, on the
other, the optimal monetary policy prescription, at least within the family of Taylor-type rules.
This simplicity allows me to highlight and explain some potential pitfalls in the typical numerical
approach adopted by the relevant literature, which consists in fixing the response coefficient to
inflation to subsequently search numerically for desirable policy reactions to stock prices and
output.
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3.1.1. Pitfalls in a numerical study of optimal Taylor-type rules
A first problem is that, taken at face value, the prescribed coefficients can be misleading. For
realistic and fixed values of the Taylor-rule coefficient attached to inflation the central bank can
increase welfare by responding to movements in stock prices and output, but such a response
increases welfare only because it strengthens the central bank’s anti-inflationary stance. Therefore,
an economist may report the desirability of some policy response to stock prices or output even
though such a prescription is really just a roundabout way of increasing the response coefficient
attached to inflation.
Second, when conducting the numerical exercise within my simple model I easily find all three
different prescriptions given a change in stock prices: no response, a positive response and a negative
response. Formally, the prescribed Taylor-rule coefficients are not robust, even qualitatively, to
small changes in two key parameters—the elasticity of Q to investment, η, and the slope of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve, λ. The fragility to changes across the (λ, η)-plane is particularly troubling
in that η and λ are precisely two parameters that have a high dispersion in the literature. Moreover,
numerical prescriptions differ substantially for different exogenous sources of policy tradeoffs. The
dispersion in the policy prescriptions recommended by the literature appears therefore to be an
inherent characteristic of the problem.
An analytical approach to welfare highlights the reason for the sensitivity of the prescription to
changes in the key parameters. I show how, in addition to price and production stability, marginal
Q stability (relative to its efficient level) directly affects consumer welfare in the model up to a
second-order approximation; the welfare weights on Q stability and on inflation stability in turn
depend on the key parameters η and λ, respectively.47
Third, part of the reason for the fragility is that the prescribed responses to Q and output are
often as close as possible to the indeterminacy border (those coefficients plus epsilon will send the
system to indeterminacy), which moves as the inflation coefficient varies. This issue arises because
a reaction to Q pushes capital towards a unit-root process. In this regard, the complementary
response to output often found in the literature (e.g., Cecchetti et al., 2001) results to offset such a
nonstationarity and is typically just enough to leave the system on the indeterminacy border.
The indeterminacy issue is even worse if capital is firm-specific. On the one hand, the firm-
specific problem has stability requirements independent of the policy rule in place (a point made
by Woodford, 2005).48 On the other, sticky prices break the equality between marginal Q and its
observable proxy, i.e., average Q (Hayashi, 1982). Namely, in the model average Q equals marginal
Q less a constant multiple of expected inflation. Therefore, a central bank that proxies a positive
prescribed reaction to the unobservable marginal Q by responding positively to average Q may
push the economy to an indetermined equilibrium. It is customary in the literature to introduce a
47Price rigidities are the only friction in the model. The priority of an aggressive inflation stabilization looks therefore
rather intuitive. However, a low value of η increases the priority of Q stabilization relative to inflation stabilization. It
is therefore not trivial that inflation stabilization remains prioritary across the (λ, η)-plane when there are exogenous
sources of policy tradeoffs. Therefore, an analysis across different values of the two key parameters combined with
the exogenous sources of policy tradeoffs allows for an analytically tractable framework to study non-trivial tradeoffs
among inflation, output and financial stability.
48Sveen and Weinke (2005) pursue a different point, which states that for low values of the reaction coefficient to
inflation and of the elasticity λ the system is indetermined.
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proxy problem by assuming an exogenous bubble component in stock prices; but under nominal
rigidities the proxy problem is true even in a setting without bubbles.49
3.1.2. Literature review
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) find that focusing on inflation
stability is sufficient. Bernanke and Gertler compute second moments of inflation and the output
gap under two rules: one based solely on inflation and one based on inflation and stock prices.
These authors define stock prices as marginal Q plus an exogenous bubble component. They find
that the rule that includes stock prices generally increases the volatility of inflation and output and
that a strong commitment to stabilizing inflation minimizes those volatilities, at least within the
family of policy rules they consider. Cecchetti et al. (2001) and Cecchetti et al. (2002) counter by
saying that Bernanke and Gertler do not choose the response coefficients optimally. Bernanke and
Gertler compute the variances of inflation and output, but do not attach weights to the two variances
to form a welfare criterion. In contrast, Cecchetti et al. use a welfare criterion in which they
specify weights for both inflation and output. They find that some policy response to stock prices
is typically optimal, at least if complemented by some response to output. More recently, Faia
and Monacelli (2007) and Gilchrist and Saito (2008) conclude that some reaction to asset prices
(marginal Q) in a Taylor-type rule is desirable, although they differ in the sign of the prescribed
response. However, Faia and Monacelli argue that under a strong anti-inflationary stance (a good
approximation to the optimal policy), the benefits of reacting to stock prices nearly vanish, a result
that I find also in my simpler setting.
Against this background, note that the extant literature does not attempt an analytical derivation
of welfare because it typically deals with rather complex models (e.g., that include endogenous
financial frictions). The inflation-output welfare metric typically used in the literature is arbitrary
and a quantitatively bad approximation in regions of the deep-parameter space in which the welfare
weight attached to financial stability is relatively high.50 Furthermore, a correct welfare analysis
allows for a clear statement of which stock price measures (among, for example, marginal Q, average
Q, or their gaps) affect welfare and which are potential arguments of a policy rule. My welfare
analysis shows how the gap in marginal Q is the financial quantity that directly affects welfare and
discusses the additional problems arising from the fact that marginal Q is unobservable.51
3.2. A monetary model
I work with a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and adjustment costs (King and
Wolman, 1996; Galı´ and Gertler, 2007). I choose the New Keynesian model since it is a standard
49Moreover, the addition of bubbles raises some additional theoretical issues, including their definition; a bubble can
be defined in terms of exogenous noise around Q, in terms of some gap measure relative to a benchmark value for Q,
or as the violation of a transversality condition (or lack thereof, as in the OLG model of Galı´, 2013) as in the case of
rational bubbles.
50The notable exception is Faia and Monacelli (2007) who, in their simulations, implicitly work with the correct
welfare function, although they do not derive the function analytically.
51Gilchrist and Saito (2008) correctly argue that the marginal Q gap is the welfare-relevant quantity, although they
also use an ad hoc inflation-output criterion and thereby cannot motivate the importance of the marginal Q gap from
first principles.
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workhorse for monetary policy evaluation. The capital adjustment cost function generates stock
price variation (Hayashi, 1982). I make investment a firm-specific decision variable (Woodford,
2005; Sveen and Weinke, 2005) to induce a link between the marginal Q and the market-book ratio
(average Q), so that I can discuss the relationship between stock prices and marginal Q. (“Stock
prices,” “average Q,” and “market-book ratio” are all used interchangeably here.) Note how the
pitfalls I point out in this writing do not hinge on the firm-specific capital specification; to maximize
comparability to the literature, in what follows I derive the structural equations and the welfare
criterion and conduct policy evaluation both in the firm-specific and in the rental-market cases.
The aggregate shocks that hit the economy result from either a cost-push or a financial distur-
bance. Such exogenous shocks are a simple device to break the divine coincidence (Blanchard and
Galı´, 2007) and make the optimal policy problem non-trivial. Moreover, these shocks break the
divine coincidence but allow for a simple characterization of a nearly optimal Taylor-type rule. I
do not therefore follow the rest of the literature in introducing additional complexity, such as en-
dogenous financial frictions,52 because it would complicate the model—in particular the derivation
of a welfare criterion—without necessarily changing the policy prescription. In fact, models that
endogenize the financial disturbance (for example, Faia and Monacelli, 2007; Carlstrom, Fuerst and
Paustian, 2010) similarly characterize the optimal Taylor-type rule as a rule aggressive on inflation.
The next subsections describe the model. The technical appendix derives the model in more
detail.
3.2.1. Consumers
Identical consumers choose consumption demand {Ct}, labor supply {Nt} and demand for
one-period bonds {Bt} to maximize the utility function
Et
∞∑
h=0
βh
[ 1
1 − σC
1−σ
t+h −
1
1 + ϕ
N1+ϕt+h
]
subject to the budget constraint∫ 1
0
Pt+h(i)Ct+h(i)di +
1
1 + i ft+h
Bt+h ≤ Wt+hNt+h + Bt+h−1 + Pt+hDt+h
where C is real consumption, P is the nominal price of a unit of consumption, B are nominal
risk-free bonds with rate of return i f , N are hours worked, W is the nominal wage rate, and D is
the real dividend that firms pay to consumers (who own the firms). Parameters σ and ϕ are the
inverse of the (constant) intertemporal elasticity of substitution and Frisch labor supply elasticity,
respectively.
Aggregate real consumption Ct is the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregate of the continuum of
goods i ∈ [0, 1]
Ct ≡
[ ∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
52See also Iacoviello (2005), Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Monacelli (2008), Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2010)
and Leduc and Natal (2011).
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where ε is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between consumption of any two goods. Con-
sumers form consumption units by minimizing costs. The first-order condition for that problem
yields the demand curve for good i
Ct(i) =
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
Ct (3.1)
where Pt ≡
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−εdi
] 1
1−ε is the price index. The solution implies that the optimal expenditure
is PtCt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i)di.
The first-order conditions for an interior solution of the consumers’ problem are
MRS t = Cσt N
ϕ
t =
Wt
Pt
(3.2)
EtMt,t+1
1 + i ft
Πt,t+1
= EtMt,t+1R
f
t = 1 (3.3)
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor, Mt+1 = β(Ct+1/Ct)−σ
is the stochastic discount factor for real payoffs, Πt,t+1 ≡ Pt+1/Pt is the gross inflation rate between
times t and t + 1, and the Fisher equation rt = i
f
t − Etpit+1 describes the real risk-free rate rt ≈ ln(R ft ).
3.2.2. Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms i ∈ [0, 1] choose nominal prices {P∗t+h(i)},
production {Yt+h(i)}, labor demand {Nt+h(i)} and investment {It+h(i)} to maximize the expected
discounted value of profits
Et
∞∑
h=0
Mt,t+h
[Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
Yt+h(i) − (1 − τ)Wt+hPt+h Nt+h(i) − (1 − τ)
∫ 1
0
Pt+h( j)It+h( j, i)d j − Tt+h
]
subject to53
Yt+h(i) =
(Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
)−ε
Yt+h
Yt+h(i) = At+hKt+h(i)αNt+h(i)1−α
Kt+h+1(i) = (1 − δ)Kt+h(i) + Φ
( It+h(i)
Kt+h(i)
)
Kt+h(i)
53Firms minimize costs in forming the investment aggregate Idt ≡
[ ∫ 1
0 I
d
t (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1 . The demand equation for
investment goods is thus Idt (i) =
( Pt(i)
Pt
)−εIdt . One can combine this result with (3.1) and (3.9) to get the demand
equation for a given firm i, Yt(i) =
( Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
)−εYt+h. Moreover, the optimal expenditure is such that ∫ 10 Pt+h( j)It+h( j, i)d j =
Pt+hIt+h(i).
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Pt+h(i) =
P∗t+h(i), with probability (1 − θ)Pt+h−1(i), with probability θ
Pt+hIt+h(i) =
∫ 1
0
Pt+h( j)It+h( j, i)d j
where Y is output, A is technology, K is the real capital stock and I is real investment. Prices are
sticky as in Calvo (1983), so that firms can reset prices at any given time only with probability 1− θ.
There are capital adjustment costs. The adjustment cost function Φ(·) is such that Φ(I/K) = δ,
Φ′(I/K) = 1 and its curvature η ≡ −[Φ′′(I/K)I/K]/Φ′(I/K) is constant and positive in the steady
state. The government levies lump-sum taxes, Tt = τWt/Pt + τIt, to finance an employment
and investment subsidy, τ, which is in place to offset any steady-state distortion caused by the
monopolistic competition.54 Parameters δ and 1 − α are the average depreciation rate of capital and
labor share of value added, respectively.
The first-order conditions for an interior optimum are
∞∑
h=0
θhEtMt,t+hPε−1t+h Yt+h(i)
[
P∗t (i) − M̂Ct+h(i)Pt+h
]
= 0 (3.4)
MCt(i)MPNt(i) = (1 − τ)WtPt (3.5)
Qt(i) =
[
Φ′
( It(i)
Kt(i)
)]−1
(3.6)
EtMt,t+1RIt+1(i) = 1 (3.7)
with
RIt+1(i) ≡
M̂Ct+1(i)MPKt+1(i) +
(
(1 − δ) + Φ
(
It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
− Φ′
(
It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
Qt+1(i)
Qt(i)
where Q is marginal Tobin’s Q, MPN is the marginal productivity of labor, MC is the real marginal
cost of output, RI is the gross real rate of return to investment, MPK is the marginal productivity
of capital and M̂C ≡ MMC, withM ≡ ε/(ε − 1) the average price markup that firms charge over
marginal costs under monopolistic competition in the goods market.
Firms then distribute profits as dividends Pt+hDt+h(i) to consumers.
Next, I define average Tobin’s Q as
S t(i) ≡ Et
∑∞
h=1 Mt,t+hDt+h(i)
Kt+1(i)
the ratio of two different valuations of the capital stock of firm i: the market price (expected
discounted dividends) and the book value.
54τ = 1/ε achieves this goal.
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Average Q is related to marginal Q through
S t(i) = Qt(i) +
1
Kt+1(i)
∞∑
h=1
EtMt,t+h
[Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
− M̂Ct+h(i)
]
Yt+h(i) (3.8)
which states that the market-book ratio is the marginal value of capital plus the expected discounted
profits per unit of capital. These profits are driven by imperfections in the goods market. I prove
equation (3.8) in the appendix. This result extends the result in Hayashi (1982) to a model with
nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition in the goods market.
3.2.3. Market clearing
The goods market clears; for each firm i, supply equals demand,
Yt(i) = Ct(i) + Idt (i) (3.9)
where Idt (i) denotes the demand for good i coming from all firms.
The labor market also clears; labor supply equals average labor demand as
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di
3.2.4. Structural form of the model solution
I loglinearize and aggregate the first-order conditions around the deterministic zero-inflation
undistorted steady state. The full loglinear model is available in the appendix. The approximation
yields a set of six equations, which together form the structural model economy that I consider
from this point on. I express everything in terms of gaps. As is customary in the literature, I define
a gap as the percentage deviation of a variable from its first-best level. Namely, y˜t ≡ yt − yet is the
output gap, q˜t ≡ qt − qet is the marginal Q gap, and k˜t ≡ kt − ket is the capital gap.
Marginal Q moves according to the dynamic equation
q˜t = βEtq˜t+1 + ϑEt (˜yt+1 − k˜t+1) + ϑEtm̂ct+1 − r˜t + χt (3.10)
where ϑ is the composite parameter ϑ ≡ 1 − β(1 − δ) and r˜t ≡ i ft − Etpit+1 − ret is the real risk-free
rate gap. The exogenous process χt represents a financial disturbance and follows the stationary
autoregression
χt+1 = ρχχt + εχ,t+1 (3.11)
where εχ is a white-noise process.
The output gap evolves by the dynamic IS equation augmented with marginal Q gaps
Ψy˜t = ΨEt˜yt+1 + (Λ − 1)˜qt − ΛEtq˜t+1 − r˜t (3.12)
where Ψ and Λ are the composite parameters Ψ ≡ σ/γc and Λ ≡ 1 + (1 − δ)Ξyq. The approximate
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link between the real economy and financial markets, i˜t − k˜t = 1η q˜t, allows me to interpret the
curvature parameter η as the inverse of the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio to marginal Q.
A standard New Keynesian Phillips curve drives inflation as
pit = βEtpit+1 + λm̂ct (3.13)
The link between the elasticity λ and the frequency of price adjustment is nonstandard under
firm-specific capital accumulation (Woodford, 2005; Sveen and Weinke, 2005). The appendix
solves the firm-specific problem. The wedge m̂ct is responsible for all deviations from the first best,
which are entirely due to nominal rigidities. Real marginal costs obey the approximate equilibrium
condition
m̂ct = Ξy˜yt − Ξyqq˜t − Ξyk˜kt + 1
λ
ut (3.14)
where Ξy,Ξyq,Ξyk are the weights in the welfare function (3.18).
Under firm-specific capital accumulation, average Q and marginal Q relate via the equation
s˜t = q˜t − ϑ
αλ
Etpit+1 (3.15)
which I prove in the appendix. Equation (3.15) endogenously models a proxy problem for a central
bank that were to react to marginal Q through stock prices.
Finally, two dynamic equations drive the states of the economy
k˜t+1 = k˜t +
δ
η
q˜t (3.16)
ut+1 = ρuut + εu,t+1 (3.17)
where εu is a white-noise process.
3.2.5. Exogenous shocks
I consider versions of the model that include either a cost-push disturbance ut or a financial
disturbance χt. I add these shocks to break the divine coincidence (Blanchard and Galı´, 2007) and
thereby avoid a trivial optimal monetary policy problem.55 One can endogenize both disturbances
from first principles. For example, Erceg et al. (2000) endogenize the cost-push disturbance through
wage rigidities, and Bernanke et al. (1999) endogenize the financial disturbance through a costly
state-verification mechanism under asymmetric information.56 Against this background, the cost-
push shock can be interpreted as a labor wedge due to imperfections in the labor market and the
financial disturbance as a risk premium due to the presence of financial frictions.
55Without any disturbance, any policy rule is optimal as long as it provides determinacy to the structural model.
56With the financial accelerator in place, χt = νEt ln(Nt/QtKt+1), for some scale factor ν, where Nt is the net worth
of the aggregate firm; the financial disturbance is related to the average leverage ratio in the economy.
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3.2.6. Calibration
I select standard values for uncontroversial parameters. For the key parameters η and λ, I
consider the range of values listed in table 3.1.
α capital share in value added 0.35
β discount factor 0.99
σ inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
ϕ inverse of Frisch labor supply elasticity 0.8
δ depreciation rate 0.025
Φ′(δ)−1 steady-state value of marginal Q 1
λ slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (0, 0.05)
η inverse of elasticity of investment-capital ratio to marginal Q (0, 5)
Table 3.1: Calibration of the deep parameters
I conduct a robustness analysis to changes in the elasticities λ and η.57
I consider values of the elasticity η between 0 and 5. There is considerable disagreement in the
literature about the most likely range of values for η. One strand of the literature (e.g., Baxter and
Crucini, 1993; King and Wolman, 1996; Bernanke et al., 1999) suggests values between 0 and 1
while another strand (e.g., Abel, 1980; Jermann, 1998) prefers values between 2 and 5.
The parameter λ is also quite controversial quantitatively. Galı´ and Gertler (1999), Galı´ et al.
(2005) and Kleibergen and Mavroeidis (2009) give point estimates between 0.01 and 0.03, but there
is still debate about its identification (Mavroeidis, 2005; Nason and Smith, 2008; Canova and Sala,
2009). In line with the estimate in Galı´ and Gertler (1999), I consider a set for λ that ranges from 0
to 0.05.
3.2.7. Rental market
Under the baseline calibration, figure 3.1 analyzes quantitatively the firm-specific problem
across the (θ, η)-plane and under the calibration of the remaining deep parameters reported in
table 3.1. An important point, emphasized by Woodford (2005), is how an important region of the
deep-parameter space yields no equilibria under the firm-specific capital specification. The appendix
discusses the requirements for determinacy, which I used to construct figure 3.1. Moreover, another
important region of the (θ, η)-plane yields multiple equilibria. These two facts characterize the
first-order component of the solution to the firm-specific problem.
This determinacy issue vanishes if I model capital accumulation through a rental market. If
firms purchase capital services on a competitive rental market at the common rental rate Rkt , each
firm repurchases from the consumers the required capital stock entirely at each period. Therefore,
57I consider several calibrations for λ, rather than for the frequency of price re-optimization θ. The parameter θ has
a nice microeconomic interpretation, but a fragile link to the structural equations of the New Keynesian model. The
structural equations depend on θ only through λ. However, the link between θ and λ is not robust, for example, to
the choice of modeling investment through a rental market or through firm-specific capital accumulation (Sveen and
Weinke, 2005). The connection between the structural equations and λ is more robust.
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Figure 3.1: Determinacy in the firm-specific capital and rental-market specifications, as function of the key parameters
θ (Calvo frequency of price adjustment) and η (curvature of capital adjustment costs).
all firms that reset at time t face an identical problem as they do not inherit different capital stocks.
In particular, the firms’ first-order conditions for optimal labor and capital purchases are
MCt(i)MPNt(i) = (1 − τ)WtPt
MCt(i)MPKt(i) = (1 − τ)Rkt
Since MPNt(i) = XtMPKt(i)−α/(1−α), where Xt is independent of i, then the distance between
individual and aggregate average marginal costs is zero, and therefore mpnt(i) − mpnt = mpkt(i) −
mpkt = 0. Therefore, yt(i) − yt = kt(i) − kt = nt(i) − nt = −ε(pt(i) − pt); firms with higher demand
for their goods purchase a proportionately higher quantity of capital and labor services.
The only first-order difference between the firm-specific and the rental-market specifications
is the link between the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, λ, and the frequency of price
optimization, θ. In particular, in the rental-market case the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips
curve is λrm = (1 − θ)(1 − βθ)/θ.
3.3. Welfare criterion
Following the seminal work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), the standard metric to
evaluate alternative monetary policies is a welfare criterion, which arises naturally in the context
of microfounded New Keynesian macromodels. A quadratic approximation to the unconditional
consumers’ objective function around the deterministic zero-inflation steady-state value provides a
welfare criterion against which I can evaluate and rank different policies. I show in the appendix
how the average welfare loss per period is directly proportional to (up to a term independent of
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policy)
L ≡ 1
2
Ξyvar(˜y) +
1
2
Ξqvar(˜q) − Ξyqcov(˜y, q˜) + 12Ξpvar(pi)
+
1
2
Ξkvar(˜k) − Ξykcov(˜y, k˜) + Ξqkcov(˜q, k˜)
(3.18)
where the welfare weights are linked to the deep parameters as Ξy ≡ σγc +
α+ϕ
1−α , Ξq ≡ γcσ Ξyq(1 + Ξyq),
Ξyq ≡ σγiγcη , Ξk ≡ γi +
σγ2i
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α2
1−α , Ξyk ≡ σγiγc +
(1+ϕ)α
1−α and Ξqk ≡ γiΞyq.
In the firm-specific case, the welfare weight attached to inflation, Ξp, is a complex function of
the deep parameters, which I derive in the appendix. Note how in the rental-market case average
welfare losses maintain the form (3.18), with the only difference in the shape of the welfare weight
attached to inflation volatility, which becomes Ξrmp = ε/λ
rm.
The major difference between welfare criterion (3.18) and the inflation-output criterion of
models without capital and adjustment costs
1
2
Ξyvar(˜y) +
1
2
Ξpvar(pi)
is the additional presence of two gap terms, one in marginal Q and one in capital.58 The presence of
a gap in marginal Q is particularly appealing in that it means that financial instability is per se a
source of welfare losses. Namely, stock price movements affect welfare both through wealth effects
to consumers and through investment effects to firms.
An important feature of the model is that, both in the firm-specific case and in the rental-market
case, a relatively large slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve associates to a relatively low
welfare weight attached to inflation volatility. Parameter θ affects welfare weights almost entirely
through λ. Therefore, I focus the policy evaluation exercise on different combinations of the deep
parameters η and λ in the rental-market case. This exercise allows for showing the pitfalls in the
numerical exercise both for the firm-specific and the rental-market cases and thereby to maximize
the comparability with the literature. To correctly consider the firm-specific case you should then
restrict your attention only to the regions of the [η, λ]-plane that are available under the firm-specific
problem (as shown in figure 3.1).
3.4. Policy evaluation
In the baseline model without exogenous shocks inflation targeting implements the first best
and Q targeting introduces a nonstationarity in capital that causes no local equilibria to exist.
The presence of an exogenous cost-push or financial disturbance breaks the divine coincidence
and introduces a policy tradeoff. Against this background, to compute the second-best policy (or
58Sveen and Weinke (2009) derive welfare within a model similar to mine but do not explore the link between welfare
and Q. Edge (2003) derives a welfare criterion within a New Keynesian model augmented by capital accumulation, and
expresses it as function of capital and investment gaps. Edge however does not consider adjustment costs to investment,
so that her model predicts constant stock prices. As a consequence, I cannot use Edge’s welfare function to study the
role of stock prices in the conduct of monetary policy.
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the optimal monetary policy under commitment), the central bank chooses the stochastic processes
[{pit+h}, {˜qt+h}, {˜yt+h}, {˜kt+h+1}]∞h=0 that maximize welfare subject to the structural model made of
equations (3.10) to (3.17).
The problem has a closed-form solution but the policy rule required to implement it is alge-
braically involved and I am not able to provide much intuition for it. Therefore I immediately
discuss implementability and focus on Taylor-type interest-rate rules; this exercise directly com-
pares to the literature and is more convenient to illustrate the point that inflation targeting is nearly
optimal in the model. I focus on the family of feasible Taylor-type rules of the form
î ft = φpipit + φs ŝt + φŷyt (3.19)
and I numerically search for the parameters [φpi, φs, φy] that minimize average welfare losses.59
I carry out the exercise also under the unfeasible rule based on marginal Q,
î ft = φpipit + φqq̂t + φŷyt (3.20)
to discuss the potential problems of a central bank using average Q as a proxy for marginal Q in
monetary policy design.
I present results as the two key parameters (η and λ) vary and under three calibrations of the
response coefficient φpi attached to inflation, φpi = 1.5, 5, 20. It turns out that the optimal coefficient
φpi is very large (practically infinite), both under cost-push shocks and under financial shocks.
3.4.1. Optimal Taylor-type rules under cost-push shocks
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the optimal response coefficients attached to output and Q in the
unfeasible rules (3.19) and (3.20), respectively, when the economy is hit by cost-push shocks.60
All graphs show the nonmonotonicity, nonlinearity and qualitative dispersion in the prescription.
The difference in color between the graphs in the second and third rows shows how an aggressive
anti-inflationary stance is the optimal reaction; the welfare gains from a reaction to anything other
than inflation decrease as φpi increases. The difference between figures 3.2 and 3.3 shows the proxy
problem; the optimal responses to stock prices and marginal Q are similar under cost-push shocks
only for large enough values of the reaction coefficient φpi. Moreover, when there are cost-push
shocks, the optimal reaction to marginal Q is zero in most of the key-parameter space and positive
when η and λ are close to zero, although the welfare gains from such a response are small. In
contrast, the optimal reaction to stock prices is usually negative and may yield large welfare gains.
These results are driven by the property that in most of the key-parameter space, the top priority
is inflation stabilization. Over the (λ, η)-plane, the welfare weights attached to everything but
59The simplicity of the rule introduces an implementation disturbance in the system. For simplicity, I assume that
no technology shocks hit the economy. This assumption disposes of the implementation disturbance, since gap terms
become observable. A consideration of technology is crucial in the context of models that endogenize the cost-push
or the financial disturbances, because technology drives those disturbances. With exogenous cost-push and financial
disturbances, however, technology shocks only drive the implementation disturbance.
60I set the persistence coefficient to a medium value, ρu = 0.75. None of the main results depends on the choice of
this number.
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(a) Optimal φq under φpi = 1.5.
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(b) Optimal φy under φpi = 1.5.
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(c) Optimal φq under φpi = 5.
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(d) Optimal φy under φpi = 5.
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(e) Optimal φq under φpi = 20.
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(f) Optimal φy under φpi = 20.
Figure 3.2: Interest-rate rule in inflation, output and marginal Q, when the economy is hit by cost-push shocks.
The colors (on a scale from 0 to 1) indicate the percentage reduction in welfare losses from choosing rule î ft =
φpipit + φqq̂t + φŷyt over rule î
f
t = φpipit.
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(a) Optimal φs under φpi = 1.5.
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(b) Optimal φy under φpi = 1.5.
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(c) Optimal φs under φpi = 5.
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(d) Optimal φy under φpi = 5.
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(e) Optimal φs under φpi = 20.
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(f) Optimal φy under φpi = 20.
Figure 3.3: Interest-rate rule in inflation, output and average Q, when the economy is hit by cost-push shocks. The colors
(on a scale from 0 to 1) indicate the percentage reduction in welfare losses from choosing rule î ft = φpipit + φs ŝt + φŷyt
over rule î ft = φpipit.
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inflation are small except when η is close to zero, where the welfare weight attached to financial
stability becomes relatively big. This result explains why we see a positive reaction to stock price
movements only when η is small and λ is relatively large; that is the only region of the key-parameter
space in which financial stabilization is of higher priority than inflation stabilization. To avoid the
case in which only inflation matters, we need either a very small η or very high risk aversion σ.
Therefore, in most of the key-parameter space, the central bank should not care about stabilizing
output or asset prices per se; instead, it should react to them to indirectly increase the anti-inflationary
stance. Since the exercise constrains φpi to some finite value, there are two ways left to increase
the aggressiveness in fighting inflation. First, the bank could react negatively to stock prices and,
as a result, react positively to expected inflation (as seen in equation (3.15)). Then, when φpi is
high enough, the marginal increase in welfare from a positive reaction to marginal Q outweighs
the marginal decrease in anti-inflationary stance from a positive reaction to average Q. Second, the
bank could react non-negatively to marginal Q and negatively to output after a cost-push shock to
cause a higher interest-rate increase than under a rule based on inflation only. In fact, a cost-push
shock causes an increase in inflation and in the marginal Q gap. As a consequence, following the
interest-rate rule (with φpi > 0 and φq ≥ 0) results in the central bank driving up interest rates. Such
a restrictive policy depresses output. Finally, the drop in output causes a further rise in interest rates
due to φy < 0. Thus, φq ≥ 0 and φy < 0 amplify the interest-rate increase, just as if the central bank
had chosen a higher coefficient φpi.
In a large region of the key-parameter space, the central bank wants to react to stock prices,
output and marginal Q as an auxiliary way to strengthen the anti-inflationary stance. However, the
boost to the reaction to inflation becomes irrelevant for sufficiently large values of φpi; hence, the
marginal welfare gain of reacting to these ancillary signals vanishes as φpi increases, as shown by
the lighter color of the lower part of figures 3.2 to 3.5, which is associated to a high coefficient
φpi = 20, relative to the upper part.
Finally, the difference in shape between the graphs in the first two rows shows the problem of
indeterminacy. The positive reactions to marginal Q may increase welfare in some regions of the
(λ, η)-plane because they increase the anti-inflationary stance. However, when φpi is low such a
reaction tends to cause a unit root in capital, thereby causing no local equilibria to exist. This is the
reason we do not see positive reactions to Q when φpi is low. In those regions of the key-parameter
space the constraint that the system must be determined is binding for low values of φpi; in this
regard, figure 3.6 shows how, for small values of φpi and of either λ or η, nearly any reaction to
stock prices causes indeterminacy. The system may regain determinacy provided a complementary
positive reaction to output—which can avoid the unit root in capital—but it is dangerous to give
any policy prescription at the indeterminacy border.
3.4.2. Optimal Taylor-type rules under financial shocks
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the optimal response coefficients attached to output and Q in the
unfeasible rules (3.19) and (3.20), respectively, when the economy is hit by financial shocks.61
61I set the persistence coefficient to a medium value, ρχ = 0.75. None of the main results depends on the choice of
this number.
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(a) Optimal φq under φpi = 1.5.
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(b) Optimal φy under φpi = 1.5.
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(c) Optimal φq under φpi = 5.
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(d) Optimal φy under φpi = 5.
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(e) Optimal φq under φpi = 20.
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(f) Optimal φy under φpi = 20.
Figure 3.4: Interest-rate rule in inflation, output and marginal Q, when the economy is hit by financial shocks. The colors
(on a scale from 0 to 1) indicate the percentage reduction in welfare losses from choosing rule î ft = φpipit + φqq̂t + φŷyt
over rule î ft = φpipit.
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(a) Optimal φs under φpi = 1.5.
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(b) Optimal φy under φpi = 1.5.
1
2
3
4
50.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
η
 
λ
 
φ s
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(c) Optimal φs under φpi = 5.
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(d) Optimal φy under φpi = 5.
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(e) Optimal φs under φpi = 20.
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(f) Optimal φy under φpi = 20.
Figure 3.5: Interest-rate rule in inflation, output and average Q, when the economy is hit by financial shocks. The colors
(on a scale from 0 to 1) indicate the percentage reduction in welfare losses from choosing rule î ft = φpipit + φs ŝt + φŷyt
over rule î ft = φpipit.
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(a) [φpi, φq] space; η = 2, λ =
0.003.
(b) [φpi, φq] space; η = 2, λ =
0.02.
(c) [φpi, φq] space; η = 0.01,
λ = 0.02.
(d) [φpi, φs] space; η = 2, λ =
0.003.
(e) [φpi, φs] space; η = 2, λ =
0.02.
(f) [φpi, φs] space; η = 0.01,
λ = 0.02.
(g) [φpi, φy] space; η = 2, λ =
0.003.
(h) [φpi, φy] space; η = 2, λ =
0.02.
(i) [φpi, φy] space; η = 0.01,
λ = 0.02.
Figure 3.6: Determinacy regions (in black) under different calibrations of the key parameters.
When financial shocks hit the economy the optimal responses to stock prices and marginal Q
differ, even qualitatively, from the cost-push case. When financial disturbances hit the economy, the
optimal reaction to Q is positive, and truncated for low values of λ and φpi, where determinacy is
more of an issue. The optimal reaction to average Q is instead negative, which emphasizes that a
stronger reaction to inflation is more a priority than a positive reaction to Q under financial frictions;
this surface as well displays a truncation when λ is small.
Apart from the sign of the prescribed response adn a greater proxy problem, however, the main
lessons under the financial disturbance are similar to the case in which a cost-push disturbance
hits the economy. In particular, the marginal welfare gain of reacting to stock prices and output
vanishes as the reaction coefficient attached to inflation increases.
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3.5. Conclusion
It seems imprudent to advise a central bank to react to stock prices in a New Keynesian
model economy when such a policy prescription derives from simulations conducted under a fixed
coefficient of reaction to inflation. The prescription is sensitive to the typical dispersion seen in the
extant literature in some key parameters, such as the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and
the elasticity of investment to Q. The optimal reaction coefficients attached to average Q, marginal
Q and output are non-monotonic and nonlinear in the arguments. In some cases, the prescription
points to policy coefficients that, if slightly modified, may send the system to indeterminacy. These
issues are robust across different sources of policy tradeoffs. Nonlinearity, non-monotonicity and
the danger of indeterminacy are all reasons not to react to stock prices. Moreover, the difference
between figures 3.2-3.3 and 3.4-3.5 shows how prescriptions differ for different sources of shocks.
These problems are unfortunate, since the policy prescription seems intractable. However, in this
simple model, all reactions to stock prices and output yield important welfare gains only when they
increase the anti-inflationary stance. Therefore, a rule exclusively based on inflation seems to be
the most robust prescription.
A final doubt concerning the robustness of the characterization of the optimal Taylor-type rule
is that the sources of tradeoffs are exogenous in the model. The cost-push disturbance proxies for
frictions in the labor market (e.g., sticky wages as in Erceg et al., 2000), the financial disturbance
for frictions in the financial market (e.g., a financial accelerator mechanism as in Bernanke et al.,
1999). Ultimately, a complete model with capital accumulation and adjustment costs endogenizes
the disturbances and everything is then driven by technology shocks (see, for instance, Faia and
Monacelli, 2007; Sveen and Weinke, 2009). In such a more complex setting, the conclusion that an
aggressively anti-inflationary rule is optimal may break down.62
However, the documented pitfalls are likely to remain with us in a more complex setting.
Appendix
3.A. Full loglinear model solution
Hat terms denote deviations from steady state.
Equations (3.2) and (3.5) combine as
σ̂ct + ϕ̂nt = m̂ct + ŷt − n̂t
The approximate aggregate production function is
ŷt = at + α̂kt + (1 − α)̂nt (3.A.1)
The approximate market clearing conditions is
ŷt = γĉct + γîit
62The result survives in the model of Faia and Monacelli (2007), who endogenize some financial frictions.
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where γi ≡ αβδ/[1 − β(1 − δ)] is the investment share of output and γc = 1 − γi is the consumption
share of output. Equation (3.6) is approximately
ît − k̂t = 1
η
q̂t (3.A.2)
which links the real economy to financial markets.
Equation (3.3) holds approximately as the dynamic IS equation
ct = Etct+1 − 1
σ
(̂i ft − Etpit+1) (3.A.3)
The approximate no-arbitrage condition (3.7) is the forward-looking equation for marginal Q
q̂t = βEtq̂t+1 + ϑ(m̂ct+1 + ŷt+1 − k̂t+1) − (̂i ft − Etpit+1) (3.A.4)
The New Keynesian Phillips curve relating inflation to marginal costs is
pit = βEtpit+1 + λm̂ct
which is the loglinearization of equation (3.4), and real marginal costs relate to the other variables
as
m̂ct = Ξŷyt − Ξyqq̂t − Ξyk̂kt − 1 + ϕ1 − αat +
1
λ
ut
with parameters Ξy ≡ σ/γc + (α+ ϕ)/(1− α), Ξyq ≡ σγi/(γcη) and Ξyk ≡ σγi/γc + α(1 + ϕ)/(1− α).
The approximate equation for capital accumulation is
k̂t+1 = (1 − δ)̂kt + δ̂it (3.A.5)
3.B. Firm-specific problem
The following derivation borrows heavily from Woodford (2005) and Sveen and Weinke (2005).
I use the notation xt(i) ≡ xt(i) − xt to denote the difference between an individual and the
corresponding aggregate variable.
Integrating individual prices, applying the law of large number and expanding individual prices
around their aggregate level, one can show that the first-order dynamics of the aggregate price level
is
p∗t − pt =
θ
1 − θpit (3.B.6)
Note also that the optimality conditions that characterize the choice of the ith firm—independently
of when it last had the chance of resetting prices—imply
mpkt(i) = −εpt(i) − kt(i)
mct(i) = − αε1 − α pt(i) −
α
(1 − α)kt(i)
(3.B.7)
A distinguishing feature of the firm-specific problem is that not all firms that reset prices
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at time t are equal, as they inherit a firm-specific capital stock that depends on when they last
had the chance of resetting prices. Against this background, the optimal price chosen by the ith
resetting firm satisfies the approximate first-order condition
∑∞
h=0(βθ)
hEit[pt+h(i) − m̂ct+h(i)] = 0
with Eit[pt+h(i)] = p
∗
t (i), where E
i denotes an expectation operator conditional on firm i not resetting
in the future.63 I can rewrite the last equation as Eit pt+h(i) = p
∗
t (i) + (p
∗
t − pt) −
∑h
j=1 Etpit+ j and
therefore the optimal price setting equation as
(p∗t (i) + p
∗
t − pt) =
∞∑
h=1
(βθ)hEtpit+h + (1 − βθ)Θ
∞∑
h=0
(βθ)hEtm̂ct+h − α(1 − βθ)Θ1 − α
∞∑
h=0
(βθ)hEitkt+h(i)
(3.B.8)
where Θ ≡ (1−α)/(1−α+αε), and where I used the fact that ∑∞h=0(βθ)h ∑hj=1 pit+ j = 11−βθ ∑∞h=1(βθ)hpit+h.
I then guess that the equilibrum solution for the distance between individual and aggregate
capital has the form
kt+1(i) = ψ2kt(i) + ψ3 pt(i) (3.B.9)
which must be true because pt(i) and kt(i) are the only states at time t idiosyncratic to firm i.
Equation (E.8) implies Eitkt+h(i) = ψ2E
i
tkt+h−1(i) + ψ3[p
∗
t (i) + p
∗
t − pt −
∑h−1
j=1 Etpit+ j]. Plugging
this expression into (E.7) we find
κ(p∗t (i) + p
∗
t − pt) = κ
∞∑
h=1
(βθ)hEtpit+h + (1 − βθ)
∞∑
h=0
(βθ)hEtm̂ct+h − α(1 − βθ)(1 − α)(1 − βθψ2)kt(i)
where κ ≡ 1/Θ + αβθψ3/[(1 − α)(1 − βθψ2)]. Then, using the approximate aggregate price
dynamics (E.1),
κ(p∗t (i)+
θ
1 − θpit) = κ
∞∑
h=1
(βθ)hEtpit+h + (1−βθ)
∞∑
h=0
(βθ)hEtm̂ct+h− α(1 − βθ)(1 − α)(1 − βθψ2)kt(i) (3.B.10)
I can then integrate equation (E.9) and solve the resulting difference equation to find64
pit = βEtpit+1 + λm̂ct
where λ ≡ (1− θ)(1− βθ)/κθ, which is the New Keynesian Phillips curve under firm-specific capital
(Sveen and Weinke, 2005; Woodford, 2005). Moreover, subtracting the New Keynesian Phillips
curve from (E.9), I find the solution for the newly reset prices, which obey the linear function of
the individual capital shock
p∗t (i) = ψ1kt(i) (3.B.11)
where
ψ1 ≡ − α(1 − βθ)
κ(1 − α)(1 − βθψ2)
63Note that Eit xt+ j = Et xt+ j for an aggregate quantity x and j ≥ 0.
64Note that
∫ 1
0 xt(i)di = O(‖x̂‖2) independent of the shape of the aggregator for variable Xt.
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Next, the approximate optimality condition for the capital choice of firm i together with (E.6)
imply
Ξkt+1(i) = βEtkt+2(i) + kt(i) − ε[Ξ − 1 − β]Et pt+1(i) (3.B.12)
where Ξ ≡ [(1 + β)(1 − α)η + ϑδ]/η(1 − α).
Note that, up to a first-order approximation,
Et pt+1(i) = θ(pt(i) − Etpit+1) + (1 − θ)Et(p∗t+1(i) + p∗t+1 − pt+1)
= θpt(i) + (1 − θ)Et p∗t+1(i)
(3.B.13)
where the last equality uses (E.1).
Then, I plug (E.8) into (E.13) and use (E.14) to identify ψ2 and ψ3 as
Ξψ2 = 1 + βψ22 + {βψ3 − ε[Ξ − 1 − β]}(1 − θ)ψ1ψ2 (3.B.14)
Ξψ3 = βψ2ψ3 + {βψ3 − ε[Ξ − 1 − β]}[θ + (1 − θ)ψ1ψ3] (3.B.15)
which verifies the guess (E.8).
The problem of firms accumulating firm-specific capital under sticky prices adds therefore two
idiosyncratic dynamic equations to the state-space system driving aggregate variables. Namely,
equations (E.8) and (E.14) form the system[
Et pt+1(i)
kt+1(i)
]
=
[
θ + (1 − θ)ψ1ψ3 (1 − θ)ψ1ψ2
ψ3 ψ2
] [
pt(i)
kt(i)
]
(3.B.16)
To have a unique bounded solution, system (3.B.16) must have both eigenvalues within the unit
circle. These eigenvalues are independent of the monetary policy rule in place. I can thus check
over the (θ, η)-plane which combinations lead to indeterminacy, independently of the policy rule
(Woodford, 2005). Note that this exercise is complementary to the exercise about the determinacy
of the equilibrium for aggregate variables, which in general depends on the monetary policy rule in
place (Sveen and Weinke, 2005).
3.C. Derivation of the welfare function
A second-order Taylor expansion of utility around the zero-inflation steady state reads
U(Yêyt − Ie 1η q̂t+̂kt ,Nênt) =
= U + U1Y
(̂
yt + 12 ŷ
2
t
)
+ 12U11Y
2̂y2t − U1 Iη
(̂
qt + 12 q̂
2
t
) − U1I(̂kt + 12 k̂2t )+
+12U11I
2(1
η
q̂t + k̂t
)2 − U11YÎyt(1η q̂t + k̂t) + U2N (̂nt + 12 n̂2t ) + 12U22N 2̂n2t
where I used the market clearing condition Ct = Yt − It and the approximate optimality condi-
tion (3.A.2).
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Noting that U11C/U1 = −σ, U22N/U2 = ϕ, Y = C/γc, and I = Cγi/γc, then
Ut − U = U1C 1
γc
[̂
yt +
1
2
(
1 − σ
γc
)̂
y2t
]
− U1C γi
γcη
[̂
qt +
1
2
(
1 +
σγi
γcη
)̂
q2t
]
+ U1C
σγi
γ2cη
ŷtq̂t+
− U1C γi
γc
[̂
kt +
1
2
(
1 +
σγi
γc
)̂
k2t
]
+ U1C
σγi
γ2c
ŷt̂kt − U1Cσγ
2
i
γ2cη
q̂t̂kt+
+ U2N
[̂
nt +
1 + ϕ
2
n̂2t
]
Recall that, in the undistorted steady state, −U2/U1 = MRS = MPN = (1 − α)Y/N. Next, a
second-order expansion of aggregate hours yields65
Nt ≡
∫
Nt(i)di = exp
{ 1
1 − α [yt − at − αkt]
} ∫
exp
{ 1
1 − αyt(i) −
α
1 − αkt(i)
}
di
= exp
{ 1
1 − α [yt − at − αkt]
}
× (3.C.17)
×
{
1 +
1
1 − αEiyt(i) +
1
2
1
(1 − α)2 ∆
y
t −
α
1 − αEikt(i) +
1
2
α2
(1 − α)2 ∆
k
t −
α
(1 − α)2 ∆
yk
t
}
⇒ (1 − α)nt = yt − at − αkt + 12
1 − α + αε
ε(1 − α) ∆
y
t +
1
2
α
1 − α∆
k
t −
α
1 − α∆
yk
t
= yt − at − αkt + 12
(1 − α + αε)ε
1 − α ∆
p
t +
1
2
α
1 − α∆
k
t +
αε
1 − α∆
pk
t (3.C.18)
where I use the notation xt(i) ≡ xt(i) − xt, ∆xt ≡ varixt(i) and ∆xyt ≡ covi(xt(i), yt(i)), for any two
random variables x and y, and where the transformation uses the fact that the demand curve implies
yt(i) = −εpt(i).
Thus, I can use the quadratic approximation to the aggregate production function (3.C.18) to
express welfare as
Ut − U ∝ γc Ut − UU1C
= ŷt − γîit + 12
(
1 − σ
γc
)̂
y2t −
1
2
(γi
η
+
σγ2i
γcη2
)̂
q2t −
1
2
(
γi +
σγ2i
γc
)̂
k2t +
+
σγi
γcη
ŷtq̂t +
σγi
γc
ŷt̂kt − σγ
2
i
γcη
q̂t̂kt −
[̂
yt − at − α̂kt
]
−
[1
2
ε
Θ
∆
p
t +
1
2
α
1 − α∆
k
t +
αε
(1 − α)ε∆
pk
t +
1 + ϕ
2(1 − α)
(̂
yt − at − α̂kt)2]
65By ‘⇒’ I mean that I disregard both terms independent of policy and terms of order higher than two.
89
where Θ ≡ (1 − α)/(1 − α + αε), and therefore, up to a term independent of policy,
⇒ −(γîit − α̂kt) + 12(1 − σγc )̂y2t − 12(γiη + σγ
2
i
γcη2
)̂
q2t −
1
2
(
γi +
σγ2i
γc
)̂
k2t +
+
σγi
γcη
ŷtq̂t +
σγi
γc
ŷt̂kt − σγ
2
i
γcη
q̂t̂kt − 12
ε
Θ
∆
p
t −
1
2
α
1 − α∆
k
t −
αε
(1 − α)ε∆
pk
t
−
[ 1 + ϕ
2(1 − α) ŷ
2
t +
(1 + ϕ)α2
2(1 − α) k̂
2
t −
(1 + ϕ)α
1 − α ŷt̂kt −
1 + ϕ
1 − α ŷtat +
(1 + ϕ)α
1 − α k̂tat
]
Next, using (3.A.5) and recalling that γi = αβδ/ϑ,
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
γîit − α̂kt) = ∞∑
t=0
βt
α
ϑ
(
β̂kt+1 − k̂t)
= −α
ϑ
k̂0
which is a term independent of policy, so that, as I sum the period-by-period utilities, I can disregard
the linear terms in [̂it, k̂t]. Thus, rewrite the quadratic approximation as
⇒ −12w′∆t − 12
{(
σ
γc
− 1
)̂
y2t +
(
γi
η
+
σγ2i
γcη2
)̂
q2t +
(
γi +
σγ2i
γc
)̂
k2t − 2σγiγcη ŷtq̂t+
−2σγi
γc
ŷt̂kt + 2
σγ2i
γcη
q̂t̂kt +
1+ϕ
1−α ŷ
2
t +
(1+ϕ)α2
1−α k̂
2
t − 2 (1+ϕ)α1−α ŷt̂kt − 2̂yt 1+ϕ1−αat + 2αk̂t 1+ϕ1−αat
}
where w ≡ [ 12 εΘ ; 12 α1−α ; αε1−α ] and ∆t ≡ [∆pt ; ∆kt ; ∆pkt ].
I focus now on the term in curly brackets, which is what I want to express in terms of gaps. Add
and subtract the quantities needed to make gaps appear and use a property of the efficient economy,
1 + ϕ
1 − αat =
(σ
γc
+
α + ϕ
1 − α
)̂
yet −
σγi
γcη
q̂et −
(σγi
γc
+
(1 + ϕ)α
1 − α
)̂
ket
to find [
Ξy˜y2t + Ξqq˜
2
t + Ξk˜k
2
t − 2Ξyq˜ytq˜t − 2Ξyky˜t˜kt + 2Ξqkq˜t˜kt
]
+
+2q̂t
[(
γi
η
+
σγ2i
γcη2
)̂
qet − σγiγcη ŷet +
σγ2i
γcη
k̂et
]
+ 2̂kt
[(
σγ2i
γcη
− σγiα
γcη
)̂
qet +
−
(
σγi
γc
− σα
γc
+ α
)̂
yet +
(
γi +
σγ2i
γc
− σγiα
γc
)̂
ket
]
=
[
Ξy˜y2t + Ξqq˜
2
t + Ξk˜k
2
t − 2Ξyq˜ytq˜t − 2Ξyky˜t˜kt + 2Ξqkq˜t˜kt
]
+ 2q̂tζq,t + 2̂ktζk,t
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where
ζq,t ≡ γi
η
q̂et + Ξyq
[γi
η
q̂et − ŷet + γîket
]
=
γi
η
q̂et − Ξyqγĉcet
=
γi
η
(̂qet − σ̂cet )
ζk,t ≡ (γi − α)σ
γc
(
γîket − ŷet +
γi
η
q̂et
)
+ γîket − α̂yet
= γi(̂kt − σ̂cet ) − α(̂yet − σ̂cet )
Note next that the intertemporal optimality conditions (3.A.3), (3.A.4) and (3.A.5) imply that
∞∑
t=0
βt(α̂kt − γîit)σ̂cet =
∞∑
t=0
βt
α
ϑ
(̂kt − β̂kt+1)σ̂cet
⇒ α
ϑ
∞∑
t=1
βt̂ktσ∆̂cet
=
α
ϑ
∞∑
t=1
βt̂kt[ϑm̂pk
e
t + βq̂
e
t − q̂et−1]
Thus, plugging this expression into the discounted sum
∑∞
t=0 2q̂tζq,t + 2̂ktζk,t, I get
2
∑∞
t=0 β
t [̂qtζq,t + k̂tζk,t] =
= 2
∑∞
t=0 β
t[α
ϑ
k̂t(ϑ̂yet − ϑ̂ket + βq̂et − q̂et−1) + γiη q̂tq̂et + γîkt̂ket − α̂kt̂yet
]
⇒ 2 ∑∞t=0 βt[α̂kt̂yet − α̂kt̂ket + αβϑ k̂tq̂et − αβϑ k̂t+1q̂et + γiη q̂tq̂et + γîkt̂ket − α̂kt̂yet ]
= 2
∑∞
t=0 β
t[(γi − α)̂kt̂ket + (γiη q̂t − γiδ ∆̂kt+1)̂qet ] = 2(γi − α) ∑∞t=0 βt̂kt̂ket
⇒ −2αβ
ϑ
∑∞
t=0 β
t (̂kt+1̂ket+1 − k̂t̂ket )
where I used γi−α = −α(1−β)/ϑ. By the stationarity of k̂t and k̂et , Et
∑∞
t=0 β
t̂kt+1̂ket+1 ≈ Et
∑∞
t=0 β
t̂kt̂ket ,
with equality when the expectation operator is unconditional, so that I can disregard the last term.
I next follow Sveen and Weinke (2009) in deriving the relationship between the dispersion term
∆t and inflation, both under firm-specific capital accumulation and under a rental market for capital
services.
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3.C.1. Firm-specific capital
Up to a second-order approximation, Sveen and Weinke (2009) show how
∆
p
t = θ∆
p
t−1 + (1 − θ)ψ1∆kt +
θ
1 − θpi
2
t
∆kt = ψ
2
2∆
k
t−1 + ψ
2
3∆
p
t−1
∆
pk
t = θψ2∆
pk
t−1 + θψ3∆
p
t−1 + (1 − θ)ψ1∆kt
I can represent this system of equations in equivalent vector notation,1 −(1 − θ)ψ
2
1 0
0 1 0
0 −(1 − θ)ψ1 1
 ∆t =
 θ 0 0ψ23 ψ22 0
θψ3 0 θψ2
 ∆t−1 +

θ
1−θ
0
0
 pi2t ⇔ B∆∆t = A∆∆t−1 + C∆pi2t
which allows me to express the discounted sum of the dispersion term in welfare as
∞∑
t=0
βtw′∆t =
∞∑
t=0
βtw′
t−1∑
h=0
(B−1∆ A∆)
hB−1∆ C∆pi
2
t−h + t.i.p.
=
∞∑
t=1
βtw′∆t =
1
2
Ξppi
2
t + t.i.p.
where Ξp ≡ w′[B∆ − βA∆]−1C∆.
I can therefore compute the discounted sum of losses in the firm-specific capital case, ending
up with expression (3.18).
3.C.2. Rental market
When firms purchase capital services on a competitive rental market, we have yt(i) = kt(i) and
therefore ∆yt = ∆kt = ∆
yk
t = ε
2∆
p
t . The recursive formulation for the cross-sectional dispersion of
prices becomes (Woodford, 2003)
∆
p
t = θ∆
p
t−1 +
θ
1 − θpi
2
t
because there is no dispersion in p∗t (i). Therefore, the dispersion component in the welfare loss
measure is
∞∑
t=0
βtw′∆t =
ε
2
∞∑
t=0
βt∆
p
t
=
1
2
εθ
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
∞∑
t=1
βtpi2t + t.i.p.
I can therefore compute the discounted sum of losses in the rental-market case, ending up with
expression (3.18) where Ξp = ε/λrm.
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3.D. Average Q and marginal Q
Along the lines of Hayashi (1982), I derive the relation between the unobservable marginal Q
and the observable average Q, which I denote by S t.
By the degree-one homogeneity of the production function and the optimality conditions,
Pt(i)Yt(i) − (1 − τ)WtPt Nt(i) − (1 − τ)It(i) − Tt = Pt(i)Yt(i) −
Wt
Pt
Nt(i) − It(i) + T t(i)
= M̂Ct(i)MPKt(i)Kt(i) + [Pt(i) − M̂Ct(i)]Yt(i) + T t(i)
(3.D.19)
where Pt(i) ≡ Pt(i)/Pt and T t(i) ≡ τWt[Nt(i) − Nt] + τ[It(i) − It] is a term that aggregates to zero.
Next, using Mt+1 ≡ Λt+1Pt+1/ΛtPt, with Λ the marginal value of nominal income, rewrite the
optimality condition (3.7) as
βEtΛt+1Pt+1[M̂Ct+1(i)MPKt+1(i)Kt+1(i) − It+1(i)] =
= ΛtPtQt(i)Kt+1(i) − βEtΛt+1Pt+1Qt+1(i)Kt+2(i) (3.D.20)
which I use to derive equation (3.8)
S t(i) =
∑∞
h=1 β
hEt
Λt+hPt+h
ΛtPt
[
Pt+h(i)Yt+h(i) − (1 − τ)Wt+hPt+h Nt+h(i) − (1 − τ)It+h(i) − Tt+h
]
Kt+1(i)
=
∑∞
h=1 β
hEt
Λt+hPt+h
ΛtPt
[
M̂Ct+h(i)MPKt+h(i)Kt+h(i) − It+h(i) + [Pt(i) − M̂Ct+h(i)]Yt+h(i) + T t+h(i)]
Kt+1(i)
= Qt(i) +
1
Kt+1(i)
∞∑
h=1
EtMt,t+h{[Pt+h(i) − M̂Ct+h(i)]Yt+h(i) + T t+h(i)}
After aggregation66 and a loglinearization around the undistorted zero-inflation steady state,67
ŝt − q̂t = −ϑ
α
∞∑
j=0
β jEtm̂ct+ j+1
= − ϑ
αλ
Etpit+1
(3.D.21)
where the last equality uses the New Keynesian Phillips curve (3.13). The technical appendix
derives equation (3.D.21) in more detail and generalizes it to the case of a distorted steady state.
Note that, in the efficient economy, m̂ct = 0 at all times t, so that ŝet = q̂
e
t , which is the result in
Hayashi (1982) that average and marginal Q are equal when there are no imperfections in the goods
market.
66Note that
∫ 1
0 T t(i)di = 0.
67Recall that
∫
pt(i)di = 0, up to a first-order approximation.
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To derive equation (3.15), combine (3.D.21) and ŝet = q̂
e
t .
Equation (3.D.21) states that if the expected long-run markup, −Et ∑∞j=1 β j−1m̂ct+ j, is high, then
firms’ profits are high, hence dividends and stock prices are high. Note that there are two effects of
markups on stock prices: one because markups affect qt, through (3.A.4)—a high markup reduces
the return to investment—one because markups affect profits.
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Technical Appendix to Part 1
A. Relationship between the cost of uncertainty and the equity premium
In this section I use a version of the Campbell and Shiller (1988) approximate identity to study
approximate loglinear analytical conditions that grant flat term structures.68 Under assumptions 2
and 3, lemma 2 shows how the equality between the cost of uncertainty and the equity premium
holds whenever Etr
e,(1)
d,t+1 = Etr
em
t+1. Lemma 3 thus studies the relationship between the equity premium
and the one-period welfare cost, l(1)t = Etr
e,(1)
d,t+1, by showing how their difference is controlled by
the systematic risk in the market dividend yield. Proposition 4, under the weak structure about the
stochastic discount factor in assumption 4, studies conditions under which the two quantities are
equal.
Assumption 2. Let either Etr
e,(n)
d,t+1 ≥ Etre,(1)d,t+1 or Etre,(n)d,t+1 ≤ Etre,(1)d,t+1, for all n > 1.
Assumption 3. The expectations hypothesis of bond valuation holds, Etr
e,(n)
b,t+1 = 0, for all n.
69
Assumption 2, which rules out ample fluctuations across maturities in the term structure of
holding-period equity risk premia, does not appear restrictive; it holds in every model among today’s
leading consumption-based asset pricing models. The expectations hypothesis in assumption 3 is
restrictive (not to mention its empirical failures, that go back at least to Fama and Bliss, 1987),
although it is still assumed in some benchmark calibrations of today’s leading asset pricing models.
Lemma 1 (Lognormal no-arbitrage pricing). The absence of arbitrage opportunities in the financial
market implies the fundamental asset pricing representation EtMt+1Rit+1 = 1 (Hansen and Richard,
1987). Under lognormality, the no-arbitrage pricing formula becomes
Etmt+1 + Etrit+1 +
1
2
vart(mt+1 + rit+1) = 0
68Recall the relationship between hold-to-maturity returns and holding period returns
r(n)t→t+n ≡ ln
( Dt+n
Et Mt,t+nDt+n
)
= ln
( Dt+n
Et+n−1Mt+nDt+n
)
+ ... + ln
(Et+1Mt+1,t+nDt+n
Et Mt,t+nDt+n
)
= r(1)t+n + ... + r
(n)
t+1
69The expectations hypothesis is usually stated as − f (n)b,t =
∑n−1
j=0 Etr
f
t+ j, for all n, which implies Etr
e,(n)
b,t+1 = 0, for all n,
because Etr
e,(n)
b,t+1 = Et f
(n−1)
b,t+1 − f (n)b,t − r ft = −
∑n−2
j=0 Etr
f
t+ j+1 +
∑n−1
j=0 Etr
f
t+ j − r ft = 0.
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This result also holds for the risk-free rate as
Etmt+1 + r
f
t +
1
2
vart(mt+1) = 0
Combining the formulas for the ex-ante return of the ith security and of the risk-free rate we
have the lognormal pricing formula for risk premia
ln EtReit+1 = −covt(mt+1, reit+1)
Lemma 2. Let assumptions 2 and 3. Suppose that the first dividend strip premium, Etre,(1)d,t+1, equals
the equity premium, Etremt+1. Then the cost of uncertainty L
N
t equals the equity premium, for any
N ⊂ N.
Proof of lemma 2. By no-arbitrage, Etremt+1 =
∑∞
n=1 wn,tEtr
e,(n)
d,t+1, where wn,t ≡ D(n)t /
∑∞
n=1 D
(n)
t . Since
Etremt+1 = Etr
e,(1)
d,t+1, then, under assumption 2, Etr
e,(n)
d,t+1 ≥ Etre,(n−1)d,t+1 , or viceversa. Suppose that the
inequality is strict for some n. Then Etr
e,(1)
d,t+1 =
∑∞
n=1 wn,tEtr
e,(n)
d,t+1 > Etr
e,(1)
d,t+1
∑∞
n=1 wn,t = Etr
e,(1)
d,t+1, a
contradiction. Therefore, the inequality must hold with equality, i.e., Etr
e,( j)
d,t+1 = Etr
e,m
t+1,∀ j ∈ N.
Therefore, and by assumption 3, l(n)t =
1
n Etr
e,(n)
t→t+n =
1
n
∑n
j=1 Et(r
e,( j)
d,t+n− j+1 − re,( j)b,t+n− j+1) = 1n Etre,mt+1. Thus,
LNt =
∑
n∈N ωn,tEtr
e,m
t+1 = Etr
e,m
t+1,∀N ⊂ N.
Lemma 3. Let a representative agent, lognormal environment without arbitrage opportunities in
the financial market. By proposition 2, the cost at time t of fluctuations at time t + 1, l(1)t , equals
the premium on a strip that pays off aggregate consumption next period. Therefore, the distance
between l(1)t and the equity premium equals
δcovt(mt+1, dpt+1) (A.1)
where dp is the log dividend-price ratio of the market portfolio and 1/δ is the unconditional market
return.
Proof of lemma 3. I define the market portfolio as the portfolio that pays off the entire consumption
stream. The approximate Campbell and Shiller (1988) identity for the market portfolio then is
rmt+1 = k + dpt − δdpt+1 + ∆ct+1
for some constant intercept k and 1/δ the unconditional market return.
Then, by no-arbitrage pricing under lognormality (lemma 1) and by the definition of the
one-period welfare cost l(1)t , the equity premium is
ln EtRemt+1 = −covt(mt+1, rmt+1)
= −covt(mt+1,∆ct+1) + δcovt(mt+1, dpt+1)
= l(1)t + δcovt(mt+1, dpt+1)
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The residual δcovt(mt+1, dpt+1), the systematic risk in the price-dividend ratio, measures the
distance between the cost of uncertainty and the equity premium.
Assumption 4. Preferences Ut conform to the generic stochastic discount factor
mt+1 = −ρt − γt
∞∑
j=0
δ j(Et+1 − Et)∆ct+ j+1 (A.2)
with δ0 = 1.
The stochastic discount factor in equation (A.2) is fairly general. For example, it embeds the
preferences studied by Campbell and Cochrane (1999); Bansal and Yaron (2004); Hansen and
Sargent (2005); Hansen, Heaton and Li (2008); Barillas, Hansen and Sargent (2009).
Assumption 5. Either the market price-dividend ratio is constant, or consumption is a random walk
and news to consumption growth and to the price-dividend ratio are orthogonal.
Proposition 4. Let a representative agent, lognormal environment without arbitrage opportunities
in the financial market. Let assumptions 2, 3, and 4. Then, the distance between the one-period
welfare cost and the equity premium is
covt(mt+1, dpt+1) = −γt
∞∑
j=0
δ jcovt
(
(Et+1 − Et)∆ct+ j+1, dpt+1)
Moreover, let assumption 5. Then, the cost of uncertainty LNt equals the equity premium, for
any coordinate set N ⊂ N.
Proof of lemma 4. Under assumption 4, the distance between the cost of uncertainty and the equity
premium characterized in lemma 3 becomes
ln EtRemt+1 = l
(1)
t − γt
∞∑
j=0
δδ jcovt
(
(Et+1 − Et)∆ct+ j+1, dpt+1) (A.3)
which proves the first part of proposition 4.
Moreover, if consumption is a random walk, expression (A.3) collapses to
ln EtRemt+1 = l
(1)
t − γtcovt(∆ct+1, δdpt+1)
If, additionally, news to consumption growth and to the price-dividend ratio are orthogonal,
ln EtRemt+1 = l
(1)
t
i.e., the one-period welfare cost equals the equity premium. This result, combined with assump-
tions 2 and 3 and lemma 2, proves proposition 4.
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To evaluate the restrictiveness of assuming trivial term structure properties, I use proposition 4
to study what conditions would grant them in some of today’s leading consumption-based asset
pricing models. Section B works out the details of each model.
Example A.1 (Log utility). Consider preferences captured by log utility, Ut = ln(Ct) + βEtUt+1.
Under log utility, the market portfolio has the convenient property that the price-dividend ratio of
the market portfolio is constant. Therefore, by proposition 4, the welfare cost of uncertainty equals
the equity premium.
Example A.2 (Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habits). In the habit formation model of Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) the utility function U(Ct, Xt) = (Ct − Xt)1−γ + βEtUt+1, where Xt represents an
external habit that is a nonlinear function of past consumption such that the log stochastic discount
factor has shape mt+1 = −ρt − γt(Et+1 − Et)∆ct+1. The nonlinearity is calibrated to ensure that the
precautionary savings effect largely offsets the intertemporal substitution effect in the determination
of the risk-free rate, thus avoiding the risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989). At the same time a large
and time-varying risk-aversion coefficient, γt, matches a high and volatile equity premium. In their
benchmark calibration, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) assume a constant risk-free rate and thereby
a flat term structure of interest rates. Under these conditions, the distance betwee the one-period
welfare cost and the equity premium is given by γtcovt(∆ct+1, dpt+1).
Thus, under the further assumption that consumption growth and the price-dividend ratio are
conditionally orthogonal, the distance (A.1) collapses to zero. Then, by proposition 4, the welfare
cost of uncertainty equals the equity premium.
Under the assumed orthogonality, dpt+1 bears no systematic risk from time t to time t + 1. The
baseline model of Campbell and Cochrane cannot however replicate the orthogonality assumption,
because it has only one structural shock, a structure that imposes a perfect correlation between
dividend growth and dividend yields.
Example A.3 (Bansal and Yaron (2004) long-run risk model). Consider preferences as described
by non-expected utility Ut = {(1 − β)C1−ρt + β[EtU1−γt+1 ]
1−ρ
1−γ } 11−ρ , where [EtU1−γt+1 ]
1
1−γ is the certainty
equivalent of utility at time t + 1 evaluated through the expected utility function v(x) = x1−γ.
Parameter ρ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and γ controls the risk aversion. An
example are the recursive preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989).
I follow Campbell (1993) and Restoy and Weil (2011), who use a version of the loglinearized
Campbell-Shiller identity and a lognormal no-arbitrage pricing framework with conditionally
homoskedastic consumption growth to show that, up to first-order, the market price-dividend ratio
and the stochastic discount factor are the functions of future consumption growth
d̂pt = −(1 − ρ)
∞∑
j=0
δ jEt∆̂ct+ j+1
(Et+1 − Et)mt+1 = −γ(Et+1 − Et)∆ct+1 + (ρ − γ)(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
δ j∆ct+ j+1
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Then, if consumption growth follows the generic process
ζt+1 = Aζt + Bet+1
∆ct+1 = µ + Cζt + Det+1
where ζ is a state vector and e ∼ WN(0, I), then the distance between the cost of uncertainty and
the equity premium is
δcovt(mt+1, dpt+1) = covt
( − γDet+1 + (ρ − γ) ∞∑
j=1
δ jCA j−1Bet+1,−(1 − ρ)
∞∑
j=1
δ jCA j−1Bet+1
)
= (1 − ρ)(γD + (γ − ρ)δC[I − δA]−1B)(δC[I − δA]−1B)′ (A.4)
where 1/δ is the steady-state value of the market return.
The price-dividend ratio is constant if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ρ, is unity or
if consumption is a random walk (C = 0). In these two cases, the distance (A.1) collapses to zero.
If consumption is a random walk, the term structure of interest rates is flat and assumption 3 holds.
Then, by proposition 4, the welfare cost of uncertainty equals the equity premium.
Note how result (A.4) is true in the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) without
stochastic volatility and the ambiguity averse preferences of the robust control literature (Barillas
et al., 2009).
Example A.4 (Barillas, Hansen and Sargent (2009) ambiguity averse multiplier preferences).
Consider agents who have a wish for robustness against some misspecification in the transition
equation for the states of the economy. I follow Hansen and Sargent (2005) in modeling the
misspecification through a non-negative martingale Gt that distorts the probability distribution
P(et|ζ0) implied by the transition equation for the states of the economy. The stochastic process
Gt in turn implies a factor gt+1, defined recursively as Gt+1 = gt+1Gt with G0 = 1, that distorts
the transition probability measure P(et+1|et, ζ0). The ambiguity-averse agent then evaluates the
objective function by drawing the worst-case scenario about the misspecification and penalizes the
objective by a function of relative entropy, which is strictly greater than zero unless there are no
distortions P-almost everywhere. I can write the objective function as
V0 = min{gt+1}
EQ0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln(Ct) + βθEPt [gt+1 ln gt+1]
}
where parameter θ represents the agent’s aversion to model misspecification and where Q represents
the distorted probability measure, whose Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to probability
measure P is Gt. It follows that the optimized function gt+1 is the Esscher transform of probability
measure P
gt+1 =
exp{−Vt+1/θ}
EPt exp{−Vt+1/θ}
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which implies the optimized value function
Vt = ln(Ct) − βθ ln EPt exp
{
− Vt+1
θ
}
(A.5)
Value function (A.5) is observationally equivalent to Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences with
unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution, provided Vt = ln Ut/(1−β) and θ = −1/[(1−β)(1−γ)].
Therefore, as in example A.3, the price-dividend ratio is constant and the cost of uncertainty equals
the equity premium.
Example A.5 (Gabaix (2012) variable rare disaster model). Although these preferences are not a
special case of (A.2), the relationship between the one-period cost of uncertainty and the equity
premium can be easily studied. Gabaix assumes power utility and that log consumption growth
falls by an amount bt+1 in the event of a disaster at time t + 1. These assumptions imply the log
stochastic discount factor
mt+1 =
−δ with probability 1 − pt−δ − γbt+1 with probability pt
where pt is the (potentially time-varying) probability of a disaster at time t + 1. Under the baseline
calibration, the model implies flat term structures of holding-period risk premia on both zero-
coupon equities and bonds and therefore the equality between the equity premium and the cost of
uncertainty.
Example A.6 (Lettau and Wachter (2007, 2011) quasi-structural model). Lettau and Wachter (2007,
2011) assume an essentially affine exponential-Gaussian setting in which shocks to dividend growth
(Et+1−Et)∆dt+1 is the only pricing factor, the price of risk xt is linear in the states of the economy, and
shocks to the price of risk are uncorrelated to cashflow shocks, i.e., covt(∆dt+1, xt+1) = 0. Namely,
consider a stochastic discount factor mt+1 = −r ft − 12γ2t FF′ − γtFεt+1, where the price of risk γt =
γ+Kζt is linear in the states ζt = Aζt−1+Bεt+1, and the pricing factor is Fεt+1 = ‖D‖−1(Et+1−Et)∆ct+1,
where ∆ct+1 = Cζt + Dεt+1, with εt ∼ Niid(0, I). Assume KBF′ = covt(∆dt+1, γt+1) = 0.
If on top of that consumption is a random walk (C = 0), we can easily verify that the term
structure of welfare costs is flat:
Et(r
(n)
d,t+1 − r(n)b,t+1) − Et(r(n−1)d,t+1 − r(n−1)b,t+1 ) = −(Bd,(n−1) − Bb,(n−1))[I − A]BF′γt
= [I − Γn−1]DF′KBF′γt = 0
where the last equality is because Bd,(n) − Bb,(n) = (Bd,(n−1) − Bb,(n−1))(A− BF′K)−DFK′. Moreover,
the term structure of interest rates is flat if HBF′ = covt(∆dt+1, rt+1) = 0, i.e., if shocks to the state
that drives the risk-free rate are either absent (as in Lettau and Wachter, 2007) or unpriced. Since
both term structures are flat, the term structure of equity must also be flat, hence the welfare cost of
uncertainty equals the equity premium.
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B. Term structures in some consumption-based asset pricing models
Recall the definition of the components of the term structure of marginal costs of uncertainty,
l(n)t =
1
n
(
exp{Etre,(n)t→t+n +
1
2
Vt(Re,(n)t→t+n)} − 1
)
(B.1)
`(n)t =
1
n
Etr
e,(n)
t→t+n +
1
2n
Vt(Re,(n)t→t+n) (B.2)
whereV(X|F ) ≡ 2 ln E[X|F ] − 2E[ln(X)|F ] denotes entropy relative to the information setF ,
and `(n)t ≡ ln(1 + nl(n)t )1/n is the continuously-compounded welfare cost of uncertainty associated
with the discretely-compounded cost l(n)t .
Note that, unconditionally,
E(l(n)t ) =
1
n
(
E(Re,(n)t→t+n) − 1
)
=
1
n
(
exp{E(Etre,(n)t→t+n) +
1
2
V(Re,(n)t→t+n)} − 1
)
=
1
n
(
exp{E(ln[1 + nl(n)t ]) +
1
2
V(EtRe,(n)t→t+n)} − 1
)
=
1
n
(
exp{E(n`(n)t ) +
1
2
V(exp{n`(n)t })} − 1
)
(B.3)
where the second equality uses equation (B.1) and the law of iterated expectations, and the third
equality uses the law of total entropy.
B.1. Notation
Throughout the appendix, I use the notation for yields F(n)c,t = D
(n)
c,t /Ct, F
(n)
d,t = D
(n)
d,t/Dt and
Fb,t = Db,t, where D
(n)
c,t = EtMt,t+nCt+n denotes the no-arbitrage price of a n-period consumption strip,
D(n)d,t = EtMt,t+nDt+n denotes the no-arbitrage price of a n-period dividend strip, and D
(n)
b,t = EtMt,t+n
denotes the no-arbitrage price of a n-period zero-coupon real bond. Also, recall the definition
R(n)t+1 =
D(n−1)t+1
D(n)t
, which implies the recursive no-arbitrage pricing formula for the term structure
components
F(n)b,t = EtMt+1F
(n−1)
b,t+1
F(n)c,t = EtMt+1
Ct+1
Ct
F(n−1)c,t+1
F(n)d,t = EtMt+1
Dt+1
Dt
F(n−1)d,t+1
with boundary condition F(0)t = 1 (Wachter, 2006; Lettau and Wachter, 2007, 2011). Finally, note
the recursive structure of the term structure of growth Fg,t = Et(Ct+n/Ct):
F(n)g,t = Et
Ct+1
Ct
F(n−1)g,t+1
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B.2. Approximate Campbell-Shiller identities
A loglinearization of the identity Rwt+1 = Wt+1/(Wt −Ct) for the wealth portfolio is
rwt+1 = − ln(δc) + ∆̂ct+1 − ĉwt+1 +
1
δc
ĉwt
where δc ≡ 1/E(Rwt ).
A loglinearization of the identity Rmt+1 = (Pt+1 + Dt+1)/Pt for the market portfolio is
rmt+1 = − ln(δd) + ∆̂dt+1 − δdd̂pt+1 + d̂pt
where δd ≡ 1/E(Rmt ).
B.3. Log utility
Consider the simple log utility case Ut = ln Ct + βEtUt+1 =
∑∞
j=0 Et ln Ct+ j, which features the
stochastic discount factor Mt+1 = βCt/Ct+1. Consumption claims and real bonds have therefore the
respective no-arbitrage prices
EtMt,t+nCt+n = βnCt EtMt,t+n = βnEt(Ct/Ct+n)
and therefore R(n)d,t+1 = Ct+1/βCt = 1/Mt+1,∀n. Under the additional assumption of lognormality,
EtR
e,(n)
t→t+n =
EtMt,t+nEt(Ct+n/Ct)
Et(Mt,t+nCt+n/Ct)
= e−Et(ct+n−ct)+
1
2 vart(ct+n)+Et(ct+n−ct)+ 12 vart(ct+n)
= evart(ct+n)
and therefore `(n)t =
1
nvart(ct+n).
B.4. Habit formation
Let the factor X in the utility function U(C, X) be a possibly nonlinear function of past con-
sumption such that the log of the stochastic discount factor has form
mt+1 = −ρt − γt(Et+1 − Et)∆ct+1
An example are the habits of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), U(Ct, Xt) = 11−γ (Ct − Xt)1−γ +
βEtUt+1, with surplus-consumption ratio S t ≡ (Ct−Xt)/Ct driven by st+1 = φst +λ(st)(Et+1−Et)ct+1.
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As in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) I assume the structure
mt+1 = −γ∆ct+1 − γ∆st+1
∆ct+1 = µ + vt+1
∆dt+1 = µ + wt+1
st+1 = (1 − φ)s + φst + λ(st)vt+1
λ(st) = e−s
√
1 − 2(st − s) − 1 with es = σv
√
γ
1 − φ − b/γ
r ft = − ln(β) + γµ −
1
2
γ(1 − φ − b/γ) − b(st − s)
with [v; w] ∼ N(0,Σ) and Σ =
[
σ2v ρcdσvσw
ρcdσvσw σ
2
w
]
.70
Consumption and dividend yields are functions of the state st. Given the nonlinearity of the
price of risk γt = γ[1 + λ(st)] on the state st, the solution does not have a closed form (Wachter,
2005):
Fb,(n)(st) = Et[βe−γ∆ct+1−γ∆st+1 F
b,(n−1)
t+1 (st+1)]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
βe−γµ−γv+γ(1−φ)(st−s)−γλ(st)vFb,(n−1)
(
(1 − φ)s + φst + λ(st)v)dP(v)
Fc,(n)(st) =
∫ ∞
−∞
βe(1−γ)µ+(1−γ)v+γ(1−φ)(st−s)−γλ(st)vFc,(n−1)
(
(1 − φ)s + φst + λ(st)v)dP(v)
Fd,(n)(st) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
βe(1−γ)µ+w−γv+γ(1−φ)(st−s)−γλ(st)vFd,(n−1)
(
(1 − φ)s + φst + λ(st)v)dP(v,w)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
βE[ew|v]e(1−γ)µ−γv+γ(1−φ)(st−s)−γλ(st)vFd,(n−1)((1 − φ)s + φst + λ(st)v)dP(v)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
βeρcd
σw
σv
v+ 12σ
2
w(1−ρ2cd)+(1−γ)µ−γv+γ(1−φ)(st−s)−γλ(st)vFd,(n−1)
(
(1 − φ)s + φst + λ(st)v)dP(v)
with the appropriate boundary conditions, and where the last equality uses the property of multi-
variate normal variables [v; w] ∼ N(0,Σ)⇒ w|v ∼ N(ρcd σwσv v, σ2w(1 − ρ2cd)).
I solve the integrals numerically by a 40-point Gauss-Legendre quadrature, bounding the support
of the shock by −8 and +8 standard deviations. I follow Campbell and Cochrane (1999) in first
computing F(n−1)(s) over a grid of points for s, to then compute F(n−1)
(
(1 − φ)s + φst + λ(st)v) by
loglinearly interpolating between grid points.
Next, compute the term structure of growth in this setting: guess Fg,(n)t ≡ Et∆Ct,t+n = eAn and,
70Note that this specification cannot guarantee that consumption and dividends are cointegrated.
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under ∆ct+1 = µ + vt+1, verify as
eAn = Et∆Ct+1eAn−1 = Eteµ+vt+1+An−1
= eµ+An−1+
1
2σ
2
v
hence An = µ + An−1 + 12σ
2
v = n(µ +
1
2σ
2
v).
Then, I build `(n)t =
1
n ln[F
b,(n)
t
Fg,(n)t
Fc,(n)t
] = 1n [ f
b,(n)
t − f c,(n)t + f g,(n)t ] and derive its mean and variance.
B.5. Long-run risk
Consider the preferences in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989), Ut =
{
(1 − β)C1−ρt +
βX1−ρt
} 1
1−ρ , where Xt ≡ [EtU1−γt+1 ]1/(1−γ) is the certainty equivalent of utility at time t + 1 evaluated
through the expected utility function v(x) = x1−γ. Power utility is the special case γ = ρ. Tallarini
(2000) is the special case ρ = 1, and is a case that can be linked to the robust control literature
(Barillas et al., 2009).
Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences have the property Ut =
∑∞
j=0 Ct+ j∂Ut/∂Ct+ j, by Euler’s theorem,
because Ut is homogeneous with ∂Ut/∂Ct = (1−β)Uρt C−ρt and ∂Ut/∂Ct+1 = βUρt Xγ−ρt U−γt+1∂Ut+1/∂Ct+1.
Thus,
Mt+1 =
∂Ut/∂Ct+1
∂Ut+1/∂Ct
= β
(Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ(Ut
Xt
)ρ−γ
(B.4)
Wt
Ct
=
Ut/Ct
∂Ut/∂Ct
=
1
1 − β
(Ut
Ct
)1−ρ
(B.5)
The factor X in the utility function is
Xt =
[
EtU
1−γ
t+1
] 1
1−γ
= β−
1
1−ρ
[
U1−ρt + (1 − β)C1−ρt
] 1
1−ρ
=
(1 − β
β
) 1
1−ρ (Wt −Ct
Ct
) 1
1−ρCt
Result (B.5), combined with the definition of the return on the wealth portfolio Rwt+1 =
Wt+1/(Wt −Ct), allows me to rewrite equation (B.4) as
Mt+1 =
[
β
(Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ] 1−γ1−ρ ( 1
Rwt+1
) γ−ρ
1−ρ (B.6)
I follow Campbell (1993) and Restoy and Weil (2011), who use the loglinearized identity and a
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lognormal no-arbitrage pricing framework to show that
cwt = const. − δ(1 − ρ)
∞∑
j=0
δ jEt∆ct+ j+1 − 12δ
1 − γ
1 − ρEt
∞∑
j=0
δ jvart+ j(zt+ j+1) (B.7)
Etmt+1 = ln(β) − ρEt∆ct+1 + 12
(γ − ρ)(1 − γ)
(1 − ρ)2 vart(zt+1)
where zt ≡ cwt − (1 − ρ)∆ct.
Proof. Using (B.6), mt+1 =
1−γ
1−ρ ln(β) − ρ 1−γ1−ρ∆ct+1 − γ−ρ1−ρrwt+1, and the lognormal pricing formula, 0 =
Etmt+1 + Etrwt+1 +
1
2vart(mt+1 + r
w
t+1) =
1−γ
1−ρ ln(β)−ρ 1−γ1−ρEt∆ct+1 + 1−γ1−ρEtrwt+1 + 12
(1−γ
1−ρ
)2vart(rwt+1−ρ∆ct+1),
hence Etrwt+1 = − ln(β) + ρEt∆ct+1 − 12 1−γ1−ρvart(rwt+1 − ρ∆ct+1). The results then follow by using the
loglinearized identity.
B.5.1. Approximate SDF
Let the nonlinear state-space model (Bansal and Yaron, 2004)
ζt+1 = Aζt + σtBεt+1
∆ct+1 = µ + Cζt + σtDεt+1
σ2t+1 = σ
2 + ν(σ2t − σ2) + Σεt+1
where ζ is a state vector, σ2t is a scalar random variable, ε ∼ WN(0, I) and Σεt⊥[Bεt; Dεt].
I guess that cw is a linear function of the states [ζt, σ2t ], hence (Et+1−Et)cwt+1 = (1−ρ)Ψ1σtεt+1+
(1 − ρ)Ψ2Σεt+1, and therefore
(Et+1 − Et)cwt+1 = −(1 − ρ)
∞∑
j=1
δ j(Et+1 − Et)∆ct+ j+1 − 12
1 − γ
1 − ρ
∞∑
j=1
δ j(Et+1 − Et)vart+ j(cwt+ j+1 − (1 − ρ)∆ct+ j+1)
= −(1 − ρ)
∞∑
j=1
δ jCA j−1Bσtεt+1 − 12(1 − γ)(1 − ρ)‖Ψ1 − D‖
2
∞∑
j=1
δ jν j−1Σεt+1
(B.8)
= −δ(1 − ρ)C[I − δA]−1Bσtεt+1 − 12δ
(1 − γ)(1 − ρ)
1 − δν ‖Ψ1 − D‖
2Σεt+1
which verifies the guess for Ψ1 = −δC[I − δA]−1B and Ψ2 = −12δ 1−γ1−δν‖D − Ψ1‖2. Therefore,
(Et+1 − Et)mt+1 = −γ(Et+1 − Et)∆ct+1 + γ − ρ1 − ρ (Et+1 − Et)cwt+1 (B.9)
= −Fσtεt+1 − JΣεt+1
(Et+1 − Et)rwt+1 = [D − (1 − ρ)Ψ1]σtεt+1 − (1 − ρ)Ψ2Σεt+1
where F ≡ γD + (ρ − γ)Ψ1 and J ≡ (ρ − γ)Ψ2.
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Thus,
δ = e−E(Etr
w
t+1)− 12 var(Etrwt+1)− 12 Evart(rwt+1)
= eln(β)−ρµ+
1
2 (1−γ)(1−ρ)(‖D−Ψ1(δ)‖2σ2+‖Ψ2(δ)Σ‖2)− 12ρ2Cvar(ζt)C′− 18 (1−γ)2(1−ρ)2‖D−Ψ1(δ)‖4var(σ2t )− 12 (‖D−(1−ρ)Ψ1(δ)‖2σ2+‖(1−ρ)Ψ2(δ)Σ‖2)
defines a map δ = f (δ) whose fixed point yields a numerical value for δ and thereby for
[Ψ1,Ψ2, F, J].
Finally, note that
r ft = −Etmt+1 −
1
2
vart(mt+1)
= − ln(β) + ρEt∆ct+1 + 12(ρ − γ)(1 − γ)(‖D − Ψ1‖
2σ2t + ‖Ψ2Σ‖2) −
1
2
(‖F‖2σ2t + ‖JΣ‖2)
= r f + Gσ2t + Hζt
where r f = − ln(β) + ρµ + 12 1−ρρ−γ‖Ψ2Σ‖2, G = −12
(‖F‖2 − (ρ − γ)(1 − γ)‖D − Ψ1‖2), and H = ρC.
B.5.2. Log utility and long-run risk (EIS = 1)
Consider Epstein-Zin-Weil non-expected utility as ρ→ 1:
lim
ln Ut
1 − β = lim
1
(1 − β)(1 − ρ) ln
(
(1 − β)C1−ρt + βX1−ρt
)
= lim
1
1 − β
(1 − β)C1−ρt ln(Ct) + βX1−ρt ln(Xt)
(1 − β)C1−ρt + βX1−ρt
= ln(Ct) − βθ ln Ete(1−γ) ln Ut+1
Let Vt ≡ ln Ut/(1 − β), and rewrite utility when ρ→ 1 as
Vt = ln(Ct) − βθ ln Et exp
{
− Vt+1
θ
}
= ct + βEtVt+1 − 12
β
θ
vart(Vt+1)
where θ = −1/[(1 − β)(1 − γ)], and where the last equality uses the lognormality of the underlying
states. These are the preferences in Tallarini (2000), which are isomorphic to the ambiguity averse
preferences of the robust control literature (Barillas et al., 2009). When agents are highly risk
averse, parameter θ is close to zero.
You can verify how these preferences imply the stochastic discount factor
Mt+1 =
∂Vt/∂Ct+1
∂Vt/∂Ct
=
(
β
Ct
Ct+1
)( exp { − Vt+1
θ
}
Et exp
{ − Vt+1
θ
})
Next, under the previous state-space system, guess the solution for the value function Vt =
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V0 + V1ζt + V2σ2t + V3ct, and verify it as
V0 + V1ζt + V2σ2t + V3ct = ct + βV0 + βV1Aζt + βV2(1 − ν)σ2 + βV2νσ2t + βV3ct + βV3µ + βV3Cζt
− 1
2
β
θ
[
vart(V1ζt+1 + V2σ2t+1 + V3ct+1)
]
which implies
V0 =
β
1 − β
( 1
1 − βµ + (1 − ν)V2σ
2 − 1
2θ
‖V2Σ‖2
)
V1 =
β
1 − βC[I − βA]
−1
V2 = −12
β
θ(1 − β)2(1 − βν)‖D + βC[I − βA]
−1B‖2
V3 =
1
1 − β
Therefore, since −12 βθvart(Vt+1) = Vt − ct − βEtVt+1,
mt+1 = ln(β) − ∆ct+1 − 1
θ
(Et+1 − Et)Vt+1 − 12θ2 vart(Vt+1)
= ln(β) − ∆ct+1 − 1
θ
(Et+1 − Et)Vt+1 + 1
βθ
Vt − 1
βθ
ct − 1
θ
EtVt+1
= ln(β) − ∆ct+1 − 1
βθ
(
βVt+1 − Vt + ct
)
= ln(β) − µ −Cζt − 12‖(1 − γ)D + (1 − γ)βC[I − βA]
−1B‖2σ2t −
1
2θ2
‖V2Σ‖2
−
(
γD − (1 − γ)βC[I − βA]−1B
)
σtεt+1 − 1
θ
V2Σεt+1
= ln(β) − µ − 1
2
(‖D − F‖2 − ‖F‖2)σ2t −Cζt −
1
2
‖σtF + JΣ‖2 − (σtF + JΣ)εt+1
where F = γD − (1 − γ)βC[I − βA]−1B and J = −(1 − β)(1 − γ)V2. Therefore, r f = − ln(β) + µ,
H = C and G = −12
(‖F‖2 − ‖D − F‖2).
You can verify that these results are equivalent to the coefficient in the approximate ρ = 1 case
found in the long-run risk case (except for parameter δ).
B.5.3. Exact solution under approximate SDF
Take as generic SDF
mt+1 = −ρt −
∞∑
j=0
σtδ j(Et+1 − Et)∆ct+ j+1 − JΣεt+1
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which embeds Bansal and Yaron (2004), by (B.7), (B.8) and (B.9). Under the assumed state-space
system that drives the economy, I can reduce it to
mt+1 = −ρt − Fσtεt+1 − JΣεt+1
where it must hold that −ρt = −r ft − 12‖σtF + JΣ‖2 to guarantee that r ft = −Etmt+1 − 12vart(mt+1).
The assumed structure is
ζt+1 = Aζt + σtBεt+1
∆ct+1 = µ + Cζt + σtDεt+1
∆dt+1 = µ + Cdζt + σtDdεt+1
mt+1 = −r ft −
1
2
‖σtF + JΣ‖2 − (JΣ + σtF)εt+1
r ft = r
f + Gσ2t + Hζt
σ2t+1 = (1 − ν)σ2 + νσ2t + Σεt+1
εt ∼ Niid(0, I)
where σt is a scalar random variable and for simplicity I assume Σεt⊥[Bεt; Dεt; Fεt].
Now guess the solution
Fb,(n)t = exp{Ab,(n) + Bb,(n)ζ ζt + Bb,(n)σ σ2t }
Fc,(n)t = exp{Ac,(n) + Bc,(n)ζ ζt + Bc,(n)σ σ2t }
Fd,(n)t = exp{Ad,(n) + Bd,(n)ζ ζt + Bd,(n)σ σ2t }
Fg,(n)t = exp{Ag,(n) + Bg,(n)ζ ζt + Bg,(n)σ σ2t }
(B.10)
and verify it for the coefficients {A(n), B(n)} with A(0) = 0, B(0)ζ = 0, B(0)σ = 0, and
eA
c,(n)+Bc,(n)ζ ζt+B
c,(n)
σ σ
2
t = EtMt+1
Ct+1
Ct
eA
c,(n−1)+Bc,(n−1)ζ ζt+1+B
c,(n−1)
σ σ
2
t+1
= eA
c,(n−1)+Bc,(n−1)σ (1−ν)σ2+Bc,(n−1)ζ Aζt+Bc,(n−1)σ νσ2t +µ+Cζt EtMt+1e[Vc,ζ,n−1σt+Vc,σ,n−1]εt+1
= eA
c,(n−1)+Bc,(n−1)σ (1−ν)σ2+Bc,(n−1)ζ Aζt+Bc,(n−1)σ νσ2t +µ+Cζt
× e−r f−Gσ2t −Hζt+ 12 Vc,ζ,n−1V′c,ζ,n−1σ2t + 12 Vc,σ,n−1V′c,σ,n−1−Vc,ζ,n−1F′σ2t −Vc,σ,n−1Σ′J′
eA
d,(n)+Bd,(n)ζ ζt+B
d,(n)
σ σ
2
t = EtMt+1
Dt+1
Dt
eA
d,(n−1)+Bd,(n−1)ζ ζt+1+B
d,(n−1)
σ σ
2
t+1
= eA
d,(n−1)+Bd,(n−1)σ (1−ν)σ2+Bd,(n−1)ζ Aζt+Bd,(n−1)σ νσ2t +µ+Cdζt
× e−r f−Gσ2t −Hζt+ 12 Vd,ζ,n−1V′d,ζ,n−1σ2t + 12 Vd,σ,n−1V′d,σ,n−1−Vd,ζ,n−1F′σ2t −Vd,σ,n−1Σ′J′
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eA
b,(n)+Bb,(n)ζ ζt+B
b,(n)
σ σ
2
t = eA
b,(n−1)+Bb,(n−1)σ (1−ν)σ2+Bb,(n−1)ζ Aζt+Bb,(n−1)σ νσ2t
× e−r f−Gσ2t −Hζt+ 12 Vb,ζ,n−1V′b,ζ,n−1σ2t + 12 Vb,σ,n−1V′b,σ,n−1−Vb,ζ,n−1F′σ2t −Vb,σ,n−1Σ′J′
eA
g,(n)+Bg,(n)ζ ζt+B
g,(n)
σ σ
2
t = eA
g,(n−1)+Bg,(n−1)σ (1−ν)σ2+Bg,(n−1)ζ Aζt+Bg,(n−1)σ νσ2t +µ+Cζt
× e 12 Vg,ζ,n−1V′g,ζ,n−1σ2t + 12 Vg,σ,n−1V′g,σ,n−1
where Vc,ζ,n−1 ≡ Bc,(n−1)ζ B + D, Vc,σ,n−1 ≡ Bc,(n−1)σ Σ, Vd,ζ,n−1 ≡ Bd,(n−1)ζ B + Dd, Vd,σ,n−1 ≡ Bd,(n−1)σ Σ,
Vb,ζ,n−1 ≡ Bb,(n−1)ζ B, Vb,σ,n−1 ≡ Bb,(n−1)σ Σ, Vg,ζ,n−1 ≡ Bg,(n−1)ζ B + D and Vg,σ,n−1 ≡ Bg,(n−1)σ Σ, where the
third equality is by the assumed conditional lognormality and where the fourth equality uses the
assumed orthogonality of Σεt (Bansal and Yaron, 2004). The solution is correct for
Ac,(n) = µ − r f + Ac,(n−1) + Bc,(n−1)σ (1 − ν)σ2 +
1
2
Vc,σ,n−1V ′c,σ,n−1 − Vc,σ,n−1Σ′J′
Bc,(n)ζ = B
c,(n−1)
ζ A + C − H
Bc,(n)σ = B
c,(n−1)
σ ν +
1
2
Vc,ζ,n−1V ′c,ζ,n−1 − Vc,ζ,n−1F′ −G
Ad,(n) = µ − r f + Ad,(n−1) + Bd,(n−1)σ (1 − ν)σ2 +
1
2
Vd,σ,n−1V ′d,σ,n−1 − Vd,σ,n−1Σ′J′
Bd,(n)ζ = B
d,(n−1)
ζ A + Cd − H
Bd,(n)σ = B
d,(n−1)
σ ν +
1
2
Vd,ζ,n−1V ′d,ζ,n−1 − Vd,ζ,n−1F′ −G
Ab,(n) = −r f + Ab,(n−1) + Bb,(n−1)σ (1 − ν)σ2 +
1
2
Vb,σ,n−1V ′b,σ,n−1 − Vb,σ,n−1Σ′J′
Bb,(n)ζ = B
b,(n−1)
ζ A − H
Bb,(n)σ = B
b,(n−1)
σ ν +
1
2
Vb,ζ,n−1V ′b,ζ,n−1 − Vb,ζ,n−1F′ −G
Ag,(n) = µ + Ag,(n−1) + Bg,(n−1)σ (1 − ν)σ2 +
1
2
Vg,σ,n−1V ′g,σ,n−1
Bg,(n)ζ = B
g,(n−1)
ζ A + C
Bb,(n)σ = B
g,(n−1)
σ ν +
1
2
Vg,ζ,n−1V ′g,ζ,n−1
which define a recursion linking the loadings of different dividend strip prices to the states of the
economy.
When ν = 0, Σ = 0 and B(n)σ = 0 we have the case without stochastic volatility.
Moreover, the risk premium on the nth consumption strip is
covt(−mt+1, r(n)c,t+1) = (Vc,ζ,n−1σt + Vc,σ,n−1)(JΣ + σtF)′ = Vc,σ,n−1Σ′J′ + Vc,ζ,n−1F′σ2t
which you can verify to be equal to ln EtR
e,(n)
c,t+1.
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The analogous expression for the dividend strip is
covt(−mt+1, r(n)d,t+1) = Vd,σ,n−1Σ′J′ + Vd,ζ,n−1F′σ2t
B.6. Reduced-form approach
I follow Lettau and Wachter (2007, 2011) in combining lognormal pricing formulas and a
loglinear state-space system with a price of risk, xt, linear in the states of the economy. Their
exponential-Gaussian model is a standard and particularly tractable setting to study term structures
with closed form equilibrium values. Lettau and Wachter assume the essentially affine stochastic
discount factor
mt+1 = −ρt − γtFεt+1
= −r ft −
1
2
x2t FF
′ − xtFεt+1
where matrix F selects which shocks of the economy are priced.
The assumed structure is
ζt+1 = Aζt + Bεt+1
∆ct+1 = µ + Cζt + Dεt+1
∆dt+1 = µ + Cdζt + Ddεt+1
mt+1 = −r ft −
1
2
γ2t FF
′ − γtFεt+1
r ft = r
f + Hζt
γt+1 = γ + Kζt+1
εt ∼ Niid(0, I)
where γt is a scalar random variable.71
Now guess the solution
Fb,(n)t = e
Ab,(n)+Bb,(n)ζt
Fc,(n)t = e
Ac,(n)+Bc,(n)ζt
Fd,(n)t = e
Ad,(n)+Bd,(n)ζt
Fg,(n)t = e
Ag,(n)+Bg,(n)ζt
71Lettau and Wachter (2007, 2011) assume [dt; ct] ∼ I(1) with cointegrating relation ct − dt ∼ I(0), hence ct − dt =
λ0 + λ1ζt. Therefore, ∆ct+1 = ∆dt+1 + λ1∆ζt+1 = µ + (Cd − λ1[1 − A])ζt + (Dd + λ1B)εt+1 = µ + Cζt + Dεt+1, which
imposes that λ1 = (Cd −C)[I − A]−1 and therefore D = Dd + (Cd −C)[I − A]−1B.
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and verify it for the coefficients {A(n), B(n)} with A(0) = 0, B(0) = 0, and
eA
c,(n)+Bc,(n)ζt = EtMt+1
Ct+1
Ct
eA
c,(n−1)+Bc,(n−1)ζt+1
= eµ+A
c,(n−1)+Bc,(n−1)Aζt+Cζt EtMt+1eVc,n−1εt+1
= eµ+A
c,(n−1)+Bc,(n−1)Aζt+Cζte−r
f
t +
1
2 Vc,n−1V
′
c,n−1−Vc,n−1F′γt
= eµ−r
f−Hζt+Ac,(n−1)−Vc,n−1F′γ+Bc,(n−1)Aζt+Cζt−Vc,n−1F′Kζt+ 12 Vc,n−1V′c,n−1
eA
d,(n)+Bd,(n)ζt = eµ−r
f−Hζt+Ad,(n−1)−Vd,n−1F′γ+Bd,(n−1)Aζt+Cdζt−Vd,n−1F′Kζt+ 12 Vd,n−1V′d,n−1
eA
b,(n)+Bb,(n)ζt = e−r
f−Hζt+Ab,(n−1)−Vb,n−1F′γ+Bb,(n−1)Aζt−Vb,n−1F′Kζt+ 12 Vb,n−1V′b,n−1
eA
g,(n)+Bg,(n)ζt = eµ+Cζt+A
g,(n−1)+Bg,(n−1)Aζt+ 12 Vg,n−1V
′
g,n−1
where Vc,n−1 ≡ Bc,(n−1)B + D, Vd,n−1 ≡ Bd,(n−1)B + Dd, Vb,n−1 ≡ Bb,(n−1)B and Vg,n−1 ≡ Bg,(n−1)B + D,
and where the third equality is by the assumed conditional lognormality. The solution is correct for
Ac,(n) = µ − r f + Ac,(n−1) + 1
2
Vc,n−1V ′c,n−1 − Vc,n−1F′γ
Bc,(n) = Bc,(n−1)A + C − H − Vc,n−1F′K
Ad,(n) = µ − r f + Ad,(n−1) + 1
2
Vd,n−1V ′d,n−1 − Vd,n−1F′γ
Bd,(n) = Bd,(n−1)A + Cd − H − Vd,n−1F′K
Ab,(n) = −r f + Ab,(n−1) + 1
2
Vb,n−1V ′b,n−1 − Vb,n−1F′γ
Bb,(n) = Bb,(n−1)A − H − Vb,n−1F′K
Ag,(n) = µ + Ag,(n−1) +
1
2
Vg,n−1V ′g,n−1
Bg,(n) = Bg,(n−1)A + C
which define a recursion linking the loadings of different dividend strip prices to the state of the
economy.
Now,
R(n)c,t+1 =
Ct+1
Ct
F(n−1)t+1
F(n)t
= er
f
t +Vc,n−1F′γ+Vc,n−1F′Kζt+Vc,n−1εt+1− 12 Vc,n−1V′c,n−1
and therefore
r(n)c,t+1 +
1
2
Vc,n−1V ′c,n−1 = r
f
t + Vc,n−1F
′γ + Vc,n−1F′Kζt + Vc,n−1εt+1
= ln EtR
(n)
c,t+1 + Vc,n−1εt+1
(B.11)
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where the last equality is because Vc,n−1V ′c,n−1 = vart(r
e,(n)
c,t+1) and Etεt+1 = 0. Moreover, the risk
premium on the nth dividend strip is
covt(−mt+1, r(n)c,t+1) = γtFV ′c,n−1 = Vc,n−1F′γ + Vc,n−1F′Kζt
which you can verify to be equal to ln EtR
e,(n)
c,t+1.
B.7. Exact term structure of welfare costs
The (continuously-compounded) nth component of the welfare term structure is
`(n)t =
1
n
ln EtR
e,(n)
t→t+n
=
1
n
[ f g,(n)t − f c,(n)t + f b,(n)t ]
Therefore,
E(`(n)t ) =
1
n
E( f g,(n)t − f c,(n)t + f b,(n)t )
var(`(n)t ) =
1
n2
var( f g,(n)t − f c,(n)t + f b,(n)t )
and the term structure of welfare costs can then be reconstructed using equation (B.3).
B.7.1. Formulas in Lettau and Wachter (2011)
Let Γ ≡ A − BF′K, and note the auxiliary result for the Lettau and Wachter (2011) model
Bc,(n) = (C − H − DF′K) + Bc,(n−1)Γ
= (C − H − DF′K)
n−1∑
j=0
Γ j = (C − H − DF′K)[I − Γ]−1[I − Γn]
Bb,(n) = −H + Bc,(n−1)Γ
= −H
n−1∑
j=0
Γ j = −H[I − Γ]−1[I − Γn]
Bg,(n) = C + Bg,(n−1)A
= C[I − A]−1[I − An]
where the last equality uses the boundary conditions B(0) = 0. Recall that A = diag(φz, φx, φr),
B = [σz;σx;σr], C = [1; 0; 0]′, D = σd, F = σd/‖σd‖, H = [0; 0; 1]′, K = [0; 1; 0]′. Note that
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σdx = 0 implies KBF′ = 0. Then,
Γn = An +

0 (φz + φx)n−1
σzσ
′
d
‖σd‖ 0
0 0 0
0 (φr + φx)n−1
σrσ
′
d
‖σd‖ 0

⇒ [I − Γ]−1[I − Γn] =

1−φnz
1−φz
(
φnx−φnz
φx−φz −
1−φnx
1−φx
)
1
1−φz
σzσ
′
d
‖σd‖ 0
0 1−φ
n
x
1−φx 0
0
(
φnx−φnr
φx−φr −
1−φnx
1−φx
)
1
1−φr
σrσ
′
d
‖σd‖
1−φnr
1−φr

Therefore,
`t − ` = {Bg,(n) − Bc,(n) + Bb,(n)}ζt
= {C[I − A]−1[I − An] − (C − DF′K)[I − Γ]−1[I − Γn]}ζt
=
1
n
{1 − φnx
1 − φxσd +
(1 − φnx
1 − φx −
φnx − φnz
φx − φz
) σz
1 − φz
} σ′d
‖σd‖γt
B.8. Gabaix (2012) variable rare disaster mode
Consider a consumer with objective E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t C
1−γ
t
1−γ with
Ct+1
Ct
=
eµ with probability 1 − pteµBt+1 with probability pt
where pt is the probability of a disaster event at time t + 1, which would depress consumption
growth by an amount Bt+1. Denote by EDt [·] an expectation conditional on disaster and ENDt [·] an
expectation conditional on no disaster. The stochastic discount factor is
Mt+1 = β
(Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
=
βe−γµ with probability 1 − ptβe−γµB−γt+1 with probability pt
Suppose that in the event of a disaster an asset pays off only a fraction Xt+1 > 0 of the promised
payoff. Namely, Gabaix (2012) assumes
Dt+1
Dt
=
eµ(1 + εdt+1) with probability 1 − pteµ(1 + εdt+1)Xt+1 with probability pt
where εdt > −1 is a mean-zero shock that is independent of the disaster event. In the case of
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consumption claims, εdt = 0 and Xt+1 = Bt+1; in the case of riskless real bonds, Dt = Xt = 1. Then,
EtMt+1
Ct+1
Ct
= βe(1−γ)µ
{
(1 − pt) + ptEDt B1−γt+1
}
≡ βe(1−γ)µ
{
1 + Hc,t
}
EtMt+1
Dt+1
Dt
= βe(1−γ)µ
{
(1 − pt) + ptEDt B−γt+1Xt+1
}
≡ βe(1−γ)µ
{
1 + Hd,t
}
EtMt+1 = βe−γµ
{
(1 − pt) + ptEDt B−γt+1
}
≡ βe−γµ
{
1 + Hb,t
}
Et
Ct+1
Ct
= (1 − pt)eµ + pteµEDt Bt+1
≡ eµ
{
1 + Hg,t
}
(B.12)
Next, let Ĥi,t ≡ Hi,t − Hi,∗, where Hi,∗ ≡ ehi,∗ − 1 is a term independent of time. The state Ĥi,t
fully describes the price of the ith asset; Gabaix (2012) interprets it the resilience of the ith asset to
disasters. Next, assume the exogenous near-AR(1) process to drive the state Ĥi,t as
Ĥi,t+1 =
1 + Hi,∗
1 + Hi,t
e−φi Ĥi,t + εi,t+1
=
ehi,∗−φi
1 + Hi,t
Ĥi,t + εi,t+1
where εi,t is uncorrelated with either the disaster event or εd,t+1 and is s.th. Etεi,t+1 = 0 and
Ĥi,t ≥ max{(1 + Hi,∗)(e−φi − 1),−pt − Hi,∗}. Therefore,
Et
[
Mt+1
Ct+1
Ct
Ĥc,t+1
]
= Et
[
Mt+1
Ct+1
Ct
]
EtĤc,t+1
= βe(1−γ)µ(1 + Hc,t)
ehc,∗−φc
1 + Hc,t
Ĥc,t
= eln(β)+(1−γ)µ+hc,∗−φc Ĥc,t
Et
[
Mt+1
Dt+1
Dt
Ĥd,t+1
]
= eln(β)+(1−γ)µ+hd,∗−φd Ĥd,t
Et
[
Mt+1Ĥb,t+1
]
= eln(β)−γµ+hb,∗−φb Ĥb,t
Et
[Ct+1
Ct
Ĥg,t+1
]
= eµ+hg,∗−φg Ĥg,t
(B.13)
Next, guess the solution F(n)i,t = a
(n)
i + b
(n)
i Ĥi,t and use equations (B.12) and (B.13) to solve
for the unknown coefficients using the no-arbitrage properties of the yields of the term structure
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components:
a(n)c + b
(n)
c Ĥc,t = EtMt+1
Ct+1
Ct
(a(n−1)c + b
(n−1)
c Ĥc,t+1)
= a(n−1)c e
ln(β)+(1−γ)µ+hc,∗ + (a(n−1)c + b
(n−1)
c e
hc,∗−φc)eln(β)+(1−γ)µĤc,t
= e−nδc
(
1 +
1 − e−nφc
1 − e−φc e
−hc,∗Ĥc,t
)
a(n)d + b
(n)
d Ĥd,t = e
−nδd
(
1 +
1 − e−nφd
1 − e−φd e
−hd,∗ Ĥd,t
)
a(n)b + b
(n)
b Ĥb,t = e
−nδb
(
1 +
1 − e−nφb
1 − e−φb e
−hb,∗ Ĥb,t
)
a(n)g + b
(n)
g Ĥg,t = e
−nδg
(
1 +
1 − e−nφg
1 − e−φg e
−hg,∗ Ĥg,t
)
where δc ≡ − ln(β) − (1 − γ)µ − hc,∗, δd ≡ − ln(β) − (1 − γ)µ − hd,∗, δb ≡ − ln(β) + γµ − hb,∗ and
δg ≡ −µ − hg,∗.
Therefore,
EtR
(n)
c,t+1 = Et∆Ct+1
e−(n−1)δc
[
1 + 1−e
−(n−1)φc
1−e−φc e
−hc,∗ Ĥc,t+1
]
e−nδc
[
1 + 1−e−nφc1−e−φc e
−hc,∗Ĥc,t
]
= eδc
[
1 + e
−φc−e−nφc
1−e−φc
Ĥc,t
1+Hc,t
]
[
1 + 1−e−nφc1−e−φc e
−hc,∗ Ĥc,t
]Et∆Ct+1
=
eδc
1 + e−hc,∗ Ĥc,t
Et∆Ct+1
= ehb,∗
1 + Hg,t
1 + Hc,t
≡ ehb,∗+hg,t−hc,t
EtR
(n)
b,t+1 = e
− ln(β)+γµ 1
1 + Hb,t
≡ e− ln(β)+γµ−hb,t
independent of n. The 1-period buy-and-hold expected return is the same across maturities, because
strips of all maturities are exposed to the same risk in the event of a disaster. Hold-to-maturity
returns load however differently on the respective state; this feature generates a non-trivial term
structure of equity yields. In fact,
b(n)d − b(n−1)d =
e−(n−1)δd−hd,∗
1 − e−φd [e
−(n−1)φd (1 − e−[φd+δd]) − (1 − e−δd )]
which is negative ∀n ≥ N and positive ∀n < N, for some N large enough (i.e., long-duration strip
yields load less on the priced state, Ĥd,t, then short-duration yields).
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Therefore,
l(n)t =
1
n
(F(n)g,t F(n)b,t
F(n)c,t
− 1
)
=
1
n
a(n)b a
(n)
g − a(n)c + a(n)b b(n)g Ĥg,t + a(n)g b(n)b Ĥb,t − b(n)c Ĥc,t + b(n)b b(n)g Ĥb,tĤg,t
a(n)c + b
(n)
c Ĥc,t
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Technical Appendix to Parts 2 and 3
This appendix derives the Real business cycle and the New Keynesian Q models.
I first determine the first-best optimum—a Real business cycle model with Tobin’s Q; then I
depart from the assumption of perfect competition in goods and labor markets and assume instead
monopolistic competition; then I add nominal rigidities, thus deriving the New Keynesian Q model.
I then derive the New Keynesian Q theory of investment that links stock prices (average Q),
investment and inflation, and an equivalent formulation in differences, which links stock returns to
investment growth and unexpected inflation.
Finally, I derive the welfare function in the New Keynesian Q model. Welfare losses are
functions of the distance of some endogenous variables from their first-best (efficient) levels. I
then use the welfare function to compute the second-best (constrained-efficient) optimum, i.e. the
optimal monetary policy, and discuss its implementation.
C. Real business cycle Q model
Mt,t+h ≡ βh Λt+hPt+hΛtPt is the stochastic discount factor for real payoffs. Pt is the price level at time t.
C.1. Consumer
The consumer solves the program
max
Ct ,Nt ,Bt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct,Nt) s.t. PtCt +
1
1+i ft
Bt ≤ WtNt + Bt−1 + PtDt
Ct is real consumption and Bt are nominal risk-free bonds with return i
f
t . I assume a twice-
differentiable utility function Ut, separable in consumption and labor, such that U1,t > 0 and U2,t < 0
on [Ct; Nt] ∈ R2+, which ensures that the budget constraint is binding, and such that U11,t < 0 and
U22,t < 0, which ensures a convex program whose solution is described by first-order conditions.
The dual program is
min
Λt≥0
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct,Nt) + βtΛt[WtNt + Bt−1 − PtCt − 1
1 + i ft
Bt + PtDt]
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The first-order conditions (FOCs) for an interior solution are
U1,t = ΛtPt
−U2,t = ΛtWt ⇒ MRS t =
Wt
Pt
1 = (1 + i ft )Etβ
Λt+1
Λt
≡ (1 + i ft )EtMt,t+1Π−1t,t+1
besides the budget constraint
PtCt +
1
1 + i ft
Bt = WtNt + Bt−1 + PtDt
and the terminality condition
lim
t→∞ E0M0,t
Bt−1
Pt
= 0
C.2. Firm
The firm solves the program72,73
max
Nt ,It ,Kt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
M0,t[Yt − WtPt Nt − It] s.t.
Yt = AtKαt N
1−α
t
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Φ( ItKt )Kt
where the constraints are the production function and a dynamic equation for the evolution of
the capital stock. Yt is real production, It is real investment, Wt is nominal wage rate per hour,
Nt is hours worked, Kt is the stock of capital, and At is technology. Technology follows a stable
autoregression with autoregressive coefficient ρa,
at = ρaat−1 + εa,t
with εa,t a white noise process.
The adjustment cost function Φ is strictly increasing and concave, and such that, for some Z,
Φ(Z) = δ, Φ′(Z) = 1 and η ≡ −Φ′′(Z)Z
Φ′(Z) .
74 The constant return to scale production function and the
shape of the capital adjustment cost function ensure a convex problem whose solution is interior.
72I adopt Neiss and Nelson (2003) definition of efficient capital level, rather than Woodford (2003, 372-8). To my
purposes, the definition of efficient capital stock is relevant for determining the gap variables; and the gap variables
are relevant because welfare is function of those gap terms. When the capital gap is expressed in terms of Neiss and
Nelson (2003) definition of efficient capital stock, the welfare function is function of gap terms only. When the capital
gap is expressed in terms of Woodford (2003) definition, the welfare function is function also of other terms.
73The objective of the firm is discounted using the same discount factor as the firm’s owner’s, i.e., the consumer.
74Thus, δ can be interpreted as the steady-state depreciation of capital, Z = δ as the steady-state investment-capital
ratio and η as the inverse of the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio to changes in Q. Note that when η = 0, there
are no capital-adjustment costs, while when η→ ∞ a positive investment adds nothing to capital, i.e. there are infinite
capital-adjustment costs. η→ ∞ leads to the standard New Keynesian model with constant capital.
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The dual program is
min
MCt≥0,Qt≥0
max
E0
∑∞
t=0 M0,t
[
Yt − WtPt Nt − It + MCt[AtKαt N1−αt − Yt]+
+Qt[(1 − δ)Kt + Φ( ItKt )Kt − Kt+1]
]
where the Lagrange multiplier MCt is the average real marginal cost of production. The definition
of marginal Q, Qt, is the real marginal value at t of a unit of capital.
FOCs:
MCt = 1
MPNt =
Wt
Pt
Qt =
[
Φ′(
It
Kt
)
]−1
ΛtPtQt = EtβΛt+1Pt+1MCt+1MPKt+1 + EtβΛt+1Pt+1Qt+1[(1 − δ) + Φ( It+1Kt+1 ) − Φ
′(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
]
⇒ 1 = EtMt+1
[MPKt+1 + Qt+1[(1 − δ) + Φ( It+1Kt+1 ) − Φ′( It+1Kt+1 ) It+1Kt+1 ]
Qt
]
along with the production function
Yt = AtKαt N
1−α
t ⇒ yt = at + αkt + (1 − α)nt (C.1)
and the capital evolution equation
(1 − δ)Kt + Φ( ItKt )Kt − Kt+1 = 0
with terminality condition
lim
t→0
E0M0,tQtKt+1 = 0
The firm then distributes profits to consumers as dividends PtDt = PtYt − WtNt − PtIt =
PtCt −WtNt.
C.3. Market clearing
The market for goods clears
Yt = Ct + It
C.4. Deterministic efficient steady state
Linearly detrended real variables are stationary in the deterministic steady state, i.e. Λt+1Pt+1
ΛtPt
= 1,
Yt = Y , Kt = K, Ct = C, It = I. Thus, I = δK and Q = 1, both by the normalization imposed on Φ,
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and Π = β(1 + i f ). Thus, in logs,
qe = 0 pie = −ρ + i f
ωe = ln(1 − α) + α
1 − α ln
( αβ
1 − β(1 − δ)
)
ne = ye − α
1 − α ln
( αβ
1 − β(1 − δ)
)
ke = ye + ln
( αβ
1 − β(1 − δ)
)
ie = ye + ln
( αβδ
1 − β(1 − δ)
)
ce = ye + ln
(1 − β(1 − δ) − αβδ
1 − β(1 − δ)
)
ye =
1
σ + ϕ
ωe − σ
σ + ϕ
(ce − ye) − ϕ
σ + ϕ
(ne − ye)
where ωt ≡ wt − pt denotes the real wage rate.
Proof. A = 1 in the deterministic steady state. Consider the FOC for labor (1 − α) YN = WP , the
production function Y = KαN1−α and the FOC for capital accumulation YK =
1−β(1−δ)
αβ
. Then,
1−β(1−δ)
β
= α YK = α
(N
Y
Y
K
)1−α
= α
( P
(1−α)W
1−β(1−δ)
αβ
)1−α, hence WP = (1 − α)( αβ1−β(1−δ)) α1−α . Then, YN =( αβ
1−β(1−δ)
) α
1−α . Next, IY =
I
K
K
Y =
αβδ
1−β(1−δ) . Next, from Y = C + I,
C
Y = 1 − IY = 1−β(1−δ)−αβδ1−β(1−δ) . Finally, to
determine all levels, consider WP = C
σNϕ =
(C
Y
)σ(N
Y
)ϕYσ+ϕ, hence Y = (WP ) 1σ+ϕ (CY )− σσ+ϕ (NY )− ϕσ+ϕ .
C.5. Loglinearized efficient solution (first best)
The loglinearized dynamic equation for capital accumulation is
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Φ( ItKt )Kt
≈⇒ k̂t+1 = δ̂it + (1 − δ)̂kt
(C.2)
The curvature of utility is characterized by the constant relative risk aversion coefficients
σ ≡ −U11,tCtU1,t and ϕ ≡
U22,tNt
U2,t
. More specifically, utility is
U(Ct,Nt) =
C1−σt
1 − σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
whence Mt,t+1 = β
(Ct+1
Ct
)−σ, and
MRS t = Cσt N
ϕ
t ⇒ mrst = σct + ϕnt
Then, the loglinearized intertemporal optimality condition is
ct = Etct+1 − 1
σ
(i ft − Etpit+1 − ρ) (C.3)
with
m̂t+1 = σ∆ct+1
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The loglinearized optimality condition for investment is
qt = η(̂it − k̂t) (C.4)
The loglinearized optimality condition for capital is
ct = Etct+1 − 1
σ
(ϑEtm̂pkt+1 + βEtqt+1 − qt) (C.5)
where ϑ ≡ 1 − β(1 − δ).
The loglinearized goods market clearing condition is
ŷt =
C
Y
ĉt +
I
Y
ît ≡ γĉct + γîit (C.6)
with γc ≡ 1−β(1−δ)−αβδ1−β(1−δ) and γi ≡ αβδ1−β(1−δ) .
The labor market clearing condition is
mrst = mpnt
⇒ σct + (1 + ϕ)nt = yt + ln (1 − α) (C.7)
Finally, combining (C.3) and (C.5), I get a no-arbitrage condition between the return on the
risk-free asset and the return to investment
qt = βEtqt+1 + ϑEtm̂pkt+1 − (i ft − Etpit+1 − ρ)
C.6. A useful characterization of the efficient equilibrium
Using all (and only) the intratemporal optimality conditions,
0 =(C.7) σ̂cet + (1 + ϕ)̂n
e
t − ŷet
=(C.1) σ̂cet +
α + ϕ
1 − α ŷ
e
t −
1 + ϕ
1 − αat −
α(1 + ϕ)
1 − α k̂
e
t
=(C.4),(C.6)
(σ − γc
γc
+
1 + ϕ
1 − α
)̂
yet −
γiσ
γcη
qet −
1 + ϕ
1 − αat −
(σγi
γc
+
(1 + ϕ)α
1 − α
)̂
ket
≡ Ξŷyet − Ξyqqet − Ξyk̂ket −
1 + ϕ
1 − αat
(C.8)
where Ξy ≡ σγc +
α+ϕ
1−α , Ξyq ≡ σγiγcη and Ξyk ≡
σγi
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α
1−α .
C.7. Solving the model
Combine the law of motion for at, (C.2), (C.5) and (C.8) to form a linear rational expectations
model that can be solved with standard algorithms (e.g., Blanchard and Kahn, 1980; Klein, 2000).
Finally, use (C.3) to determine the efficient real interest rate, which will be relevant for deter-
mining the interest-rate rule implementing the optimal monetary policy,
r f ,et = ρ + ΨEt∆̂y
e
t+1 − ΞyqEt∆qet+1 − ηΞyq∆̂ket+1
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where Ψ ≡ σ/γc.
Notice that the real variables in the model are fully determined without having to consider
monetary policy. Monetary policy is therefore neutral on the real variables (and on their steady-state
values) in the efficient economy.
D. Real business cycle Q model with monopolistic competition
There is a continuum of goods, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], so that firm i is a monopolistic competitor
offering its particular good.
There is a continuum of consumers indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], offering different kinds of labor
services, so that each j is a monopolistic competitor offering her particular labor.
The government levies lump-sum taxes, Tt, on households and firms to finance distortionary
subsidies, τ, in goods and factor markets in order to offset any steady-state distortions due to
monopolistic competition that make the competitive equilibrium inefficient.
D.1. Monopolistic competition in the labor market
The aggregate wage and hours worked are the Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) aggregates Nt(i) ≡ [
∫ 1
0
Nt(i, j)
εw−1
εw d j]
εw
εw−1 , and Wt ≡ [
∫ 1
0
Wt( j)1−εwd j]
1
1−εw .
Then, each firm constructs an optimal labor unit, for a given expenditure for acquiring them, by
maximizing their Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregator, i.e. the ith firm solves
max
[Nt(i, j)]10
Nt(i) s.t.
∫ 1
0
Wt( j)Nt(i, j)d j = Zt(i)
FOCs:
Nt(i, j) =
(Wt( j)
Wt
)−εw
Nt(i)
Nt(i)Wt =
∫ 1
0
Wt( j)Nt(i, j)d j
where the left-hand equation is a demand curve.
D.2. jth consumer
The jth consumer solves the program
max
Ct( j),Wt( j),Nt( j),Bt( j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct( j),
∫ 1
0
Nt(i, j)di)
s.t.
Nt(i, j) =
(
Wt( j)
Wt
)−εw
Nt(i)∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i, j)di + 11+i ft
Bt( j) ≤ (1 − τw)Wt( j)
∫ 1
0
Nt(i, j)di + Bt−1( j) + PtDt − PtT ht
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where 1 − τw =Mw is a labor income tax designed to neutralize the steady-state distortions due to
the imperfection in the labor market and T ht are lump-sum governmental transfers.∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i, j)di = PtCt( j) holds by construction of the optimal consumption unit. By definition
the labor market clearing condition for labor type j, Nt( j) =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i, j)di. Thus, the dual program
can be written as
min
Λt( j)≥0
max
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tU
(
Ct( j),
(
Wt( j)
Wt
)−εw
Nt
)
+
+βtΛt( j)
[
(1 − τw)Wt( j)1−εwWεwt Nt + Bt−1( j) − PtCt( j) − 11+i ft Bt( j) + PtDt − PtT
h
t
]
FOCs:
(1 − τw)Λt( j)Wt( j)Wt = −MwU2,t( j)
=MwNt( j)ϕ
whereMw ≡ εw−1εw .75
Λt( j)Pt = U1,t( j) = Ct( j)−σ
1 = (1 + i ft )Etβ
Λt+1( j)
Λt( j)
Since each j faces an identical problem, they will all choose the same Wt( j) = Wt,Nt( j) =
Nt,Ct( j) = Ct,Λt( j) = Λt, Bt( j) = Bt, and
MRS t =M−1w (1 − τw)
Wt
Pt
⇒ mrst = wt − pt
whereMw is the wedge driven in the condition for a Pareto optimum, due to imperfect competition
in the labor market, and neutralized by the labor income tax τw = ε−1w .
D.3. Monopolistic competition in the goods market
Consumption by consumer j and investment and capital by firm j are the CES aggregates
Ct( j) ≡ [
∫ 1
0
Ct(i, j)
εp−1
εp di]
εp
εp−1 , It( j) ≡ [
∫ 1
0
It(i, j)
εp−1
εp di]
εp
εp−1 and Kt( j) ≡
∫ 1
0
Kt(i, j)di. The aggregate
price level is the CES aggregator Pt ≡ [
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−εpdi]
1
1−εp .
Then, the jth buyer constructs an optimal consumption unit and an optimal investment unit, for
75Note that, since Wt( j)Pt =MwMRS t( j) ≥ MRS t( j), we may interpretMw as the markup by which the jth worker
increases her wage because of monopolistic competition in the labor market.
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a given expenditure for acquiring them, by maximizing their CES aggregator. They solve
max
[Ct(i, j)]10
Ct( j) =
[ ∫ 1
0
Ct(i, j)
εp−1
εp di
] εp
εp−1 s.t.
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i, j)di = Zt( j)
max
[It(i, j)]10
It( j) =
[ ∫ 1
0
It(i, j)
εp−1
εp di
] εp
εp−1 s.t.
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)It(i, j)di = Zt( j)
FOCs:
Ct(i, j) =
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−εp
Ct( j) PtCt( j) =
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i, j)di (D.1)
It(i, j) =
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−εp
It( j) PtIt( j) =
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)It(i, j)di (D.2)
where the left-hand equations are demand curves.
The market clearing condition for the ith good, Yt(i) = Ct(i) + Idt (i) =
∫ 1
0
Ct(i, j)d j +
∫ 1
0
It(i, j)d j,
then implies that the ith firm faces the demand equation
Yt(i) =
∫ 1
0
Ct(i, j)d j +
∫ 1
0
It(i, j)d j
=
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−εp ∫ 1
0
[Ct( j) + It( j)]d j
=
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−εp
Yt
D.4. ith firm
The ith firm solves the program
max
Pt(i),Nt(i),It(i),Kt+1(i)
E0
∞∑
t=0
M0,t[
Pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i) − (1 − τp)WtPt Nt(i) − (1 − τp)
∫ 1
0
Pt( j)
Pt
It( j, i)d j − T ft (i)]
s.t.
Yt(i) =
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−εp
Yt
PtIt(i) =
∫ 1
0
Pt( j)It( j, i)d j
Yt(i) = AtKt(i)αNt(i)1−α
Kt+1(i) = (1 − δ)Kt(i) + Φ
( It(i)
Kt(i)
)
Kt(i)
where 1 − τp =M−1p is an employment and investment subsidy designed to neutralize the steady-
state distortions due to the imperfection in the goods market and T ft are lump-sum governmental
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transfers levied on firm’s profits and used to finance the subsidy, i.e., T ft (i) = T
f
t = τp
Wt
Pt
Nt + τpIt.
Notice that these transfers depends on aggregate employment and investment; since each firm has
zero mass they take the level of transfers as given.
The dual program is
min
MCt(i),Qt(i)≥0
max
E0
∑∞
t=0 M0,t
[(
Pt(i)
Pt
)1−εp
Yt − (1 − τp)WtPt Nt(i) − (1 − τp)It(i) − T
f
t
+MCt(i)[AtKt(i)αNt(i)1−α −
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εp
Yt]+
+(1 − τp)Qt(i)[(1 − δ)Kt(i) + Φ( It(i)Kt(i))Kt(i) − Kt+1(i)]]
where I multiply by 1 − τp the last Lagrange multiplier to remain with a unitary marginal Q in
steady state.
FOCs:
M−1p
Pt(i)
Pt
= MCt(i)
Qt(i) =
[
Φ′
( It(i)
Kt(i)
)]−1
M−1p MPNt(i) = (1 − τp)
Wt
Pt(i)
Qt(i) = EtMt+1
( M−1p
1 − τp MPKt+1(i)+
+ Qt+1(i)
[
(1 − δ) + Φ
( It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
− Φ′
( It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
) It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
])
whereMp ≡ εpεp−1 .76
Since each i faces an identical problem, each firm chooses the same quantities, so that Pt(i) =
Pt,Yt(i) = Yt,MCt(i) = MCt,Nt(i) = Nt,Qt(i) = Qt, It(i) = It,Kt+1(i) = Kt+1, and
(1 − τp)WtPt =M
−1
p MPNt
⇒ mpnt = (wt − pt)
whereM−1p is the wedge driven in the condition for a Pareto optimum, due to imperfect competition
in the goods market, and neutralized by the employment subsidy τp = 1 −M−1p = ε−1p .
Firms then distribute to consumers profits as dividends PtDt.
76Note that, since Pt(i)/Pt = MpMCt(i) ≥ MCt(i),Mp can be interpreted as the markup that firm i charges over
marginal costs because of monopolistic competition on the goods market.
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D.5. Market clearing
The market for good i clears: Yt(i) = Ct(i) + Idt (i). Then, combine (D.1)-(D.2) and the market
clearing condition for good i to find
Yt(i) =
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−εp
Yt
The labor market clears:
Nt( j) =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i, j)di
hence, since Nt( j) = Nt, Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di.
D.6. Deterministic steady state
Since employment subsidies neutralize all steady-state distortions due to monopolistic compe-
tition in goods and labor markets (i.e. 1 − τp =M−1p and 1 − τw =Mw), the deterministic steady
state is the deterministic efficient steady state.
The general deterministic steady state is, in logs,
qn = 0
pin = −ρ + i f
ωn =
1
1 − α ln
( M−1p
1 − τp
)
+ ln(1 − α) + α
1 − α ln
( αβ
1 − β(1 − δ)
)
nn = yn − α
1 − α ln
( M−1p αβ
(1 − τp)[1 − β(1 − δ)]
)
kn = yn + ln
( M−1p αβ
(1 − τp)[1 − β(1 − δ)]
)
in = yn + ln
( M−1p αβδ
(1 − τp)[1 − β(1 − δ)]
)
cn = yn + ln
(
1 − M
−1
p αβδ
(1 − τp)[1 − β(1 − δ)]
)
yn =
1
σ + ϕ
ln
( Mw
1 − τw
)
+
1
σ + ϕ
ωn − σ
σ + ϕ
(cn − yn) − ϕ
σ + ϕ
(nn − yn)
D.7. Loglinearized solution
With the efficient employment subsidies in place there are no steady-state distortions, and the
loglinearized model with monopolistic competition (or natural economy) equals the loglinearized
efficient economy, made by equations (C.1)-(C.7). The solution of the loglinearized model is
therefore the same of the loglinearized efficient model.
The general rational expectations representation of the natural economy in deviations from the
steady state equals the efficient economy.
M−1p
1−τp and
Mw
1−τw affect only the level of the steady state.
Therefore, the natural steady-state levels are their efficient steady-state counterparts plus a constant.
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E. New Keynesian Q model
E.1. Price and wage rigidities
The ith firm can readjust its price at each period t with probability (1 − θp). The jth consumer
can readjust her wage at each period t with probability (1 − θw). Firms (consumers) do not all
face an identical problem anymore, since some can adjust, some cannot. Price (wage) dispersion
becomes relevant. Besides, an aggregate production function is no longer trivial to define.
I use notation X(i) ≡ Xt(i)/Xt to denote the ratio between an individual and the corresponding
aggregate variable.
I use the subscript ·t+h|t to denote the variable at t + h chosen by a firm (consumer) that last had
the chance of resetting price (wage) at t. I then denote by ·t+h the average value of the variable at
t + h.
I assume a complete financial market and preferences separable in consumption and hours, so
that consumers can always achieve the optimal level of consumption by substituting intertemporally;
the distortions due to wage rigidities only affect their labor choice. Therefore, I still have that all
agents choose the same consumption, i.e. Ct+h|t = Ct+h, hence Λt+h|t = Λt+h.
Lemma 4 (Price dispersion and price dynamics). A firm can reset price at t with probability 1 − θp.
I assume that the event ‘firm i resets at t’, sit ∼ B((1 − θp)), is indepedent across t and i. Let P∗t the
newly set price at t (if the firm gets the chance to reset). Then, the equation describing aggregate
price dynamics is
pt = θp pt−1 + (1 − θp)p∗t (E.1)
up to a first-order approximation around the zero-inflation steady state.
Proof. There are infinite firms, so that by the law of large numbers 1 − θp is the fraction of firms
that resets prices at t. Then,∫
ept(i)di = θp
∫
ept−1(i)−pitdi + (1 − θp)
∫
ep
∗
t (i)−(p∗t −pt)di
Ei pt(i) = θp
{
Ei pt−1(i) − pit
}
+ (1 − θp){Ei p∗t (i) + (p∗t − pt)} + O(‖ p̂‖2)
⇒ θppit = (1 − θp)(p∗t − pt) + O(‖ p̂‖2)
which you can rearrange to find the result.
Lemma 5 (Wage dispersion and wage dynamics). A consumer can reset wage at t with probability
1 − θw. I assume that the event ‘worker j resets at t’, s jt ∼ B((1 − θw)), is indepedent across t
and j. Let W∗t the newly set wage at t (if the worker gets the chance to reset). Then, the equation
describing aggregate wage dynamics is
wt = θwwt−1 + (1 − θw)w∗t
up to a first-order Taylor approximation around zero-wage-inflation steady state.
Proof. Analogous to lemma 4.
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Lemma 6 (Aggregate production function). Up to a first-order approximation,
Yt = AtKαt N
1−α
t
is the aggregate production function.
Proof. Expanding the definition of output aggregator
1 =
∫ 1
0
e
ε−1
ε yt(i)di
0 = Eiyt(i) + O(‖̂y‖2)
and therefore Eiyt(i) = O(‖̂y‖2).
Analogous reasoning for the capital aggregator leads to
Eikt(i) = O(‖̂k‖2)
Furthermore, ∫
Nt(i)di =
[
A−1t YtK
−α
t
] 1
1−α
∫
e
1
1−α yt(i)− α1−α kt(i)di
=
[
A−1t YtK
−α
t
] 1
1−α
{
1 +
1
1 − αEiyt(i) −
α
1 − αEikt(i)
}
⇒ (1 − α)nt = −at + yt − αkt + O(‖̂y, k̂‖2)
which proves the result
Consistent with lemma 6, I define the aggregate average marginal cost MCt ≡ WtPt MPNt .
Also, I define the aggregate MRS t ≡ Cσt Nϕt .
E.2. Monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets
The demand equations in this economy are, as in the monopolistically competitive economy,
Yt+h(i) =
(Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
)−εpYt+h, and Nt+h( j) = (Wt+h( j)Wt+h )−εp Nt+h.
E.3. jth consumer
Consumer j solves
max
Ct+h( j),W∗t+h( j),Nt+h( j),Bt+h( j)
Et
∞∑
h=0
βhU(Ct+h( j),Nt+h( j))
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subject to
Nt+h( j) =
(Wt+h( j)
Wt+h
)−εw Nt+h
Pt+hCt+h( j) +
1
1 + i ft+h
Bt+h( j) ≤
[ (1 − τw)Wt+h( j)Nt+h( j) + Bt+h−1( j)+
+Pt+hDt+h − Pt+hT ht+h
]
Wt+h( j) =
W∗t+h( j), with probability (1 − θw)Wt+h−1( j), with probability θw
E.4. Resetting consumer
The consumers that gets the chance of resetting her wage at time t solves the program
max
Ct+h,W∗t ,Nt+h|t ,Bt+h
∞∑
t=0
(θwβ)hEtU(Ct+h,Nt+h|t)
s.t.
Nt+h|t =
( W∗t
Wt+h
)−εw Nt+h
Pt+hCt+h + 11+i ft+h
Bt+h ≤ (1 − τw)W∗t Nt+h|t + Bt+h−1 + Pt+hDt+h − Pt+hT ht+h
or the dual program
min
Λt+h≥0
max
∑
(θwβ)hEt
{
U(Ct+h, (W∗t )
−εwWεwt+hNt+h)+
+Λt+h
[
(1 − τw)(W∗t )1−εwWεwt+hNt+h + Bt+h−1 − Pt+hCt+h − 11+i ft+h Bt+h+
+Pt+hDt+h − Pt+hT ht+h
]}
FOCs (only those that differ from the corresponding conditions in section D):∑
(θwβ)hEt
[
U2,t+h|tMw Nt+h|tW∗t
+ (1 − τw)Λt+hNt+h|t
]
= 0
⇒
∑
(θwβ)hEtNt+h|tU1,t+h
[
(1 − τw) W
∗
t
Pt+h
−MwMRS t+h|t
]
= 0 (E.2)
where I used the other optimality conditions.
Also, the relation between the marginal rate of substitution of the resetting consumer and the
aggregate marginal rate of substitution is, since Ct+h|t = Ct+h,
mrst+h|t = mrst+h + ϕ(nt+h|t − nt+h)
= mrst+h − εwϕ(w∗t − wt+h)
As shown by Erceg et al. (2000), I can then approximate (E.2) to express the equation as the
129
New Keynesian wage Phillips curve
piw,t = βEtpiw,t+1 − λwµ̂w,t (E.3)
where λw ≡ (1−βθw)(1−θw)θw(1+εwϕ) .
Proof. A first-order approximation of (E.2) around the zero-inflation steady state yields ŵ∗t = (1 −
βθw)
∑∞
h=0(βθw)
hEt[m̂rst+h|t+p̂t+h] =
1−βθw
1+εwϕ
∑∞
h=0(βθw)
hEt[m̂rst+h+εwϕŵt+h+p̂t+h] =
1−βθw
1+εwϕ
∑∞
h=0(βθw)
hEt[(1+
εwϕ)ŵt+h − µ̂w,t+h] = βθwEtŵ∗t+1 + (1 − βθw)[ŵt − (1 + εwϕ)−1µ̂w,t], by (E.15). Finally, use lemma 5
to find piw,t = βEtpiw,t+1 − λwµ̂w,t.
E.5. ith firm
Firm i solves
max
P∗t+h(i),Yt+h(i),Nt+h(i),It+h(i)
Et
∞∑
h=0
Mt,t+h
[Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
Yt+h(i) − (1 − τp)Wt+hPt+h Nt+h(i) − (1 − τp)It+h(i) − T
f
t+h
]
subject to
Yt+h(i) =
(Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
)−εp
Yt+h
Yt+h(i) = At+hKt+h(i)αNt+h(i)1−α
Kt+h+1(i) = (1 − δ)Kt+h(i) + Φ
( It+h(i)
Kt+h(i)
)
Kt+h(i)
Pt+h(i) =
P∗t+h(i), with probability (1 − θp)Pt+h−1(i), with probability θp
When firms accumulate firm-specific capital, the first-order conditions for an interior optimum
are
∞∑
h=0
θhEtMt,t+hPε−1t+h Yt+h(i)
[
P∗t (i) −MpMCt+h(i)Pt+h
]
= 0 (E.4)
MCt(i)MPNt(i) = (1 − τp)WtPt
Qt(i) =
[
Φ′
( It(i)
Kt(i)
)]−1
EtMt,t+1RIt+1(i) = 1 (E.5)
with
Qt(i)RIt+1(i) ≡ M̂Ct+1(i)MPKt+1(i) +
(
(1 − δ) + Φ
( It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
− Φ′
( It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
) It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
Qt+1(i)
where Qt(i), It(i),Kt(i) are chosen by the firm and where M̂Ct(i) ≡ MCt(i)/(1 − τp).
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The following derivation borrows heavily from Woodford (2005). For the generic firm i—
independently of when it last had the chance of resetting prices—the optimal choice of labor implies
mct+h(i) = −mpnt+h(i) = −yt+h(i) + nt+h(i) = α1−αyt+h(i)− α1−αkt+h(i) = − αε1−α pt+h(i)− α1−αkt+h(i), where
the second and third equalities used the production function and the fourth equality used the demand
function. Note also that mpkt+h(i) = yt+h(i) − kt+h(i) = 1−αα mct+h(i). Summing up,
mpkt(i) = −εpt(i) − kt(i)
mct(i) = − αε1 − α pt(i) −
α
1 − αkt(i)
(E.6)
Next, note that not all firms that reset at t are equal, since they inherit a firm-specific capital
stock, that depends on when they last had the chance of resetting prices. The optimal price chosen
by the ith resetting firm (E.4) satisfies
∑∞
h=0(βθ)
hEit[pt+h(i) − m̂ct+h(i)] = 0 with Eit[pt+h(i)] = p∗t (i),
where Ei denotes an expectation operator conditional on firm i not resetting in the future.77 We can
rewrite the last equation as Eit pt+h(i) = p
∗
t (i)+(p
∗
t − pt)−Eit(pt+h− pt) = p∗t (i)+(p∗t − pt)−
∑h
j=1 Etpit+ j.
I can then rewrite the optimal price setting equation as
∑
(βθ)h[p∗t (i) + (p
∗
t − pt) −
∑h
j=1 Etpit+ j −
Θm̂ct+h + αΘ1−αE
i
tkt+h(i)] = 0, where Θ ≡ 1−α1−α+αε . Therefore,
(p∗t (i)+ p
∗
t −pt) =
∞∑
h=1
(βθ)hEtpit+h+(1−βθ)Θ
∞∑
h=0
(βθ)hEtm̂ct+h−α(1 − βθ)Θ1 − α
∞∑
h=0
(βθ)hEitkt+h(i) (E.7)
where I used the fact that
∑∞
h=0(βθ)
h ∑h
j=1 pit+ j =
1
1−βθ
∑∞
h=1(βθ)
hpit+h.
I then guess that the equilibrum solution for the distance between individual and aggregate
capital has the form
kt+1(i) = ψ2kt(i) + ψ3 pt(i) (E.8)
which must be true because pt(i) and kt(i) are the only states at time t idiosyncratic to firm i.
Equation (E.8) implies Eitkt+h(i) = ψ2E
i
tkt+h−1(i) + ψ3E
i
t pt+h−1(i) = ψ2E
i
tkt+h−1(i) + ψ3[p
∗
t (i) +
p∗t − pt −
∑h−1
j=1 Etpit+ j] and therefore (1 − βθψ2)
∑∞
h=0(βθ)
hEitkt+h(i) = kt(i) + ψ3
∑∞
h=1(βθ)
h[p∗t (i) +
p∗t − pt −
∑h−1
j=1 Etpit+ j] = kt(i) +
βθψ3
1−βθ [p
∗
t (i) + p
∗
t − pt −
∑∞
h=1(βθ)
hEtpit+h]. Plugging this expression
into (E.7) and using the approximate aggregate price dynamics (E.1) we find
κ(p∗t (i) +
θ
1 − θpit) = κ
∞∑
h=1
(βθ)hEtpit+h + (1 − βθ)
∞∑
h=0
(βθ)hEtm̂ct+h − α(1 − βθ)(1 − α)(1 − βθψ2)kt(i) (E.9)
where κ ≡ 1
Θ
+
αβθψ3
(1−α)(1−βθψ2) .
77Note that Eit xt+ j = Et xt+ j for an aggregate quantity x and j ≥ 0.
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I can then integrate equation (E.9) and solve the resulting difference equation to find78
κθ
1 − θpit =
κθ2
1 − θβEtpit+1 + κθβEtpit+1 + (1 − βθ)m̂ct
=
κθ
1 − θβEtpit+1 + (1 − βθ)m̂ct (E.10)
which is the New Keynesian Phillips curve under firm-specific capital (Sveen and Weinke, 2005;
Woodford, 2005). Moreover, subtracting the New Keynesian Phillips curve (E.10) from (E.9), I
find the solution for newly set prices, which obey the linear function of the individual capital shock
p∗t (i) = ψ1kt(i) (E.11)
where ψ1 ≡ − α(1−βθ)κ(1−α)(1−βθψ2) .
Next, the approximate optimality condition for capital for firm i is −Etm̂t+1 = ϑEt(mct+1(i) +
mpkt+1(i)) +
βη
δ
Et∆kt+2(i) − ηδ∆kt+1(i), where I used the first-order approximation of the individual
capital accumulation equation qt+h(i) =
η
δ
∆kt+h+1(i). Integrating over i, the same equation holds also
for the dynamics of the aggregate marginal Q as
−Etm̂t+1 = ϑEt[m̂ct+1 + m̂pkt+1] + βEtqt+1 − qt (E.12)
Then, subtracting one from the other and using (E.6),
Ξkt+1(i) = βEtkt+2(i) + kt(i) − ε[Ξ − 1 − β]Et pt+1(i) (E.13)
where Ξ ≡ (1+β)(1−α)η+ϑδ
η(1−α) .
Note that, up to a first-order approximation, expected prices for the ith firm are the new price
weighted by the probability of having the chance of resetting plus the old price weighted by the
probability of not having the chance of resetting prices. Formally, Et p̂t+1(i) = θ p̂t(i)+(1−θ)Et p̂∗t+1(i),
and therefore
Et pt+1(i) = θ(pt(i) − Etpit+1) + (1 − θ)Et(p∗t+1(i) + p∗t+1 − pt+1)
= θpt(i) + (1 − θ)Et p∗t+1(i)
(E.14)
where the last equality uses the approximate aggregate price dynamics (E.1).
Then, I plug (E.8) into (E.13) and use (E.14) and (E.11) to identify ψ2 and ψ3 as
Ξψ2 = 1 + βψ22 + {βψ3 − ε[Ξ − 1 − β]}(1 − θ)ψ1ψ2
Ξψ3 = βψ2ψ3 + {βψ3 − ε[Ξ − 1 − β]}[θ + (1 − θ)ψ1ψ3]
which verifies the guess (E.8).
The problem of firms accumulating firm-specific capital under sticky prices adds therefore two
idiosyncratic dynamic equations to the state-space system driving aggregate variables. Namely,
78Note that
∫ 1
0 xt(i)di = O(‖x̂‖2) independent of the shape of the aggregator for variable Xt.
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equations (E.8) and (E.14) form the system[
Et pt+1(i)
kt+1(i)
]
=
[
θ + (1 − θ)ψ1ψ3 (1 − θ)ψ1ψ2
ψ3 ψ2
] [
pt(i)
kt(i)
]
which, to have a unique bounded solution, must have both eigenvalues within the unit circle.
E.5.1. Rental market
When firms purchase capital services on a competitive rental market, the first-order conditions
for an interior optimum are
EtMt,t+1RIt+1 = 1
Qt =
[
Φ′
( It
Kt
)]−1
∞∑
h=0
(βθ)hEtMt,t+hPε−1t+h Yt+h(i)
[
P∗t (i) −MpMCt+h(i)Pt+h
]
= 0
MCt(i)MPNt(i) = (1 − τp)WtPt
MCt(i)MPKt(i) = (1 − τp)Rkt
with
QtRIt+1 ≡ Rkt+1 +
(
(1 − δ) + Φ
( It+1
Kt+1
)
− Φ′
( It+1
Kt+1
) It+1
Kt+1
)
Qt+1
where Qt, It,Kt are chosen by the representative consumer and the rental rate Rkt is the same for all
firms.
Since MPNt(i) = (1 − α)A
1
1−α
t
(
Yt(i)
Kt(i)
)− α1−α , then mct(i) = 0 and therefore mpnt(i) = mpkt(i) = 0.
Therefore, yt(i) = kt(i) = nt(i) = −εpt(i); firms with higher demand for their goods purchase a
proportionately higher quantity of capital and labor services. Note how each firm repurchases the
required capital stock entirely at each period; therefore, all firms that reset at time t face an identical
problem as they do not inherit different capital stocks. I may therefore introduce notation xt+h|t to
denote the choice of variable x at time t + h made by a firm that last reset prices at time t. Note how
without capital adjustment costs It/Kt is a constant.
E.6. Market clearing
Combine (C.6) and (C.4):
ŷt = γĉct +
γi
η
qt + γîkt
E.7. Solving the model
There are two wedges responsible for potential departures of the competitive equilibrium from
the social planner problem:
mct = (wt − pt) − mpnt µw,t ≡ (wt − pt) − mrst (E.15)
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I use the gap notation ·˜t = ·t − ·et . Then, use lemma 6, (C.4), (C.6) and (E.15):
m̂ct = ω̂t − m̂pnt
= ω˜t − y˜t + n˜t
= µ̂w,t + σc˜t − y˜t + (1 + ϕ)˜nt
= µ̂w,t + σc˜t +
α + ϕ
1 − α y˜t −
α(1 + ϕ)
1 − α k˜t
= µ̂w,t + Ξy˜yt − Ξyqq˜t − Ξyk˜kt
Next, rewrite (C.3) and (E.12), recalling that ∆kt+1 = δηqt, as
ŷt = Et̂yt+1 +
γi(1 − δ)
η
qt − γi
η
Etqt+1 − γc
σ
(i ft − Etpip,t+1 − ρ)(
1 +
σγi(1 − δ)
γcη
)
qt =
(
β +
σγi
γcη
)
Etqt+1 +
(
ϑ − σ
γc
)
Et̂yt+1 +
σ
γc
ŷt + ϑEtm̂ct+1 − ϑEt̂kt+1
Also, recall that ŷet = Et̂y
e
t+1 +
γi(1−δ)
η
qet − γiη Etqet+1 − γcσ (r f ,et − ρ) and
(
1 + σγi(1−δ)
γcη
)
qet =
(
β +
σγi
γcη
)
Etqet+1 +
(
ϑ − σ
γc
)
Et̂yet+1 +
σ
γc
ŷet − ϑEt̂ket+1. Thus, rewrite (C.3), (E.10) and (E.12) as
pip,t = βEtpip,t+1 + λpΞy˜yt − λpΞyqq˜t − λpΞyk˜kt + λpµ̂w,t (E.16)
y˜t = Et˜yt+1 +
γi(1 − δ)
η
q˜t − γi
η
Etq˜t+1 − γc
σ
(i ft − Etpip,t+1 − r f ,et ) (E.17)(
1 + Ξyq(1 − δ)
)˜
qt − σ
γc
y˜t = β
(
1 + Ξyq(1 − δ)
)
Etq˜t+1 −
(σ
γc
− ϑ(1 + Ξy)
)
Et˜yt+1
− ϑ(1 + Ξyk )˜kt+1 + ϑEtµ̂w,t+1 (E.18)
Moreover, by the chosen utility function,
µ̂w,t = ω˜t −
(σ
γc
+
ϕ
1 − α
)˜
yt + Ξyqq˜t +
(σγi
γc
+
ϕα
1 − α
)˜
kt (E.19)
and note the identity
ω˜t = ω˜t−1 − pip,t + piw,t − et (E.20)
where et ≡ ∆ω̂et is a policy-independent function of the states of the economy.
The last structural equation coming from consumers’ optimization is the capital accumulation
equation
k˜t+1 =
δ
η
q˜t + k˜t (E.21)
To fully determine all variables in the economy, I need only to specify an interest-rate rule, that
this time is going to affect the real variables in the system. Then, combine the structural form of the
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model solution, the interest-rate rule and the laws of motion of the exogenous processes in a linear
rational expectations model of the kind discussed in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or Klein (2000). I
use the QZ algorithm in Klein (2000) to find the reduced form of the model solution.
E.8. The model (structural form)
We can now consider at least three alternative models:
E.8.1. Sticky prices and wages
The sixtuplet [(E.3),(E.16),(E.17),(E.18),(E.19),(E.20)] embeds all relevant information (con-
sumers’ FOCs, firms’ FOCs, market clearing conditions) for the New Keynesian model with
endogenous capital accumulation, capital adjustment costs, and nominal rigidities both in prices
and in wages.
E.8.2. Sticky prices
The quadruplet [(E.16),(E.17),(E.18),(E.21)] with µ̂w,t = 0 embeds all relevant information
when θw = 0, i.e. for the New Keynesian model with endogenous capital accumulation, capital
adjustment costs, and nominal rigidities only in prices.
E.8.3. Sticky prices with exogenous variations in wage markups
The quadruplet [(E.16),(E.17),(E.18),(E.21)] embeds all relevant information when the effi-
ciency wedge µ̂w,t from wage rigidities is taken to be exogenous, i.e. for the New Keynesian model
with endogenous capital accumulation, capital adjustment costs, endogenous nominal rigidities in
prices, and exogenous nominal rigidities in wages. This is the simplest way within this framework
to make an exogenous disturbance appear in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (Galı´ (2008)), which
is what the literature calls a cost-push disturbance,
ut = λpµw,t
This cost-push disturbance allows me to break the divine coincidence that makes monetary
policy be trivial, without complicating the analysis of policy because of endogenous wage rigidities
affecting the loss function.
When I focus on the case of an exogenous cost-push disturbance, I assume the exogenous stable
autoregression
ut = ρuut−1 + εut (E.22)
with εut a white noise process.
F. New Keynesian Q theory of investment
F.1. Marginal and average Q
Along the lines of Hayashi (1982), I first derive the relation between the unobservable marginal
Q and the theoretically observable average Q, that I denote by S t. This result extends that in Hayashi
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(1982) to a model with nominal rigidities, besides monopolistic competition in the goods market. I
then define average Q as
S t(i) ≡
Et
∑∞
h=1 Mt,t+h
[Pt+h(i)
Pt+h
Yt+h(i) − (1 − τp)Wt+hPt+h Nt+h(i) − It+h(i) − T
f
t+h
]
Kt+1(i)
=
Et
∑∞
h=1 Mt,t+hDt+h(i)
Kt+1(i)
the ratio of two different valuations of the capital stock of firm i: the market price (expected
discounted dividends) and the book value.
Proposition 5 (Relation between marginal and average Qs). The relation between marginal Q, Qt,
and average Q, S t, in a New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities is
ŝt = βEt ŝt+1 + κ1qt − βκ2Etqt+1 + κ3Etmt+1 − κ4Etm̂ct+1 (F.1)
where κ1 ≡
(
1 + 1−M
−1
αM−1
)/(
1 + (1−M
−1)ϑ
α(1−β)M−1
)
, κ2 ≡
(
1 + 1−M
−1
αM−1
(
1 + ϑδ(1−β)η
))/(
1 + (1−M
−1)ϑ
α(1−β)M−1
)
, κ3 ≡ (1−M−1)αM−1
(
1 +
ϑ
1−β
)/(
1 + (1−M
−1)ϑ
α(1−β)M−1
)
, and κ4 ≡ ϑαM−1
/(
1 + (1−M
−1)ϑ
α(1−β)M−1
)
. The wedgeM that distorts the steady state is
M ≡Mp(1 − τp).
Besides, the zero-inflation steady state for average q, S , is weakly higher than the zero-inflation
steady state for marginal q, Q = 1, i.e. S = 1 + (1−M
−1)ϑ
α(1−β)M−1 ≥ 1.
Proof. By the degree-one homogeneity of the production function, the optimality conditions
Wt =
M−1p
1−τp Pt(i)MPNt(i) and MCt(i) =M−1p Pt(i), and because lump-sum transfers finance aggregate
employment and investment subsidies,
Pt(i)Yt(i) − (1 − τp)WtPt Nt(i) − T
f
t = Pt(i)Yt(i) −
Wt
Pt
Nt(i) − τpIt(i) + T t(i)
= Pt(i)Yt(i) − M̂Ct(i)MPNt(i)Nt(i) − τpIt(i) + T t(i)
= M̂Ct(i)MPKt(i)Kt(i) + [Pt(i) − M̂Ct(i)]Yt(i) − τpIt(i) + T t(i)
where T t(i) ≡ τpWt[Nt(i) − Nt] + τp[It(i) − It] and M̂Ct(i) ≡ MCt(i)/(1 − τp).
Next, using Mt+1 ≡ Λt+1Pt+1/ΛtPt, with Λ the marginal value of nominal income, rewrite the
optimality condition (E.5) as
βEtΛt+1Pt+1M̂Ct+1(i)MPKt+1(i)Kt+1(i) =
= ΛtPtQt(i)Kt+1(i) − βEtΛt+1Pt+1Qt+1(i)
[
(1 − δ) + Φ
(
It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
− Φ′
(
It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
)
It+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
]
Kt+1(i)
= ΛtPtQt(i)Kt+1(i) − βEtΛt+1Pt+1Qt+1(i)Kt+2(i) + βEtΛt+1Pt+1It+1(i)
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which I use to derive,
S t(i) =
∑∞
h=1 β
hEt
Λt+hPt+h
ΛtPt
[
Pt+h(i)Yt+h(i) − (1 − τp)Wt+hPt+h Nt+h(i) − (1 − τp)It+h(i) − T
f
t+h
]
Kt+1(i)
=
∑∞
h=1 β
hEt
Λt+hPt+h
ΛtPt
[
M̂Ct+h(i)MPKt+h(i)Kt+h(i) − It+h(i) + [Pt(i) − M̂Ct+h(i)]Yt+h(i) + T t+h(i)]
Kt+1(i)
=
∑∞
h=1 β
h−1EtΛt+h−1Pt+h−1Qt+h−1(i)Kt+h(i) − βhEtΛt+hPt+hQt+h(i)Kt+h+1(i)
ΛtPtKt+1(i)
+
+
∑∞
h=1 β
hEtΛt+hPt+h[Pt+h(i) − M̂Ct+h(i)]Yt+h(i)
ΛtPtKt+1(i)
+
∑∞
h=1 β
hEtΛt+hPt+hT t+h(i)
ΛtPtKt+1(i)
= Qt(i) +
1
Kt+1(i)
∞∑
h=1
EtMt,t+h[Pt+h(i) − M̂Ct+h(i)]Yt+h(i) + 1Kt+1(i)
∞∑
h=1
EtMt,t+hT t+h(i)
The equation states that the market-book ratio is the marginal value of capital plus the expected
discounted profits per unit of capital. The zero-inflation steady-state value is S = 1 + β(1−M
−1)Y
(1−β)K ≥ 1.
Disregarding the transfer terms, T t(i), which aggregate to zero, this dynamic equation we can
equivalently write as
S t(i) − Qt(i) = EtMt+1[S t+1(i) − Qt+1(i)]Kt+2(i)Kt+1(i) + EtMt+1
[Pt+1(i) − M̂Ct+1(i)]Yt+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
After a loglinearization around the zero-inflation steady state and aggregating,
S ŝt − qt = βEt(S ŝt+1 − qt+1) + β(S − 1)Et(m̂t+1 + ∆̂kt+2) + β(1 −M
−1)Y
K
Etm̂t+1+
− βM
−1Y
K
Etm̂ct+1 +
β(1 −M−1)Y
K
Etm̂pkt+1 =
= βEt(S ŝt+1 − qt+1) + (1 −M
−1)ϑ
α(1 − β)M−1 Etm̂t+1 +
β(1 −M−1)ϑδ
αη(1 − β)M−1 Etqt+1
− ϑ
α
Etm̂ct+1 +
(1 −M−1)ϑ
αM−1 Etm̂pkt+1
where I used β(1−M
−1)Y
K =
(1−M−1)ϑ
αM−1 and S = 1 +
(1−M−1)ϑ
α(1−β)M−1 . Using (E.12), rewrite the equation as(
1 + (1−M
−1)ϑ
α(1−β)M−1
)̂
st −
(
1 + 1−M
−1
αM−1
)
qt =
= β
(
1 + (1−M
−1)ϑ
α(1−β)M−1
)
Et ŝt+1 − β
(
1 + 1−M
−1
αM−1
(
1 + ϑδ(1−β)η
))
Etqt+1+
+
(1−M−1)
αM−1
(
1 + ϑ1−β
)
Etm̂t+1 − ϑαM−1 Etm̂ct+1
which ends the proof.
Note that, in the efficient economy,M = 1, so that se = 0, κ1 = κ2 = 1, κ3 = 0, κ4 = ϑα and
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m̂ct = 0. These facts imply set = q
e
t , the result in Hayashi (1982) that average and marginal Q are
equal when there is no imperfection in goods markets.
F.2. Distorted steady state
In the monopolistically competitive model without employment subsidies,M−1 < 1, so that
marginal and average natural Qs generally differ, and (F.1) reads
ŝnt = βEt ŝ
n
t+1 + κ1q
n
t − βκ2Etqnt+1 + σκ3Et∆cnt+1
Thus,
(st − snt ) = βEt(st+1 − snt+1) + κ1(qt − qnt ) − βκ2Et(qt+1 − qnt+1)+
+σκ3Et∆(ct+1 − cnt+1) − κ4Etm̂ct+1
hence, recalling that ·̂et − ·̂nt is a constant,
s˜t = βEt s˜t+1 +
(
κ1 +
σγiκ3(1−δ)
γcη
)˜
qt +
(
κ4Ξyq − σγiκ3γcη − βκ2
)
Etq˜t+1+
−σκ3
γc
y˜t +
(σκ3
γc
− κ4Ξy)Et˜yt+1 + κ4Ξyk˜kt+1 − κ4λp Etut+1
where s˜t ≡ ŝt − ŝet is a stock price gap (or average Q gap).
F.3. Undistorted steady state
Proposition 6 (Corollary to proposition 5). Suppose that an employment subsidy is in place that
corrects all steady-state distortions, i.e.,M−1 = 1. Then,
st = qt − ϑ
αλp
Etpit+1 ⇒ s˜t = q˜t − ϑ
αλp
Etpit+1 (F.2)
or, equivalently,
pit =
αβλpη
ϑ
(̂it − k̂t) − αβλp
ϑ
st + λpm̂ct (F.3)
Proof. Equation (F.1) withM−1 = 1 is st−qt = βEt(st+1−qt+1)− ϑαEtm̂ct+1 = −ϑα
∑∞
j=0 β
jEtm̂ct+ j+1 =
− ϑ
αλp
Etpit+1, where the last equality uses the New Keynesian Phillips curve (E.10). I can then
rewrite the New Keynesian Phillips curve as st = qt − ϑαβλpit + ϑαβm̂ct. Rearrange and get pit =
αβλη
ϑ
(̂it − k̂t) − αβλϑ st + λm̂ct.
F.4. A first-differenced New Keynesian Q model
The gross real return to investment79 is Rit+1, defined as
1 = EtMt+1
M̂Ct+1MPKt+1 − It+1Kt+1 + Kt+2Kt+1 Qt+1
Qt
≡ EtMt+1RIt+1 (F.4)
79I disregard here the difference between aggregate and invidual quantities, as it is irrelevant in view of the subsequent
first-order approximation.
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Then, using (E.12) for the aggregate quantities,
M̂Ct+1MPKt+1Kt+1 − It+1 = RIt+1QtKt+1 − Qt+1Kt+2
The gross real return to equity is Rmt+1, defined as R
m
t+1 =
Et+1
∑∞
h=1 Mt+1,t+hDt+h
Et
∑∞
h=1 Mt,t+hDt+h
, with Dt+h ≡ Yt+h −
Wt+h
Pt+h
Nt+h − It+h = M̂Ct+hMPKt+hKt+h + (1 − M̂Ct+h)Yt+h − It+h. Thus,
Dt+h = (1 − M̂Ct+h)Yt+h + RIt+hQt+h−1Kt+h − Qt+hKt+h+1 (F.5)
hence
Rmt+1 =
Et+1
∑∞
h=0 Mt+1,t+h+1Dt+h+1
Et
∑∞
h=0 Mt,t+hDt+h − Dt
=
ΛtPt
βΛt+1Pt+1
×
× Et+1
∑∞
h=1 β
hΛt+hPt+hEt+h−1
(
RIt+hQt+h−1Kt+h − Qt+hKt+h+1 + (1 − M̂Ct+h)Yt+h
)
Et
∑∞
h=1 β
hΛt+hPt+hEt+h−1
(
RIt+hQt+h−1Kt+h − Qt+hKt+h+1 + (1 − M̂Ct+h)Yt+h
)
where the second equality uses (F.5) and the law of iterated expectations. Next, using (F.4), one has
that Et+h−1βΛt+hPt+hRIt+h − Λt+h−1Pt+h−1 = 0, so that the previous equation simplifies to
Rmt+1 =
ΛtPt
βΛt+1Pt+1
× Λt+1Pt+1R
I
t+1QtKt+1 + Et+1
∑∞
h=1 β
hΛt+hPt+h(1 − M̂Ct+h)Yt+h
EtΛt+1Pt+1RIt+1QtKt+1 + Et
∑∞
h=1 β
hΛt+hPt+h(1 − M̂Ct+h)Yt+h
=
QtKt+1RIt+1 + Et+1
∑∞
h=1 Mt+1,t+h(1 − M̂Ct+h)Yt+h
QtKt+1 + Et
∑∞
h=1 Mt,t+h(1 − M̂Ct+h)Yt+h
If M̂Ct+h = 1, then one has the prediction Rmt+1 = R
I
t+1.
When M̂Ct+h , 1, which is the case I am interested in, one can take a loglinear approximation
around the steady state:
Rm(1 + r̂mt+1) = R
i +
QKRi
QK+βY 1−M−11−β
r̂It+1+
+
(1−M−1)Y
QK+βY 1−M−11−β
{(
Et+1 − Et)∑∞h=1 βh−1( − M−11−M−1 m̂ct+h + ŷt+h)+
+Et+1
∑∞
h=1 β
h−1m̂t+1,t+h − Et ∑∞h=1 βh−1m̂t,t+h}
where I used 1 = βRi (which follows from (F.4)). Note that Rm = Ri. Next, using m̂t+1,t+h =
−γ(ct+h − ct+1),
r̂mt+1 = κ1̂r
i
t+1 + κ2γ∆ct+1 + κ2(1 − β)(Et+1 − Et)
∑∞
h=1 β
h−1(̂yt+h + γct+h)+
−κ3(1 − β)(Et+1 − Et) ∑∞h=1 βh−1m̂ct+h
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where κ1 ≡ QK(1−β)QK(1−β)+β(1−M−1)Y , κ2 ≡ β(1−M
−1)Y
QK(1−β)+β(1−M−1)Y , and κ3 ≡ βM
−1Y
QK(1−β)+β(1−M−1)Y .
Finally, use βYK =
ϑ
αM−1 and Q = 1, to find κ1 =
1−β
1−β+ (1−M−1)ϑ
αM−1
, κ2 =
(1−M−1)ϑ
αM−1
1−β+ (1−M−1)ϑ
αM−1
, and κ3 =
ϑ
α
1−β+ (1−M−1)ϑ
αM−1
.
Next, by the NKPC, pit+1 = βEt+1pit+2 + λpm̂ct+h = λp
∑∞
h=1 β
h−1m̂ct+h, so that κ3(1 − β)(Et+1 −
Et)
∑∞
h=1 β
h−1m̂ct+h =
κ3(1−β)
λp
(pit+1 − Etpit+1). Suppose that some policy is in place that makesM = 1,
hence κ1 = 1 and κ2 = 0. Then,
r̂mt+1 = r̂
I
t+1 −
ϑ
αλp
(Et+1 − Et)pit+1
⇒ (Et+1 − Et )̂rmt+1 = (Et+1 − Et )̂rIt+1 −
ϑ
αλp
(Et+1 − Et)pit+1
(F.6)
where r̂It+1 = ϑ(m̂ct+1 + m̂pkt+1) + ηβ(̂it+1 − k̂t+1) − η(̂it − k̂t).
Equation (F.6) is another way to state the New Keynesian Q theory of stock prices (F.2)-(F.3).
Also, r̂mt+1 = ϑ(m̂ct+1 + m̂pkt+1) + βŝt+1 − ŝt.
F.5. Return-forecasting ability of the market-book ratio
You should remember that there is an identity linking the market return and market-book ratios:
a version of the Campbell-Shiller (approximate) identity
rmt+1 = βst+1 − st + (1 − β)dkt+1 (F.7)
where dkt+1 ≡ dt+1 − kt+1 + β1−β∆kt+2.
To derive this expression first note that the price of the market portfolio is Pmt = S tKt+1, then
consider the definition of market return Rmt+1 ≡ (Pmt+1 + Dt+1)/Pmt . Therefore, loglinearizing the last
identity, rmt+1 = βp
m
t+1−pmt +(1−β)dt+1 = βst+1−st+(1−β)(dt+1−kt+1)+β∆kt+2 ≡ βst+1−st+(1−β)dkt+1.
Cochrane (2008a) provides strong economic and statistical arguments for return-forecasting
ability of the price-dividend ratio. Since market-book and price-dividend ratios have nearly a
perfect correlation, the same argument goes through here using the Campbell-Shiller identity (F.7)
in its form
var(st) = (1 − β)cov
( ∞∑
j=1
β jdkt+ j, st
)
− cov
( ∞∑
j=1
β jrmt+ j, st
)
⇔ 1 = b(∞)d + b(∞)r
where b(∞)d and b
(∞)
r are the OLS coefficients in the respective long-horizon forecasting equations,
which says that the market-book ratio must forecast something.
G. Welfare function
I derive here a quadratic approximation to welfare, along the lines of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), Woodford (2003) and Galı´ (2008).
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Lemma 7 (Aggregate production function). Up to a second-order approximation,
(1 − α)nt = yt − at − αkt + 12
εp
Θ
vari pt(i) +
1
2
α
1 − αvarikt(i) +
αεp
1 − αcovi(pt(i), kt(i)) +
εw
2
var jwt( j)
where Θ ≡ 1−α1−α+αεp .
Proof. Expanding the definition of output aggregator
1 =
∫ 1
0
e
εp−1
εp
yt(i)di
0 = Eiyt(i) +
1
2
εp − 1
εp
Eiy
2
t (i) + O(‖̂y‖3)
⇒ [Eiyt(i)]2 = O(‖̂y‖4)
0 = Eiyt(i) +
1
2
εp − 1
εp
variyt(i) + O(‖̂y‖3)
Analogous reasoning for the capital and price aggregators leads to
0 = Eikt(i) +
1
2
varikt(i) + O(‖̂k‖3)
0 = Ei pt(i) +
1
2
(1 − εp)vari pt(i) + O(‖p̂‖3)
Next, Nt =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Nt(i, j)d jdi =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
∫ 1
0
Nt(i, j)
Nt(i)
d jdi =
∫ 1
0
(Wt( j)
Wt
)−εwd j ∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di
[
1+
εw
2 var jwt( j)
]
. Furthermore,∫
Nt(i)di =
[
A−1t YtK
−α
t
] 1
1−α
∫
e
1
1−α yt(i)− α1−α kt(i)di
=
[
A−1t YtK
−α
t
] 1
1−α
{
1 +
1
1 − αEiyt(i) +
1
2
1
(1 − α)2 variyt(i) −
α
1 − αEikt(i)
+
1
2
α2
(1 − α)2 varikt(i) −
α
(1 − α)2 covi(yt(i), kt(i)) + O(‖̂y, k̂‖
3)
}
and therefore
(1 − α)nt = −at + yt − αkt + 12
1 − α + αεp
εp(1 − α) variyt(i) +
1
2
α
1 − αvarikt(i)
− α
1 − αcovi(yt(i), kt(i)) +
εw
2
var jwt( j) + O(‖̂y, k̂, ŵ‖3)
= −at + yt − αkt + 12
(1 − α + αεp)εp
1 − α vari pt(i) +
1
2
α
1 − αvarikt(i)
+
αεp
1 − αcovi(pt(i), kt(i)) +
εw
2
var jwt( j) + O(‖̂k, p̂, ŵ‖3)
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so that both price and capital dispersions are relevant to determine aggregate hours worked.
Lemma 8. Up to a second-order approximation,∫ 1
0
n̂t( j)d j +
1 + ϕ
2
∫ 1
0
n̂t( j)2d j = n̂t +
1 + ϕ
2
n̂2t +
ε2wϕ
2
var jwt( j)
Proof. Approximate the labor aggregator as n̂t+
1+ϕ
2 n̂
2
t =
∫ 1
0
n̂t( j)d j+ 12
∫ 1
0
n̂t( j)2d j. Next,
∫ 1
0
nt( j)2d j =∫ 1
0
(̂nt( j) − n̂t)2d j + 2
∫ 1
0
(̂nt( j) − n̂t )̂ntd j + n̂2t = ε2w
∫ 1
0
ŵt( j)2d j − 2εwn̂t
∫ 1
0
ŵt( j)d j + n̂2t = n̂t( j)
2 −
wn̂tεw(εw − 1)var jwt( j) + ε2wvar jwt( j) = n̂t( j)2 + ε2wvar jwt( j), using the labor demand equation
n̂t( j) − n̂t = −εwŵt( j) and the second-order approximation to the wage aggregator derived in lemma
7, and disregarding third-order terms.
Proposition 7 (Quadratic approximation to utility function). A quadratic approximation to the
consumer’s objective, integrated across j, around the deterministic zero-inflation steady-state
value80 is directly proportional to
W0 ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Φy˜t − 12Ξy˜y
2
t −
1
2
Ξqq˜2t + Ξyq˜ytq˜t −
1
2
Ξppi
2
p,t −
1
2
Ξwpi
2
w,t
− αΦk˜t − 12Ξk˜k
2
t + Ξyky˜t˜kt − Ξqkq˜t˜kt
]
+ t.i.p.
(G.1)
where Ξy ≡ σγc +
α+ϕ
1−α , Ξq ≡ γcσ Ξyq(1 + Ξyq), Ξyq ≡ σγiγcη , Ξw ≡
εwθw(1−α)(1+εwϕ)
(1−βθw)(1−θw) , Ξk ≡ γi +
σγ2i
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α2
1−α ,
Ξyk ≡ σγiγc +
(1+ϕ)α
1−α , Ξqk ≡ γiΞyq. Lemma 9 describes coefficient Ξp.
As a corollary, the approximate average welfare loss per period is directly proportional to
L ≡ −ΦE[˜yt] + 12ΞyE[˜y
2
t ] +
1
2
ΞqE[˜q2t ] − ΞyqE[˜qt˜yt] +
1
2
ΞpE[pi2p,t] +
1
2
ΞwE[pi2w,t]
+ αΦE[˜kt] +
1
2
ΞkE[˜k2t ] − ΞykE[˜yt˜kt] + ΞqkE[˜qt˜kt] + t.i.p.
(G.2)
Proof. Approximate the integrated utility around the zero-inflation steady state (recall that Ct( j) =
Ct,∀ j, and that a separable utility function implies U12 = 0), using the market clearing condition
Ct = Yt − It, and the optimality condition (C.4):∫ 1
0
U(Yêyt − Ie 1η qt+̂kt ,Nênt( j))d j =
= U + U1Y
(̂
yt + 12 ŷ
2
t
)
+ 12U11Y
2̂y2t − U1 Iη
(
qt + 12q
2
t
)
−U1I(̂kt + 12 k̂2t ) + 12U11I2(1ηqt + k̂t)2 − U11YÎyt(1ηqt + k̂t)
+U2N
∫ 1
0
(̂
nt( j) + 12 n̂t( j)
2)d j + 12U22N2 ∫ 10 n̂t( j)2d j
80Woodford (2003, 383-92) explains the reasons for choosing this particular point of expansion. Note that this steady
state is independent of policy.
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Now, noting that U11U1 C = −σ, U22U2 N = ϕ, Y = C 1γc , I = C
γi
γc
, and using lemma 8,∫ 1
0
(Ut( j) − U)d j = U1C 1γc
[̂
yt + 12
(
1 − σ
γc
)̂
y2t
]
− U1C γiγcη
[
qt + 12
(
1 + σγi
γcη
)
q2t
]
−U1C γiγc
[̂
kt + 12
(
1 + σγi
γc
)̂
k2t
]
+ U1C
σγi
γ2cη
ŷtqt + U1C
σγi
γ2c
ŷt̂kt − U1C σγ
2
i
γ2cη
qt̂kt
+U2N
[̂
nt +
1+ϕ
2 n̂
2
t +
ε2wϕ
2 var jwt( j)
]
Recall that −U2U1 = MRS = (1 − Φ)MPN = (1 − Φ)(1 − α) YN , where Φ is a measure of distortion
of the steady state around which I am expanding. Thus,81 using lemma 7
Ut − U ∝ γc Ut−UU1C
=
[̂
yt + 12
(
1 − σ
γc
)̂
y2t
]
− γi
η
[
qt + 12
(
1 + σγi
γcη
)
q2t
]
− γi
[̂
kt + 12
(
1 + σγi
γc
)̂
k2t
]
+
σγi
γcη
ŷtqt +
σγi
γc
ŷt̂kt − σγ
2
i
γcη
qt̂kt − (1 − Φ)(1 − α)
[̂
nt +
1+ϕ
2 n̂
2
t +
ε2wϕ
2 var jwt( j)
]
= ŷt − γîit + 12
(
1 − σ
γc
)̂
y2t − 12
(
γi
η
+
σγ2i
γcη2
)
q2t
−12
(
γi +
σγ2i
γc
)̂
k2t +
σγi
γcη
ŷtqt +
σγi
γc
ŷt̂kt − σγ
2
i
γcη
qt̂kt
−(1 − Φ)
[̂
yt − at − α̂kt + 12w′∆t + Υ2 var jwt( j) + 1+ϕ2(1−α)
(̂
yt − at − α̂kt)2]
⇒ Φŷt − αΦ̂kt − (γîit − α̂kt) + 12(1 − σγc )̂y2t − 12(γiη + σγ2iγcη2 )q2t − 12(γi + σγ2iγc )̂k2t
+
σγi
γcη
ŷtqt +
σγi
γc
ŷt̂kt − σγ
2
i
γcη
qt̂kt − (1 − Φ)
[
εp
2Θvari pt(i) +
Υ
2 var jwt( j)
+
1+ϕ
2(1−α) ŷ
2
t +
(1+ϕ)α2
2(1−α) k̂
2
t − (1+ϕ)α1−α ŷt̂kt − 1+ϕ1−α ŷtat + (1+ϕ)α1−α k̂tat
]
where Υ ≡ εw(1 − α)(1 + εwϕ) and Θ ≡ 1−α1−α+αεp , ∆t ≡ [vari pt(i); varikt(i); covi(pt(i), kt(i))] and
w ≡ [ 12 εΘ ; 12 α1−α ; αε1−α ].
Now, using (C.2) and recalling that γi =
αβδ
ϑ
,
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
γîit − α̂kt) = ∞∑
t=0
βt
α
ϑ
(
β̂kt+1 − k̂t)
= −α
ϑ
k0
which is a term independent of policy, so that, as I sum the period-by-period utilities, I can cancel
out the linear terms in [̂it, k̂t].
Next, under the small distortions assumption that Φ times second-order terms is of order higher
than two,82
⇒ Φŷt − Φα̂kt − 12
[
εp
Θ
vari pt(i) + Υvar jwt( j)
]
− 12×
×
[(
σ
γc
− 1
)̂
y2t +
(
γi
η
+
σγ2i
γcη2
)
q2t +
(
γi +
σγ2i
γc
)̂
k2t − 2σγiγcη ŷtqt − 2
σγi
γc
ŷt̂kt + 2
σγ2i
γcη
qt̂kt+
+
1+ϕ
1−α ŷ
2
t +
(1+ϕ)α2
1−α k̂
2
t − 2 (1+ϕ)α1−α ŷt̂kt − 2̂yt 1+ϕ1−αat + 2αk̂t 1+ϕ1−αat
]
81By ‘⇒’ I mean that I disregard both terms independent of policy, and terms of order higher than two.
82See Woodford (2003, 383-92) for a comment on this assumption.
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I focus now on the last two rows of the last expression, which is what I want to express in terms
of gaps. Let the output gap with respect to the efficient economy y˜t ≡ ŷt − ŷet ≡ (yt − yet ) − (yn − ye),
the marginal Q gap q˜t ≡ qt − qet and the capital gap k˜t ≡ k̂t − k̂et .83
I next add and subtract the quantities needed to make gaps appear, and use (C.8) to substitute
out 1+ϕ1−αat:
⇒
[(
σ
γc
− 1 + 1+ϕ1−α
)
(̂y2t − 2̂yt̂yet ) +
(
γi
η
+
σγ2i
γcη2
)
(q2t − 2qtqet )
+
(
γi +
σγ2i
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α2
1−α
)
(̂k2t − 2̂kt̂ket ) − 2σγiγcη (̂ytqt − ŷtqet − qt̂yet )
−2
(
σγi
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α
1−α
)
(̂yt̂kt − ŷt̂ket − k̂t̂yet ) + 2σγ
2
i
γcη
(qt̂kt − qt̂ket − k̂tqet )
]
+
[
2
(
σ
γc
− 1 + 1+ϕ1−α
)̂
yt̂yet + 2
(
γi
η
+
σγ2i
γcη2
)
qtqet + 2
(
γi +
σγ2i
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α2
1−α
)̂
kt̂ket − 2σγiγcη ŷtqet
−2σγi
γcη
qt̂yet − 2
(
σγi
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α
1−α
)̂
yt̂ket − 2
(
σγi
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α
1−α
)̂
kt̂yet + 2
σγ2i
γcη
qt̂ket + 2
σγ2i
γcη
k̂tqet
]
+
[
− 2
(
σ
γc
− 1 + 1+ϕ1−α
)̂
yt̂yet + 2
σγi
γcη
ŷtqet + 2
(
σγi
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α
1−α
)̂
yt̂ket
+2
(
σ
γc
− 1 + 1+ϕ1−α
)
α̂kt̂yet − 2σγiγcη α̂ktqet − 2
(
σγi
γc
+
(1+ϕ)α
1−α
)
α̂kt̂ket
]
Some terms in the last four rows wipe each other out. After straightforward simplification,[
Ξy˜y2t + Ξqq˜
2
t + Ξk˜k
2
t − 2Ξyq˜ytq˜t − 2Ξyky˜t˜kt + 2Ξqkq˜t˜kt
]
+2qt
[(
γi
η
+
σγ2i
γcη2
)
qet − σγiγcη ŷet +
σγ2i
γcη
k̂et
]
+2̂kt
[(
σγ2i
γcη
− σγiα
γcη
)
qet −
(
σγi
γc
− σα
γc
+ α
)̂
yet +
(
γi +
σγ2i
γc
− σγiα
γc
)̂
ket
]
≡
[
Ξy˜y2t + Ξqq˜
2
t + Ξk˜k
2
t − 2Ξyq˜ytq˜t − 2Ξyky˜t˜kt + 2Ξqkq˜t˜kt
]
+ 2qtζq,t + 2̂ktζk,t
Next,
ζq,t =
γi
η
q̂et + Ξyq
[γi
η
q̂et − ŷet + γîket
]
=
γi
η
q̂et − Ξyqγĉcet
=
γi
η
(̂qet − σ̂cet )
ζk,t = (γi − α)σ
γc
(
γîket − ŷet +
γi
η
q̂et
)
+ γîket − α̂yet
= γi(̂kt − σ̂cet ) − α(̂yet − σ̂cet )
83Note that y˜2t = (̂y
2
t − ŷet )2 ⇐ ŷt − 2̂yt̂yet , q˜2t ⇐ (q2t − 2qtqet ) and k˜2t ⇐ (̂k2t − 2̂kt̂ket ); also, y˜tq˜t ⇐ (̂ytqt − ŷtqet − qt̂yet ),
k˜tq˜t ⇐ (̂ktqt − k̂tqet − qt̂ket ), and y˜t̂kt ⇐ (̂yt̂kt − ŷt̂ket − k̂t̂yet ).
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so that,
2qtζq,t + 2̂ktζq,t = 2
γi
η
qt[qet − σ̂cet ] + 2γîkt [̂ket − σ̂cet ] − 2α̂kt [̂yet − σ̂cet ]
= 2(α̂kt − γîit)σ̂cet + 2
γi
η
qtqet + 2γîkt̂k
e
t − 2α̂kt̂yet
Now, note that the intertemporal optimality conditions (C.2) and (C.5) imply that
∞∑
t=0
βt(α̂kt − γîit)σ̂cet =
∞∑
t=0
βt
α
ϑ
(̂kt − β̂kt+1)σ̂cet
⇒ α
ϑ
∞∑
t=1
βt̂ktσ∆̂cet
=
α
ϑ
∞∑
t=1
βt̂kt[ϑm̂pk
e
t + βq̂
e
t − q̂et−1]
Plugging this expression into the discounted sum
∑∞
t=0 2[qtζq,t + k̂tζk,t], I get
2
∑∞
t=0 β
t[qtζq,t + k̂tζk,t] =
= 2
∑∞
t=0 β
t[γi
η
qtqet + γîkt̂k
e
t − α̂kt̂yet − (γi − α)ktσcet − γi(̂it − kt)σcet
]
= 2
∑∞
t=0 β
t[α
ϑ
k̂t(ϑ̂yet − ϑ̂ket + βqet − qet−1) + γiη qtqet + γîkt̂ket − α̂kt̂yet
]
⇒ 2 ∑∞t=0 βt[α̂kt̂yet − α̂kt̂ket + αβϑ k̂tqet − αβϑ k̂t+1qet + γiη qtqet + γîkt̂ket − α̂kt̂yet ]
= 2
∑∞
t=0 β
t[(γi − α)̂kt̂ket + (γiη qt − γiδ ∆̂kt+1)qet ]
= 2(γi − α) ∑∞t=0 βt̂kt̂ket
⇒ −2αβ
ϑ
∑∞
t=0 β
t (̂kt+1̂ket+1 − k̂t̂ket )
where I used the facts that αβ
ϑ
=
γi
δ
, ∆̂kt+1 = δ(̂it − k̂t) = δηqt, and that γi − α = −α(1−β)ϑ . Now,
by stationarity of k̂t and k̂et ,
∑∞
t=0 β
t(E[̂kt+1̂ket+1] − E[̂kt̂ket ]) = 0, so that the last term has zero
unconditional expectation, so that it does not appear in L.
I can thus compute the discounted sum of losses, applying lemma 9, to end up with the
expressions for W0 and L.
I next follow Sveen and Weinke (2009) in deriving the relationship between the dispersion term
∆t and inflation, both under firm-specific capital accumulation and under a rental market for capital
services.
Lemma 9. Firm-specific capital Up to a second-order approximation, Sveen and Weinke (2009)
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show how
∆
p
t = θp∆
p
t−1 + (1 − θp)ψ1∆kt +
θp
1 − θppi
2
t
∆kt = ψ
2
2∆
k
t−1 + ψ
2
3∆
p
t−1
∆
pk
t = θpψ2∆
pk
t−1 + θpψ3∆
p
t−1 + (1 − θp)ψ1∆kt
I can represent this system of equations in equivalent vector notation,1 −(1 − θp)ψ
2
1 0
0 1 0
0 −(1 − θp)ψ1 1
 ∆t =
 θp 0 0ψ23 ψ22 0
θpψ3 0 θpψ2
 ∆t−1 +

θp
1−θp
0
0
 pi2t ⇔ B∆∆t = A∆∆t−1 + C∆pi2t
which allows me to express the discounted sum of the dispersion term in welfare as
∞∑
t=0
βtw′∆t =
∞∑
t=0
βtw′
t−1∑
h=0
(B−1∆ A∆)
hB−1∆ C∆pi
2
t−h + t.i.p.
=
∞∑
t=1
βtw′∆t =
1
2
Ξppi
2
t + t.i.p.
where Ξp ≡ w′[B∆ − βA∆]−1C∆.
Rental market When firms purchase capital services on a competitive rental market, we have
yt(i) = kt(i) and therefore ∆
y
t = ∆
k
t = ∆
yk
t = ε
2∆
p
t . The recursive formulation for the cross-sectional
dispersion of prices becomes (Woodford, 2003)
∆
p
t = θp∆
p
t−1 +
θp
1 − θppi
2
t
because there is no dispersion in p∗t (i). Therefore, the dispersion component in the welfare loss
measure is
∞∑
t=0
βtw′∆t =
ε
2
∞∑
t=0
βt∆
p
t
=
1
2
εpθp
(1 − θp)(1 − βθp)
∞∑
t=1
βtpi2t + t.i.p.
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H. Optimal monetary policy
I focus on the New Keynesian Q model with sticky prices and an exogenous cost-push distur-
bance.
H.1. The linear rational expectations model
Consider the quadruplet [(E.16),(E.17),(E.18),(E.21)]:
pit = βEtpit+1 + λpΞy˜yt − λpΞyqq˜t − λpΞyk˜kt + ut (H.1)
Λq˜t = βΛEtq˜t+1 + Ψy˜t − βΩEt˜yt+1 − ϑ(1 + Ξyk )˜kt+1 + ϑ
λp
Etut+1 (H.2)
k˜t+1 =
δ
η
q˜t + k˜t (H.3)
i ft = r
f ,e
t − Ψy˜t − (1 − Λ)˜qt + Etpit+1 + ΨEt˜yt+1 − ΞyqEtq˜t+1 (H.4)
where Λ ≡ 1 + Ξyq(1 − δ), Ψ ≡ σγc and Ω ≡ β−1
(
Ψ − ϑ(1 + Ξy)).
Next, write the quadruplet [(H.1),(H.2),(H.3),(H.4)] and the law of motion for the cost-push
disturbance (E.22) as the linear rational expectations model
ρu 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 δ
η
0
−1 λpΞyk 1 λpΞyq −λpΞy
0 0 0 Λ −Ψ
0 0 0 1 − Λ Ψ


ut
k˜t
pit
q˜t
y˜t

=
=

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 β 0 0
ϑ
λp
−ϑ(1 + Ξyk) 0 βΛ −βΩ
0 0 1 −Ξyq Ψ

Et

ut+1
k˜t+1
pit+1
q˜t+1
y˜t+1

+

0
0
0
0
−1
 (i
f
t − r f ,et )
(H.5)
This is the structural form of the model solution. We next have to specify an equation for
monetary policy to close the model.
H.2. Optimal monetary policy under commitment (second best)
The policymaker can determine the best feasible dynamics for the variables under full commit-
ment by choosing the stochastic processes {pit, q˜t, y˜t, k˜t+1, t ≥ 0} to
max
{pit},{˜qt},{˜yt},{˜kt+1}
Wt s.t. (H.1), (H.2), (H.3)
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i.e. to
max
{γt},{ϕt},{νt}≥0
min
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
{
− Φy˜t + 12Ξy˜y2t + 12Ξqq˜2t − Ξyq˜ytq˜t + 12Ξppi2t +
+αΦk˜t + 12Ξk˜k
2
t − Ξyky˜t˜kt + Ξqkq˜t˜kt+
+γt
[
pit + λpΞyqq˜t − λpΞy˜yt − βpit+1 + λpΞyk˜kt − ut]+
+ϕt
[
Λq˜t − Ψy˜t − βΛq˜t+1 + βΩy˜t+1 + ϑ(1 + Ξyk )˜kt+1 − ϑλp Etut+1
]
+
+νt[ δη q˜t + k˜t − k˜t+1]
}
The FOCs for an interior optimum, along with (H.1), (H.2) and (H.3), are
νt = αβΦ + βΞk˜kt+1 + ϑ(1 + Ξyk)ϕt + βλpΞykEtγt+1 + βEtνt+1 + βΞqkEtq˜t+1 − βΞykEt˜yt+1
−γt = Ξppit − γt−1
Ξqk˜kt + Ξqq˜t − Ξyq˜yt − Λϕt−1 + δηνt = −λpΞyqγt − Λϕt
−Ξyk˜kt − Ξyqq˜t + Ξy˜yt + Ωϕt−1 = Φ + λpΞyγt + Ψϕt
(H.6)
I can write (H.1), (H.2), (H.3) and (H.6) as the linear rational expectations model
ρu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 δ
η
0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
−1 λpΞyk 0 0 0 0 1 λpΞyq −λpΞy
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Λ −Ψ
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 Ξp 0 0
0 Ξqk 0 −Λ 0 δη 0 Ξq −Ξyq
0 −Ξyk 0 Ω 0 0 0 −Ξyq Ξy


ut
k˜t
γt−1
ϕt−1
γt
νt
pit
q˜t
y˜t

=

0
0
0
0
0
αβΦ
0
0
Φ

+
+

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 β 0 0
ϑ
λp
−ϑ(1 + Ξyk) 0 0 0 0 0 βΛ −βΩ
0 βΞk 0 ϑ(1 + Ξyk) βλpΞyk β 0 βΞqk −βΞyk
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −λpΞyq −Λ 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 λpΞy Ψ 0 0 0 0 0

Et

ut+1
k˜t+1
γt
ϕt
γt+1
νt+1
pit+1
q˜t+1
y˜t+1

or, identically,
BcYt = AcEtYt+1 + Cc
The system has five nonpredetermined, [pit+1, q˜t+1, y˜t+1, γt+1, νt+1], and four predetermined vari-
ables, [ut+1, k˜t+1, γt, ϕt], with initial conditions γ−1 = ϕ−1 = k˜0 = u0 = 0.
I solve the system with the algorithm in Klein (2000). As shown by Blanchard and Kahn (1980),
if the matrix B−1c Ac has five eigenvalues inside and four outside the unit circle, then its solution is
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unique, and has reduced form
γ∗ct
ν∗ct
pi∗ct
q˜∗ct
y˜∗ct
 = G
c
0 + G
c
1

ut
k˜t
γt−1
ϕt−1


ut+1
k˜∗ct+1
γ∗ct
ϕ∗ct
 =

0
Hc0,2
Hc0,3
Hc0,4
 +

ρu 0 0 0
Hc1,21 H
c
1,22 H
c
1,23 H
c
1,24
Hc1,31 H
c
1,32 H
c
1,33 H
c
1,34
Hc1,41 H
c
1,42 H
c
1,43 H
c
1,44


ut
k˜t
γt−1
ϕt−1
 +

1
0
0
0
 εut+1
(H.7)
which allows me to study the responses of the variables to a cost-push shock and compute the
welfare criterion (G.1) for the optimal monetary policy under commitment.
Assuming the determinacy of (H.7)—which holds under the baseline calibration—we can next
rearrange (H.6) to substitute out all Lagrange multipliers. We thus get the targeting rule under
commitment that implements second best, which links the endogenous variables as
0 = Ξp
(
1 + λp
ΞyΛ−ΞyqΩ
Ξy(Γ−Λ)+Ξyq(Ω−Ψ) (1 − L)
)
pit
+
βδΞqk
η
(Ψ −ΩL)(1 − L)Etq˜t+1 −
( ΞyqΓ−Ψ(Ξq+ βδ2
η2
Ξk)
Ξy(Γ−Λ)+Ξyq(Ω−Ψ) −
ΞyqΛ−Ω(Ξq+ βδ
2
η2
Ξk)
Ξy(Γ−Λ)+Ξyq(Ω−Ψ) L
)
(1 − L)˜qt
−βδΞyk
η
(Ψ −ΩL)(1 − L)Et˜yt+1 +
(
ΞyΓ−ΞyqΨ
Ξy(Γ−Λ)+Ξyq(Ω−Ψ) −
ΞyΛ−ΞyqΩ
Ξy(Γ−Λ)+Ξyq(Ω−Ψ) L
)
(1 − L)˜yt
−
( ΞykΓ−Ψ(Ξqk+ βδη Ξk)
Ξy(Γ−Λ)+Ξyq(Ω−Ψ) −
ΞykΛ−Ω(Ξqk+ βδη Ξk)
Ξy(Γ−Λ)+Ξyq(Ω−Ψ) L
)
(1 − L)˜kt
(H.8)
where L is the lag operator, that lags also the conditional expectation operator, and Γ ≡ Λ + δϑ
η
(1 +
Ξyk).
We can also implement second best with an interest-rate rule. Two examples are the fundamentals-
based and the expectations-based interest-rate rules of Evans and Honkapohja (2003, 2006) and
Woodford (2003, 527-33).
H.2.1. Fundamentals-based interest-rate rule
Using the reduced form (H.7), I can express the interest rate in (H.4) in terms of ut, k˜t, γt−1, ϕt−1.
This is the fundamentals-based interest-rate rule, which is consistent with the solution (H.7). How-
ever, this interest-rate rule may well be consistent with other solutions, as the rational expectations
model under the fundamentals-based interest-rate rule may be indetermined. Indeed, under the
baseline calibration the system has multiple solutions.
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H.2.2. Expectations-based interest-rate rule
Invert (H.5) as
ut
k˜t
pit
q˜t
y˜t

=

ρu 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 δ
η
0
−1 λpΞyk 1 λpΞyq −λpΞy
0 0 0 Λ −Ψ
0 0 0 1 − Λ Ψ

−1 
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 β 0 0
ϑ
λp
−ϑ(1 + Ξyk) 0 βΛ −βΩ
0 0 1 −Ξyq Ψ

Et

ut+1
k˜t+1
pit+1
q˜t+1
y˜t+1

+

ρu 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 δ
η
0
−1 λpΞyk 1 λpΞyq −λpΞy
0 0 0 Λ −Ψ
0 0 0 1 − Λ Ψ

−1 
0
0
0
0
−1
 (i
f
t − r f ,et )
(H.9)
Then, plug the expressions for [˜kt, pit, y˜t, q˜t] of (H.9) into the targeting rule (H.8) and solve for
i ft , to find the expectations-based interest-rate rule. This rule implements the optimal monetary
policy under commitment and by construction leads the system to determinacy.
Proof. By construction, this interest-rate rule, once combined with [(H.1),(H.2),(H.3),(H.4)], im-
plies that the targeting rule, in the structural form (H.8), holds at all periods. And I already know
that the targeting rule, combined with (H.1), (H.2) and (H.3), yields the solution (H.7).
H.2.3. Optimal monetary policy under commitment, naı¨ve welfare criterion
If the central bank used the naı¨ve inflation-output welfare criterion Φy˜t − 12Ξy˜y2t − 12Ξppi2t , the
system it would consider is
ρu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 δ
η
0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
−1 λpΞyk 0 0 0 0 1 λpΞyq −λpΞy
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Λ −Ψ
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 Ξp 0 0
0 0 0 −Λ 0 δ
η
0 0 0
0 0 0 Ω 0 0 0 0 Ξy


ut
k˜t
γt−1
ϕt−1
γt
νt
pit
q˜t
y˜t

=
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=
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Φ

+

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 β 0 0
ϑ
λp
−ϑ(1 + Ξyk) 0 0 0 0 0 βΛ −βΩ
0 0 0 ϑ(1 + Ξyk) βλpΞyk β 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −λpΞyq −Λ 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 λpΞy Ψ 0 0 0 0 0

Et

ut+1
k˜t+1
γt
ϕt
γt+1
νt+1
pit+1
q˜t+1
y˜t+1

H.3. Optimal monetary policy under discretion
The policymaker operating under discretion can determine the best feasible dynamics for the
variables by choosing the random variables {pit, q˜t, y˜t, k˜t+1} to
max
pit ,˜qt ,˜yt ,˜kt+1
Wt s.t. (H.1), (H.2), (H.3)
i.e. to
max
[γ,ϕ,ν]≥0
min
−Φy˜t + 12Ξy˜y2t + 12Ξqq˜2t − Ξyq˜ytq˜t + 12Ξppi2t
+αβΦk˜t+1 + 12βΞk˜k
2
t+1 − Ξyky˜t˜kt − βΞyk˜kt+1Et˜yt+1 + Ξqkq˜t˜kt + βΞqk˜kt+1Etq˜t+1
+γ[pit + λpΞyqq˜t − λpΞy˜yt − βEtpit+1 + λpΞyk˜kt − ut]
+ϕ[Λq˜t − Ψy˜t − βΛEtq˜t+1 + βΩEt˜yt+1 + ϑ(1 + Ξyk )˜kt+1 − ϑλp Etut+1]
+ν[ δ
η
q˜t + k˜t − k˜t+1]
The FOC for an interior optimum, along with (H.1), (H.2) and (H.3), is
−(ΞykΓ − ΞqkΨ)˜kt + λpΞp(ΞyΓ − ΞyqΨ)pit − (ΞyqΓ − ΞqΨ)˜qt + (ΞyΓ − ΞyqΨ)˜yt =
=
(
Γ − αβδ
η
Ψ
)
Φ − βδΞkΨ
η
k˜t+1 − βδΞqkΨη Etq˜t+1 + βδΞykΨη Et˜yt+1
(H.10)
Equation (H.10) can be interpreted as a targeting rule for the output gap.
I can now write (E.22), (H.1), (H.2), (H.3) and (H.10) as the linear rational expectations model
ρu 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 δ
η
0
−1 λpΞyk 1 λpΞyq −λpΞy
0 0 0 Λ −Ψ
0 −(ΞykΓ − ΞqkΨ) λpΞp(ΞyΓ − ΞyqΨ) −(ΞyqΓ − ΞqΨ) ΞyΓ − ΞyqΨ


ut
k˜t
pit
q˜t
y˜t

=
=

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 β 0 0
ϑ
λp
−ϑ(1 + Ξyk) 0 βΛ −βΩ
0 −βδΞkΨ
η
0 −βδ
η
ΞqkΨ
βδ
η
ΞykΨ

Et

ut+1
k˜t+1
pit+1
q˜t+1
y˜t+1

+
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0
0
0
0(
Γ − αβδ
η
Ψ
)
Φ

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or, identically,
BdYt = AdEtYt+1 + Cd
which is a system with three nonpredetermined, [pit+1, q˜t+1, y˜t+1], and two predetermined variables,
ut+1, k˜t+1, with initial condition k˜0 = u0 = 0. I solve the system with the algorithm in Klein (2000).
As shown by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), if the matrix B−1d Ad has three eigenvalues inside and two
outside the unit circle, then the solution is unique, and has reduced formpi
∗d
t
q˜∗dt
y˜∗dt
 = Gd0 + Gd1
[
ut
k˜t
]
[
ut+1
k˜∗dt+1
]
=
[
0
Hd0,2
]
+
[
ρu 0
Hd1,21 H
d
1,22
] [
ut
k˜t
]
+
[
1
0
]
εut+1
which allows me to study the responses of the variables to a cost-push shock and compute the
welfare criterion (G.1) for the optimal monetary policy under discretion.
H.3.1. Optimal monetary policy under discretion, naı¨ve welfare criterion
If the central bank used the naı¨ve inflation-output welfare criterion Φy˜t − 12Ξy˜y2t − 12Ξppi2t , the
system it would consider is
ρu 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 δ
η
0
−1 λpΞyk 1 λpΞyq −λpΞy
0 0 0 Λ −Ψ
0 0 λpΞp(ΞyΓ − ΞyqΨ) 0 ΞyΓ
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=
=
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0 1 0 0 0
0 0 β 0 0
ϑ
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0 0 0 0 0
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H.4. Divine coincidence
Consider the family of Taylor rules
i ft = r
f ,e
t + φpipit
Then, (H.5) becomes
ρu 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 δ
η
0
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0 0 φpi 1 − Λ Ψ
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or, identically,
BpiYt = ApiEtYt+1
which is a system with three nonpredetermined, [pit+1, q˜t+1, y˜t+1], and two predetermined variables,
ut+1, k˜t+1, with initial condition k˜0 = u0 = 0. As shown by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), if the matrix
B−1pi Api has three eigenvalues inside and two outside the unit circle, then the solution is unique, and
has reduced form pi
∗
t
q˜∗t
y˜∗t
 = G0 + G1
[
ut
k˜t
]
[
ut+1
k˜∗t+1
]
=
[
0
H0,2
]
+
[
ρu 0
H1,21 H1,22
] [
ut
k˜t
]
+
[
1
0
]
εut+1
Suppose that εu,t = 0 at all t. Then, since k˜0 = 0, and as long as the matrix B−1pi Api is stable, the
unique reduced form solution of the model is pi∗t = q˜
∗
t = y˜
∗
t = k˜
∗
t+1 = 0 at all t. What Blanchard and
Galı´ (2007) dub ‘divine coincidence’ thus holds in the particular case of εu,t = 0 at all t.
I. Simple interest-rate rules
I consider the simple generalized Taylor rules
i ft = ρ + φpipit + φqqt ≡ r f ,et + φpipit + φsq˜t + vt
i ft = ρ + φpipit + φq ŝt ≡ r f ,et + φpipit + φs s˜t + vt (I.1)
with the implementation disturbance vt = −̂ret + φsqet , where I used set = qet .
To plug (I.1) into the linear rational expectations model (H.5), I have to insert equation (F.2)
and a law of motion for vt in (H.5).
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